dissenting in part.
I believe it is of particular significance that Sweiven participated in the discussion of and voted for Ordinance 92-18. As the court observes, this ordinance does not directly affect all of Homer, or even a large segment of the City or an entire class of its citizens. More particularly, the ordinance directly affects only thirteen lots, including Sweiven’s own, out of approximately 500 lots located within the Central Business District. The record further reveals Sweiven’s belief that Ordinance 92-18 would increase the value of his property. Indeed Sweiven explicitly stated that “[the proposal] would increase the tax base and property values” of the area when recommending the Limited Rezone to the planning commission.1
Based on the foregoing, the court correctly concludes that “Sweiven had a ‘substantial financial interest’ within the meaning of HCC 1.12.010(a)[2] in a reclassification which would increase the permissible uses of his property.... The superior court’s finding that Sweiven did not have a disqualifying conflict of interest is clearly erroneous.” Op. at 25,28.
My disagreement with the court’s opinion goes to its discussion of the effect of Sweiven’s conflict of interest and the appropriate remedy given the factual context of this ease. Central to my differing analysis are the provisions of the Homer City ordinances which address the subject of conflict of interest. In my view, the court’s analysis ignores that part of the Homer Municipal Code 1.12.030, which states:
A City Councilmember or Mayor with a conflict of interest under section 1.12.020 shall so declare to the body as a whole and ask to be excused from voting on the matter. However, a City Councilmember or Mayor with a conflict of interest, regardless of whether excused from voting, shall not be allowed to participate in discussion about the matter. (Ord.92-49(A) § 4, 1992; Ord. 86-22(S) § Kpart), 1986).[3]
The City of Homer, as expressed in section 1.12.030 of its Code, has adopted a policy which flatly contradicts the court’s statement that
[t]he vote and participation of a conflicted member will not invariably alter the votes of other members or affect the merits of the council’s decision. This is especially true if the conflict is disclosed or well known, allowing other members to assess the merits of the conflicted member’s comments in light of his or her interest.
Regardless of the wisdom of the City of Homer’s legislative enactment barring con*1032flicted council members’ participation in decisions,4 the fact remains that the City of Homer has expressly adopted a rule specifically prohibiting conflicted council members from taking part in discussion or voting on the matter of interest. In fact, the prohibition on discussion is more stringent than the rule on voting — even when the “Mayor or other presiding officer” decides that the member need not be excused from voting, and even when the council chooses not to override that decision by a simple majority vote, the member is nonetheless forbidden to participate in the discussion.
The rule adopted by the court pays no heed to this participation ban contained in the City of Homer’s municipal code. The portions of the court’s rule which conflict with the express non-participation policy of HCC 1.12.030 are the following:
If the interest is undisclosed, the ordinance will generally be invalid; it can stand only i/the magnitude of the member’s interest, and the extent of his or her participation, are minimal. If the interest is disclosed, the ordinance will be valid unless the member’s interest and participation are so great as to create an intolerable appearance of impropriety.
(Emphasis added.) In short, the court’s rule would permit a conflicted council member to participate in the discussion of a matter before the body responsible for official action in cases where the conflicting interest has been disclosed, or where the conflicting interest is undisclosed and the conflicted member’s participation does not create an intolerable appearance of impropriety.
Although the court’s formulation might well be adopted as a general rule, I think it inappropriate to do so in the face of an ordinance completely prohibiting participation by any city council member with a substantial conflicting interest in the subject matter of a proposed ordinance. In this regard, it is noteworthy that HCC 1.12.030 is not couched in terms of de minimis levels of participation. On the contrary, it imposes a complete ban on the conflicted member’s participation.
Given the participation ban imposed by HCC 1.12.030, Sweiven’s conflict generating significant financial interest, and Sweiven’s participation in the discussion of Ordinance 92-18, I conclude that the appropriate remedy is invalidation of the ordinance.
As the court recognizes, a council member’s role in the adoption or rejection of an ordinance cannot necessarily be measured solely by that member’s vote. A conflicted member’s participation in discussion and debate culminating in the final vote may influence the votes of the member’s colleagues. The court also appropriately recognizes that the integrity required of public office holders demands that even the appearance of impropriety be avoided.5
*1033Guided by these principles and the City of Homer’s explicit ban on a conflicted member’s participation, I respectfully, dissent from the court’s remedy. Rather than remand this issue, I would hold Ordinance 92-18 invalid because of council member Sweden’s participation.6
. The court notes:
The record reflects that when Sweiven was advocating rezoning the entire CBD, he was quoted in the Homer News as stating: "Even my own business. I can’t sell my business, but I can sell my building, and someone who wants to put a VW repair shop there — he can't.... It's not just me. This gives everybody in town a lot more options as far as selling their business." Finally, Sweiven refrained from voting on Ordinance 94-13, which would have repealed Ordinance 92-18, on the ground that he had a potential conflict of interest.
Op. at 27.
. At all times relevant to the case at bar, HCC 1.12.010(a) defined “substantial financial interest” as follows:
1. An interest that will result in immediate financial gain; or
2. An interest that will result in financial gain which will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
(HCC 1.12.010 has subsequently been amended.) HCC 1.12.020 provides:
A City Councilmember or Mayor with a substantial financial interest in an official action to be taken by the Council has a conflict of interest. (Ord.92-49(A) § 3, 1992; Ord. 86-22(S) § Kpart), 1986).
. HCC 1.12.040 provides:
The Mayor or, in his absence, the Mayor Pro-Tern or other presiding officer, shall rule on a request by a City Councilmember to be excused from voting on a matter because of a declared conflict of interest. The Mayor Pro-tem or other presiding officer shall rule on a request by the Mayor to be excused from participating in a matter because of a declared conflict of interest. (Ord.92-49(A) § 5, 1992; Ord. 86-22(S) § l(pnrt), 1986). HCC 1.12.050 further provides:
A decision of the Mayor or other presiding officer under Section 1.12.040 may be overridden by a majority vote of the City Council. (Ord.86-22(S) § l(part), 1986).
. This court has consistently held that it is not our function to question the wisdom of legislation. University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 666 P.2d 424, 428 (Alaska 1983); Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618, 621 (Alaska 1978).
. See generally Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflict of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L.Rev. 161 (1989). Here the author writes in part:
The second and more common provision is to prohibit participation when a conflict of interest exists. The rationales behind this are obvious. Although disclosure has some restraining effect, a significant conflict might still affect the substantive outcome of a decision. More importantly, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy are only partly addressed by disclosure.
For these reasons disqualification rather than disclosure is the preferable approach. Although in some instances disclosure might adequately address the need for impartiality, in many instances it will only be partially effective. The inconvenience of adjusting to the disqualification of a decisionmaker is not so great as to justify the threat to accuracy and legitimacy posed by the requirement of mere disclosure.
Beyond determining what effect a conflict of interest should have on a particular decision-maker is what judicial remedies should be available when a zoning decision in fact involved an improper conflict of interest. In those instances in which the biased decision-maker casts a dispositive vote, courts have consistently invalidated the decision. This seems appropriate in that both accuracy and legitimacy concerns are clearly threatened when a decision appears to turn on the vote of a self-interested decisionmaker.
A more difficult issue is whether the participation of a conflicting member whose vote was not determinative to a decision should also result in invalidation. This might occur in two general situations. First is where the *1033tainted vote was numerically unnecessary for the decision. Courts have evenly split on this issue, with a slight majority favoring invalidation. Courts refusing to invalidate such decisions have primarily reasoned that even without the tainted vote the decision would have occurred anyway and therefore invalidation is improper. In this sense the threat to accuracy and legitimacy concerns is arguably de minim-is when the particular vote is apparently not crucial to a decision. In particular, legitimacy concerns are less threatened when a decision appears inevitable. As a result, the administrative burden of invalidating and remanding a decision outweighs any threat to substantive results and perceptions of fairness.
Despite these distinctions, several strong reasons exist for invalidating decisions even when a tainted decisionmaker's vote was numerically unnecessary for the decision. First, courts invalidating such decisions have noted that collegial decisionmaking ideally involves the exchange of ideas and views, often with the intent of persuading toward a particular position. The actual contribution of any particular decisionmaker cannot be measured with precision, but frequently extends significantly beyond the actual vote cast. For this reason, a significant threat to accuracy can exist even when a particular vote was numerically unnecessary for the decision.
For similar reasons legitimacy concerns also exist even when a vote is numerically unnecessary. Although legitimacy concerns are less substantial in such circumstances, the perception of collegial decisionmaking and the potential influence of a tainted decisionmaker on others would violate "appearance of fairness" standards. Thus, for both accuracy and legitimacy reasons the better view is that even when a vote is numerically unnecessary for a decision courts should still invalidate it.
Id. at 214-216 (footnotes omitted).
. I note my agreement with the court's other holdings.