Government Code section 845.8, subdivision (b) (section 845.8), provides that a public entity is immune from liability for injuries caused by a person resisting arrest or detention.1 The majority holds that this statute “does not provide immunity to public entities for liability that is predicated on Vehicle Code section 17001,” which provides that a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a public employee’s negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of a motor vehicle.2 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1165.) I respectfully disagree.
The majority recites several persuasive reasons why the immunity provided by section 845.8 should apply when the alleged liability of the public entity is predicated upon Vehicle Code section 17001, and why the decisions in Duarte v. City of San Jose (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 648 [161 Cal.Rptr. 140] *1170and its progeny were wrongly decided.3 The majority concludes, however, that we are precluded from overruling Duarte and the later cases because, by enacting Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which grants a limited immunity for injuries arising from vehicular pursuits,4 the Legislature purportedly “acquiesced in [those decisions] to the extent it did not overrule them.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1165.) Again, I respectfully disagree.
In Duarte v. City of San Jose, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d 648, a police officer arrested a suspect for driving under the influence of alcohol and left him, unattended and unhandcuffed, in the backseat of a patrol vehicle with the motor running. The suspect got into the driver’s seat of the patrol vehicle and sped off. A high-speed chase ensued, which ended when the suspect drove into the front yard of the plaintiff’s residence, striking and seriously injuring the plaintiff.
The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, ruling, in part, that the city was immune pursuant to section 845.8. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating that application of the immunity provision “would thwart the purpose of [Vehicle Code] section 17001.” (Duarte v. City of San Jose, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 656.) I find this reasoning unpersuasive.
Government Code section 815 states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” The legislative committee comment on this statute explains: “In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute ... is found declaring them to be liable.” (Legis. committee com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1980 ed.) foil. § 815, p. 168.) Under the system created by the Legislature, governmental immunity statutes thus invariably “thwart” statutes imposing governmental liability. That is the purpose of such immunity statutes.
The decision in Duarte next considered “the public policy underlying the enactment of Government Code section 845.8, as articulated in the Law *1171Revision Commission comment to that section: ‘The extent of the freedom that must be accorded to prisoners for rehabilitative purposes and the nature of the precautions necessary to prevent escape of prisoners are matters that should be determined by the proper public officials unfettered by any fear that their decisions may result in liability.’” (Duarte v. City of San Jose, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 656.) The Duarte opinion recognized that “[a] colorable argument can be made that what is involved here is just what the statute was enacted to immunize: a decision as to the proper precautions necessary to prevent escape.” (Id. at p. 657.) Instead, the court in Duarte reached the opposite conclusion: “What is alleged here is not that the police used insufficient force to restrain [the arrestee], but rather that they negligently operated police vehicles.” (Ibid.) That is incorrect. The alleged police negligence in Duarte included allowing the arrestee to escape (he was left unattended and unhandcuffed), as well as providing access , to a police vehicle as a means of escape and negligently operating other police vehicles during the ensuing chase. Although allowing the arrestee to escape in a police vehicle, rather than on foot, certainly increased the likelihood that the arrestee would cause injury, the same would be true had the arrestee been allowed to escape in his own vehicle or to obtain a weapon. In any of these situations, including the circumstances present in Duarte, the public entity would be immune under section 845.8 for any injuries caused by an arrestee whom the police negligently had allowed to escape.
The decision in Duarte also fails to consider that, unlike other statutes, section 845.8 does not expressly exempt claims arising under Vehicle Code section 17001 from the immunity provided by section 845.8. By contrast, Government Code sections 844.6 (immunity for injuries caused by or to a prisoner), 850.4 (immunity for injuries “resulting from the condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities”), and 854.8 (immunity for injuries caused by or to a patient of a mental institution) all expressly state that their immunity provisions do not apply if liability is predicated upon “Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.” This demonstrates that the Legislature, when it has wished to exempt Vehicle Code section 17001 from the scope of an immunity provision, has stated that intention expressly and unambiguously. The circumstance that section 845.8 contains no similar limitation is a compelling indication that its immunity provisions do apply when liability is predicated upon Vehicle Code section 17001.
The majority, recognizing the flaws in Duarte, concludes that this court may not overrule that decision because the Legislature, by enacting Vehicle Code section 17004.7, partially ratified the decisions in Duarte and its progeny. I disagree.
*1172Vehicle Code section 17004.7 provides limited immunity to a public entity that has adopted a written policy governing vehicular pursuits, from liability for damages “resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued by a peace officer employed by the public entity in a motor vehicle.” (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b).) The majority reasons that, because Vehicle Code section 17004.7 provides immunity only if the public entity has adopted a written pursuit policy, the Legislature effectively overruled Duarte only in part and, therefore, must be deemed to have ratified that decision to the extent it was not overruled. This reasoning is flawed in several respects.
The majority’s reasoning is based upon the erroneous premise that the enactment of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 overruled in part the decision in Duarte. To the contrary, there is nothing to indicate that this was the Legislature’s intention, and the enactment of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 did not have that effect. Duarte held that the immunity provision of section 845.8 did not apply if liability was predicated under Vehicle Code section 17001 upon a public employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The enactment of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 did not alter this holding; it did not amend either section 845.8 or Vehicle Code section 17001 or specify the relationship between these two statutes. Instead, Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which was enacted seven years after Duarte was decided, provided a limited immunity for damages arising from vehicular pursuits.
The scope of section 845.8 is not limited to vehicular pursuits, but applies to injuries caused in any manner by fleeing suspects using any form of locomotion. Even when liability is predicated under Vehicle Code section 17001 upon the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the injury will not arise invariably from a vehicular pursuit, as the circumstances in Duarte suggest. The reference in Duarte to the negligent operation of a vehicle was not limited to the conduct of the pursuit, but included the act of leaving unattended an unhandcuffed arrestee in a police vehicle with the motor running. Thus the reasoning and result in Duarte would have been the same had the arrestee caused the injury to the plaintiff before the police commenced their pursuit.
Another indication that Vehicle Code section 17004.7 was not enacted in response to Duarte's interpretation of section 845.8 is the circumstance that the applicability of the two immunity statutes is triggered by different types of events. Section 845.8 provides immunity from liability for damages “caused by” a fleeing suspect. Vehicle Code section 17004.7 provides *1173immunity from liability for damages “resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by” a fleeing suspect. This difference is significant. In order for section 845.8 to apply, the fleeing suspect must be the cause of the damage, but the damage need not result from a collision of a vehicle being driven by the suspect. For example, if a suspect fleeing on foot ran directly in front of a pursuing police vehicle, causing the vehicle to swerve into a parked vehicle in order to avoid striking the suspect, the damage to the parked vehicle would be caused by the fleeing suspect and the public entity would be immune under section 845.8, but not under Vehicle Code section 17004.7. (Billester v. City of Corona (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1124 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 121] [“Section 17004.7 does not cover accidents in which victims are injured by peace officers’ vehicles during pursuits of suspects.”].) Conversely, if a suspect who was the object of a vehicular pursuit was forced off the road by a police vehicle and struck a parked vehicle, the immunity provided in section 845.8 might not apply, because the damage was not caused by the suspect—but the immunity provided in Vehicle Code section 17004.7 would apply (if the public entity had adopted a written pursuit policy), because the damage resulted from the collision of the vehicle driven by the suspect.
A further indication that the Legislature did not intend the enactment of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 to overrule, in whole or in part, Duarte's interpretation of section 845.8, is that Vehicle Code section 17004.7 begins by stating: “The immunity provided by this section is in addition to any other immunity provided by law.” The Legislature made clear, therefore, that its provision of a limited immunity in Vehicle Code section 17004.7 was not intended to limit the scope of other immunity statutes, such as section 845.8. The Legislature’s pronouncement that the immunity provided in Vehicle Code section 17004.7 was in addition to any other immunity provided by law is incompatible with the majority’s conclusion that the enactment of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 ratified the holding in Duarte limiting the scope of the immunity provided in section 845.8.
The majority relies upon our opinion in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, 851 P.2d 27] for the proposition that we are not free to overrule the decisions in Duarte and its progeny, because the Legislature, by enacting Vehicle Code section 17004.7, “modified the law stated in those decisions, and impliedly approved them to the extent it did not modify them.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1162.) The King case is readily distinguishable, however, and does not support the majority’s position.
King examined Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, which states that a juvenile tried as an adult is ineligible for commitment to the California *1174Youth Authority (CYA) if he or she is sentenced to “imprisonment for life.” This court held in In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210 [168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087] that the sentence for first degree murder of “25 years to life” is not a life sentence within the meaning of that statute. Within a year, the Legislature passed emergency legislation amending Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 to make ineligible for CYA commitment only persons 18 years or older who commit first degree murder. King observed that an earlier version of the bill would have excluded from CYA all persons who commit first degree murder, and held that the amendment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 “effectively overrules Jeanice D. as applied to persons between the ages of 18 and 21 years, but it also impliedly reaffirms the Jeanice D. rule as applied to 16- and 17-year-olds.” (People v. King, supra, 5 Cal.4th 59, 67.) This court concluded that the “Legislature apparently intended to make adult, but not juvenile, murderers ineligible for CYA.” (Ibid.)
The emergency legislation at issue in King clearly was enacted in response to this court’s decision in Jeanice D., and clearly manifested a legislative judgment that persons 18 years of age or older should be barred from CYA commitment, but that 16- and 17-year-olds should not be barred. The legislation at issue in the present case does not appear to have been enacted in response to Duarte (it was enacted seven years after the decision in Duarte was filed) and does not evidence a legislative determination concerning the interplay between Vehicle Code section 17001 and Government Code section 845.8. To the contrary, section 17004.7 expressly states that it was not intended to limit the scope of any other applicable immunity statute, and its sole purpose appears to be to grant public entities an additional, limited immunity for injuries resulting from vehicular pursuits. The reasoning used in King simply does not apply in the present case.
In my view, this court is not bound to accept the flawed reasoning in Duarte v. City of San Jose, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d 648, and its progeny. For the reasons explained above, I would overrule those decisions and hold that the immunity provided to public entities in section 845.8 from liability for damages caused by a fleeing suspect applies when liability is predicated under Vehicle Code section 17001 upon the negligent or wrongful operation of a motor vehicle by a public employee.
Unlike the majority, therefore, I would reach the issue whether the immunity provided by section 845.8 for damages caused by a fleeing suspect applies under the circumstances of the present case.
Justice Mosk, in his concurring opinion, concludes that section 845.8 does not apply in the present case because “the injury was not ‘caused by’ the *1175suspect but ‘caused to’ him . . . (Conc, opn., ante, at p. 1166.) Although Justice Mosk acknowledges that “occasionally an injury may be caused both by and to the same person (i.e., a self-inflicted wound)” (id. at p. 1167), he concludes that the Legislature did not intend that section 845.8 apply in such circumstances.
Justice Mosk reasons that it cannot be said that, because plaintiff refused to submit to detention, he caused his own injury within the meaning of section 845.8. (Conc, opn., ante, at p. 1166.) I agree. Such an interpretation of section 845.8 would stretch the language of the statute beyond its plain meaning and result in startling consequences. If section 845.8 were held to apply whenever a suspect failed to submit to custody, the public entity would be immunized for any injury sustained by either the fleeing suspect or a third person, even if law enforcement officers acted negligently, used excessive force, or committed an intentional tort. Such an interpretation would render superfluous the provisions of Vehicle Code section 17004.7, because the public entity would be immune from liability for any injury resulting from a vehicular pursuit, whether or not the public entity had promulgated a pursuit policy or the damage resulted from a collision of a vehicle driven by the suspect. Nothing in section 845.8 suggests that the Legislature intended such results.
But recognizing that a suspect does not cause his or her own injuries within the meaning of section 845.8 simply by failing to submit to an arrest or detention does not determine whether the statute applies in other circumstances, such as when a fleeing suspect causes a collision in which the suspect is injured.
In my view, the immunity provided in section 845.8 clearly applies when a fleeing suspect causes his or her own injury.5 This point, however, is of only theoretical interest, as Justice Mosk appears to recognize. (Conc, opn., ante, at p. 1167, fn. 2.) In such circumstances, the immunity provided by *1176section 845.8 is superfluous, because in any event there is no basis for holding a public entity liable for a fleeing suspect’s self-inflicted injury.
In the case before us, for example, whether the public entity is immune under Government Code section 845.8, and whether the public entity (but for section 845.8) would be liable under Vehicle Code section 17001, are two sides of the same coin. The public entity is immune under section 845.8 if plaintiff caused his own injuries, but the public entity is liable under Vehicle Code section 17001 only if plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the police officer’s negligent or wrongful operation of a motor vehicle.
In the present case, therefore, whether viewed from the perspective of whether section 845.8 provides immunity or whether Vehicle Code section 17001 imposes liability, the pertinent question is the same: was the collision in which plaintiff was injured caused by plaintiff or, instead, by the police officer driving the patrol vehicle? Because a majority of the court does not address this issue, it would serve little purpose for me to espouse at length my individual views concerning this issue, as it affects only the parties in the present case. I do, however, offer the following general observations regarding the resolution of such issues.
The collision in which plaintiff was injured occurred late at night, within seconds after plaintiff ran into the street, at full speed, in the path of the patrol vehicle, attempting to evade capture. Whether the police officer driving the patrol vehicle acted reasonably must be determined in light of the quickly changing, emergency circumstances encountered by the officer. As the United States Supreme Court has observed in the related context of determining whether the force used to effect a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . .” (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 [104 L.Ed.2d 443, 455-456, 109 S.Ct. 1865].) The high court recognized that the reasonableness of an officer’s actions “must be judged from the perspective
*1177of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” (Id. at p. 396 [104 L.Ed.2d at p. 455].)
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Section 845.8 provides: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: [¶] .... [¶] (b) Any injury caused by: [¶] (1) An escaping or escaped prisoner; [¶] (2) An escaping or escaped arrested person; or [f (3) A person resisting arrest.” We held in Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 419 [204 Cal.Rptr. 428, 682 P.2d 1093] that the statute applies as well to injuries caused by a person resisting a temporary detention.
Vehicle Code section 17001 provides: “A public entity is liable for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment.”
The decision in Duarte was followed in Stark v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 276 [214 Cal.Rptr. 216] and City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 695 [212 Cal.Rptr. 661].
Vehicle Code section 17004.7, subdivision (b), provides: “A public agency employing peace officers which adopts a written policy on vehicular pursuits complying with subdivision (c) is immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or death of any person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued by a peace officer employed by the public entity in a motor vehicle.”
Justice Mosk observes that “three other statutes in the same chapter of the Tort Claims Act as section 845.8” expressly provide immunity for injuries both “caused by” and caused “to” specified classes of persons, and concludes “[t]he Legislature obviously knows how to draw this simple distinction.” (Conc, opn., ante, at pp. 1167-1168.) Of course there is a distinction between an injury “caused by” a person and an injury “caused to” that person, but it does not follow, as Justice Mosk suggests, that the addition of a provision providing immunity for injuries “caused to” a person described in such a statute demonstrates that the phrase “caused by” in that statute does not include self-inflicted injuries.
A provision providing immunity for injuries “caused by” a specified class of persons includes (within the common meaning of that phrase) self-inflicted injuries. The effect of adding a provision providing immunity for injuries “caused to” the specified class of persons is to afford the public entity immunity from liability when the injury is caused by the public *1176entity or a third person, in addition to the immunity already provided for self-inflicted injuries.
Although the circumstance that section 845.8 does not contain a provision providing immunity for injuries “caused to” a fleeing suspect might suggest that section 845.8 does not provide immunity for injuries caused to the suspect by the public entity or a third person, it does not support the conclusion reached by Justice Mosk that the Legislature meant to limit the scope of the phrase “caused by” to exclude self-inflicted injuries.