Thompson v. City of Long Beach

CARTER, J.

I concur.

I agree that this case presents, primarily, a question concerning conflicting evidence and that the resolution of that conflict was a matter for the trier of fact whose determination must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in support thereof, and that there is here sufficient evidence to support that determination. This is a well established rule in our jurisprudence and one which I firmly believe should be followed although a majority of this court has not always seen fit to do so, preferring, instead, oftentimes to reweigh *247the evidence and make its own determination. (See, among others: Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 663] ; Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 656 [255 P.2d 431] ; Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal.2d 179 [253 P.2d 10] ; Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192 [253 P.2d 18] ; Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139 [251 P.2d 975] ; Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955] ; Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224 [253 P.2d 441] ; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 254 [253 P.2d 447] ; Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207 [253 P.2d 1] ; Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823 [256 P.2d 933] ; Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799 [256 P.2d 962] ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778 [256 P.2d 947] ; Turner v. Mellon, ante, p. 45 [257 P.2d 15] ; Barrett v. City of Claremont, ante, p. 70 [256 P.2d 977].)

It is my opinion that the rule here announced with reference to the medical testimony is inconsistent with that announced in Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [234 P.2d 34], We are here concerned with a malady of the eyes. The majority says “Appellant made no objection to the competency of the four doctors who testified at the board proceedings on behalf of the city. Their experience in the medical profession ranged from 12 to 50 years. While they were general practitioners rather than eye specialists, this fact did not affect their competency but only went to the weight to be accorded their testimony. (Cases anno: 54 A.L.R. 860, 861.) Manifestly, the qualification of the general practitioners to testify as expert witnesses concerning appellant’s admitted visual defects and the effect of such defects on appellant’s ability to satisfactorily perform her work had no relation to their familiarity with the standards of care required in the treatment of eye conditions.” In the Huffman case, a majority of this court said: “A medical expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the Standards required of physicians under similar circumstances.” (Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 478 [234 P.2d 34].) A majority of this court now seek to distinguish the Huffman case by stating that it was there declared that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining an objection to the qualification of an autopsy surgeon to “testify as an expert with regard to the question of whether defendant doctor had exercised the proper and *248requisite degree of skill and care.” As I understand it, no question was raised concerning the treatment of eye conditions ; the question centers upon appellant ⅛ ability to do her work with her limited eyesight. Surely, the standards applied by eye specialists in making such a determination would be a major factor in determining the competency of expert witnesses and so it was said in the Huffman case: “A medical expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the standards required of physicians under similar circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) The majority makes no attempt to distinguish this holding in the Huffman case from its contrary holding here. Certainly the eyes are considered in the medical profession as a matter for specialization. The loss of vision, or percentage of loss, is within the specialized medical field of eye, ear, nose and throat diseases and maladies. But the majority here holds that in accepting the testimony of the general practitioners ‘‘and rejecting the contrary opinions of the specialists, the board exercised its fact-finding powers in the determination of conflicting evidence.” Inasmuch as appellant made no objection to the general practitioners testifying as experts in an expert’s field, probably that statement is correct. However, the statement in the majority opinion here to the effect that the familiarity of the general practitioners with the standards of care required of specialists had no relation to their qualification as expert witnesses is most certainly not in accord with the statement made in the majority opinion in Huffman v. Lindquist, supra, 37 Cal.2d 465. Of course, the holding in the Huffman case barred plaintiff from recovering and the holding here, although in conflict with Huffman, does the same thing.

SCHAUER, J.

It is my view that the findings of the local board are not supported,1‘by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c)), that petitioner was not legally discharged, and that conse-, quently she retains her civil service status and the right to receive salary until such time as she resigns or a legal discharge is effected.

For further discussion,' which to me appears adequate and impelling to the conclusions reached, reference is made to the opinion of the District Court of Appeal (reported at 250 P.2d 312, 319-323), authored by Justice Vallée and concurred in by Presiding Justice Shinn and Justice Wood *249(Parker). For the reasons therein and hereinabove stated I would reverse the judgment with directions as stated by the District Court of Appeal.

Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 1953.