I concur that the proffer as to appellant’s evidence of lack of causation, i.e., that appellee’s criminal conduct was caused by the need for funds to support a cocaine habit rather than the alleged sexual abuse, was insufficient.
I do not concur, however, with certain discussions in the other concurrence relating to that proffer. As I perceive it, the basis for that discussion is that the proffer would not, even if sufficiently made, relieve “[Shpak] from liability.” I disagree. While the evidence was inconsistent with the claims made by Schertle, I fail to see how it is inconsistent with Shpak’s position.
This was a civil case. As I understand the jury’s verdict, it found for the appellee on the second count of the amended complaint, battery, and on the third count, intentional infliction of emotional distress. It has long been established that:
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the particular consequence for which a pecuniary finding is sought is the direct result of a wrongful act ... by the defendant.
Symington v. Graham, 165 Md. 441, 449, 169 A. 316 (1933) (emphasis added). As I view the evidence, it overwhelmingly indicated that appellant had sexually abused the appellee. Nevertheless, as I perceive the defense’s case, Shpak sought to introduce the evidence as to cocaine usage not to prove that the sexual abuse did not occur, but to establish that even if it *231had occurred, the damage alleged by Schertle was not caused by the sexual abuse, but instead resulted from her need to finance her cocaine use. Had I been a juror and had the cocaine evidence been admitted, I may well have thought that this defense theory was indeed a “red herring.” But, it may very well have been to the actual jurors both relevant and probative as to Shpak’s “lack of causation” defense. Appellant was not attempting to establish a relationship between the sexual abuse and appellee’s criminal acts, but was trying to establish that the criminal acts of appellee were caused by something other than the alleged abuse. Shpak was attacking the relationship between the alleged abuse and the criminal conduct by offering a different cause for the subsequent conduct. Appellant was offering this evidence to counter the wealth of evidence presented by Dr. Spodak that the sexual abuse caused Schertle’s later criminal conduct. While I agree that the evidence, especially that of Dr. Spodak, supporting Schertle’s position that her later criminality was caused by the early sexual abuse is strong, I cannot agree that evidence to the contrary, had it been admitted, would have been “all but irrelevant.” It may have or it may not have been depending upon its weight and the credibility of those who might have presented it. I also see nothing inconsistent with a civil defendant’s attempt to prove that the damages incurred by the plaintiff did not result from the defendant’s wrongful acts.
Additionally, I do not agree that a causation challenge, such as that sought to be made by appellant, would be limited only to “calculating” damages. If Schertle’s criminality was caused by a factor other than the sexual abuse, i.e., the financing of a cocaine habit, then, to the extent her damages are based on her criminality, she would not be entitled to recover unless the cocaine use itself could be connected to the abuse.
I find it necessary to comment further. While the “bothering” of an appellate judge is normally of little consequence or importance, I note that it is bothersome to contemplate the tens of thousands of men and women who are or have been imprisoned as a result of criminal conduct that they, or others, believe was caused or influenced by factors that occurred *232during their formative years. The appellee’s theory of her case, condensed to its operative mode, is: I committed criminal acts as a result of sexual victimization as a child. Thus, I have a cause of action for which my damage is to be compensation for the penalty, imprisonment, I paid as an adult for these criminal acts. As stated in the other concurrence, “the true issue in the case, ... was that Shpak’s sexual abuse of Schertle over a period of nine years caused her dysfunctional criminal behavior.” Concurring opinion, Bell, J., 97 Md.App. at 229, 629 A.2d at 775.
With increasing frequency, suits and other proceedings are being brought based upon sexual offenses allegedly occurring years, sometimes decades, earlier. These litigants in many instances rightfully seek and are able to prove damages for physical injury and emotional distress imposed upon them by a parent’s or a stepparent’s abuse. Appellee, in the case sub judice, goes a step further. She attempts to recover damages based in part on the punishment received for her criminal acts on the theory that what occurred in her childhood caused her to behave criminally. This is, as far as I am aware, a unique case of first impression.
I suggest that we should at least hesitate in considering the balancing of causes and defenses when contemplating a decision that may be cited as authority, not only for sex abuse causation, but for other character affecting conduct that may have occurred during a criminal’s formative years. For instance, may alcoholic parents or stepparents, battling parents, corporal punishment parents, or neglectful parents be sued by their adult criminal children and be required to compensate their children for the punishment that the children receive for their criminal acts? May the State be sued by prisoners for allowing the poverty that everyone agrees is one of the causative factors of crime? May school boards and teachers be sued when lack of education is a causative factor in criminal conduct? As I understand the literature, those parental and societal factors, and many others, may influence the later criminal conduct of the children of such parents and victims of such societal problems. Where does it end?
*233Appellant did not adequately raise the very viability of suits such as the one sub judice. Thus, the viability of permitting criminals to sue parents and others for damages based upon the criminal penalties paid by them is not directly at issue before us. I would suggest, however, that serious public policy considerations may exist when legislatively created penalties are subsequently assuaged by money damages. I note that not every victim of sexual abuse later commits criminal acts, nor does every sex abuse victim that later commits criminal acts do so because of the prior abuse. To permit damages to incorporate, directly or indirectly, compensation to the criminal for the penalties imposed on her or him not only dilutes the punishment, but diverts responsibility away from the criminal and reduces the element of choice inherent in choosing to commit a criminal act.
In cases such as the one sub judice, that may be brought by criminals against those allegedly causing their criminalization,1 there are, as I see it, two primary defenses: (1) The acts were not committed; and/or (2) the later criminal conduct was not caused by the alleged acts even if they were committed. The language used in the other concurrence would, as I see it, inappropriately limit the ability of a defendant to challenge the evidence offered by the plaintiff to link the conduct occurring during childhood to the damage alleged — criminalization. That evidence discussed as not being relevant and as being inconsistent is, in my view, completely relevant to, and entirely consistent with one of the defenses, i.e., lack of causation. Had the proffer been sufficient, I would have voted to reverse.
. While the torts of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not new, I respectfully suggest that the theory that a criminal may be compensated for her criminality if she can establish a causal connection between it and the earlier torts is a new theory.