dissenting.
I agree with the court’s discussion of the controlling legal principles, but disagree with the result it reaches. In my view, the alleged danger was obvious. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 (1965), River & Sea could not be expected to believe that users of the boat and trailer combination would fail to “realize its dangerous condition.” River & Sea consequently owed Maddox no duty to protect him from the “dangerous condition” presented by the excessive tongue weight.
The court correctly notes that “a seller is not liable for injuries caused by an obviously dangerous product.” Op. at 1037 (citing Mele v. Turner, 106 Wash.2d 73, 720 P.2d 787, 790 (1986); Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 400 (Iowa 1985)). It concludes, however, that “[t]he evidence leaves in material dispute the question whether Maddox could reasonably be expected to realize the hazards associated with lifting the trailer,” and therefore reverses the summary judgment. Op. at 1039.
As the court recognizes, the danger posed by attempting to lift an obvious weight is usually obvious. Op. at 1038. See Cotton v. Morck Hotel Co., 32 Wash.2d 326, 201 P.2d 711, 718 (1949).
Assuming for sake of discussion that the weight of some objects might present dangerous conditions actionable under Restatement section 388,1 that is not the case here. *1041The tongue weight was inevitably disclosed and obvious to any person who sought to unhitch the trailer. A person unhitching the trailer had to lift the hitch, and thus the tongue, several inches to clear the towing ball on which the hitch rested. Maddox testified that it was an inch and seven-eighths or a two-inch standard ball. To unhitch the trailer, he had to raise the tongue some inches vertically to clear the top of the ball attached to his truck. The user consequently could assess the full tongue weight before the hitch cleared the top of the ball; before the hitch cleared the ball, the user could always release the weight, allowing the hitch to drop safely over the ball. The full weight thus became obvious during the lift. The potential danger (any discrepancy between the user’s lifting ability and the undisclosed tongue weight) was inevitably disclosed to the user.
This method of discerning the tongue weight is more valuable to a consumer than a written disclosure. Except perhaps for skilled weight lifters, written disclosure of a non-trivial weight would help few consumers decide whether they could safely lift an object. Most would have to do what reasonable persons must be expected to do: assess the weight against their own abilities while taking up the tongue weight and raising the hitch. The ineffectiveness of disclosure confirms the infirmity of imposing a duty here. Apart from fluctuations resulting from what the boat was carrying and where the contents were located relative to the trailer’s axle, disclosing tongue weight would reveal to few consumers whether they could safely unhitch the trailer by hand.
Nothing about the boat and trailer combination sets it apart from other moderately heavy products provided to consumers. If there were legal justification for imposing a duty to disclose weight in this case, it would logically extend to other consumer products, including televisions, stoves, and reftiger-ators. It should apply to outboard motors, because of the danger consumers might injure themselves lifting the motors from ground level or removing them from boat transoms.
Likewise, any duty to disclose the tongue weight of an eighteen-foot boat and trailer combination would apply to all boat-trailer combinations. It would apply to smaller boat-trailer combinations because some owners are foreseeably less able than Maddox. It would apply to much larger boat-trailer combinations, because some users will inevitably fail to appreciate that the weight exceeds their ability to lift safely and because tongue weights will inevitably exceed the capabilities of any consumer. It is irrelevant that Maddox’s trailer and boat may have been mismatched and that the tongue weight was “excessive.” The tongue weight of a properly matched and adjusted boat and trailer could still exceed the safe lifting capabilities of some consumers.
No purchaser reasonably could have expected from the appearance of the boat and trailer that the tongue weight would be trivial and could be safely lifted by all consumers, regardless of their strength, infirmity, age, experience, or intelligence. Maddox submitted evidence the tongue weight should have been between 100 and 200 pounds. Some consumers are incapable of safely lifting such weights, but that does not mean the failure to disclose them creates a duty under section 388.
Knowledge of gravity must be imputed to all consumers. I would find no duty given the salient facts of this casé: a vertical lift of a non-trivial weight with opportunities to compare the weight with the user’s ability to lift and to safely release the weight if it seemed excessive. I would affirm the summary judgment.
. Thus, some objects might theoretically mislead users into assuming that they are not weighty, at all. A reasonable user might be exposed to danger by lifting the object in a manner ill-suited to hefting a heavy weight. One who sells a leaden pillow might, therefore, be subject to liability for failing to warn a purchaser that its weight is dangerously greater than it appears to be. Perhaps an object’s weight might also pose a non-obvious hazard if a consumer could set it into downward motion without first lifting its full *1041weight. Forsman v. Seattle Elec. Co., 58 Wash. 666, 109 P. 121 (1910).
Where a party undertakes to raise a heavy body from the ground, he has notice of the weight before the danger period arrives. It is very different, however, where one undertakes to unload an object from a wagon or a car, and has no notice other than the appearance of the object, until the weight is upon him and the danger period at hand. In brief, in the one case he can desist when the danger becomes apparent, and in the other he cannot.
Id. 109 P. at 122.