concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion with one exception: I do not agree that a violation of A.R.S. section 32-2181 is negligence per se because I do not believe section 32-2181 qualifies as a statute intended “for the safety of others.” Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 511, 667 P.2d 200, 211 (1983).
The majority bases its holding on the following statement:
The subdivision reporting statutes were enacted to protect buyers of subdivision lots ... from buying residential lots not containing the utility services necessary to make the property safe and habitable.... Therefore, because the subdivision disclosure statutes have been enacted for the protection and safety of the public, one who violates the statutes is guilty of negligence per se.
Supra, at 597, 892 P.2d at 1386. I am unpersuaded by this conelusory reasoning and find little support in either the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 286 (1965), or the cases cited by the majority for their holding that negligence per se exists when a subdivider fails to file a notice under A.R.S. section 32-2181 and thereby misleads purchasers of the subdivided lands.
In Arizona, the rule is that actionable negligence per se exists when: (1) the defendant has violated a statute enacted as a safety regulation, Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); J.H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Gardner, 96 Ariz. 95, 392 P.2d 567 (1964); Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 496, 8 *601P.2d 249, 251 (1932), overruled on other grounds by MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d 211 (1958); (2) the plaintiff is part of the class of persons that the statute was designed to protect, Hidalgo v. Cochise County, 13 Ariz.App. 27, 474 P.2d 34 (1970); (3) the violation of the statute is either unexcused or inexcusable, Brannigan, 136 Ariz. at 517, 667 P.2d at 217; and (4) the violation is the proximate cause of the injury, Young Candy & Tobacco Co. v. Montoya, 91 Ariz. 363, 372 P.2d 703 (1962); Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220 (1958).
That a statute needs to have public safety as part of its purpose has been stated explicitly in the substantial majority of Arizona appellate decisions where the doctrine has been invoked.5 This public safety aspect of negligence per se is also implicit in the remaining Arizona cases on point, all of which involve statutes with a clear public safety purpose.6 I find no such purpose in the requirements of A.R.S. section 32-2181.
While I agree that the availability of water has a substantial impact on habitability, it is unclear to me how failing to file a notice disclosing, among other things, the name and address of the property owner,7 the location of the nearest public schools,8 the availability of utilities,9 and the approximate amount of annual taxes,10 places potential buyers in harm’s way. If appellee had violated a statute requiring disclosure of dangerous conditions on the land, e.g., sinkholes, toxic waste, I would tend to agree with the majority’s analysis, but a seller’s failure to disclose the fact that no water hookup is available does not expose purchasers or their property to some unforeseen physical damage. Thus, I disagree that section 32-2181 was enacted as a safety statute.
The majority states that my definition of a safety statute is too narrow, and cites cases from other states and the illustrations given in the Restatement as examples of negligence per se being applied to economic harms. These examples are inapposite. The harms they describe are “economic” only in that it costs money to remedy them. They *602are all examples of physical harm or damage to persons or property resulting from statutorily regulated hazards such as floods, pesticides, disease, and railroad tracks. These hazards and their concomitant harms are simply not analogous to NIC’s violation and its effect on the Alafaces.
I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The majority seems to read this section as saying that a statute may be the basis for negligence per se if the purpose of the statute relates to some part of subsections 286(a)-(d). This is incorrect. The words “exclusively or in part” in section 286 refer to the purpose of the statute, not subsections (a)-(d). Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 286 (1965). Those subsections are conjunctive, indicating that a statute’s purpose must satisfy all four criteria if the statute is to be used as a standard for negligence per se. It is clear the majority has stopped too soon in finding it sufficient that A.R.S. section 32-2181 was intended to protect a particular interest of a class of persons. As Restatement subsection 286(d) makes clear, negligence per se statutes also need to be designed to protect against a particular hazard.11 Thus, the fact that a statute is designed to protect the public in some fashion is insufficient grounds for making the violation of it negligence per se.
To hold otherwise has the potential of making the violation of virtually any statute grounds for negligence per se liability. Using the majority’s expansive approach to negligence per se under section 32-2181, for example, one can now argue that a subdivi-der should be liable on a theory of negligence per se if it fails to comply with subsection (A)(ll) and buyers who relied on that omission are later disappointed to discover they cannot paint their house chartreuse.12 I cannot agree that negligence per se should be applied to such claims and harms.
Thus, without reference to negligence per se, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on appellants’ common law negligent misrepresentation by omission claim, affirm in all other respects, and remand this case to allow appellants to prove their remaining theory of liability based solely on the common law standard for disclosure outlined in Hill v. Jones, 151 Ariz. 81, 725 P.2d 1115 (App.1986) and Frazier v. Southwest Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 134 Ariz. 12, 653 P.2d 362 (App.1982).
. Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Kauffman v. Schroeder, 116 Ariz. 104, 568 P.2d 411 (1977); Konow v. Southern Pac. Co., 105 Ariz. 386, 465 P.2d 366 (1970); Rogers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 100 Ariz. 154, 412 P.2d 272 (1966); J.H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Gardner, 96 Ariz. 95, 392 P.2d 567 (1964); Mercer v. Vinson, 85 Ariz. 280, 336 P.2d 854 (1959); Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass’n, 57 Ariz. 451, 114 P.2d 904 (1941); Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 496, 8 P.2d 249, 251 (1932); Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, Inc., 164 Ariz. 364, 793 P.2d 121 (App.1990); Monares v. Wilcoxson, 153 Ariz. 359, 736 P.2d 1171 (App.1987); Good v. Glendale, 150 Ariz. 218, 722 P.2d 386 (App.1986); Gibson v. Boyle, 139 Ariz. 512, 679 P.2d 535 (App.1983); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 577 P.2d 1084 (App. 1978); Anderson Aviation Sales Co. v. Perez, 19 Ariz.App. 422, 508 P.2d 87 (1973); Worthington v. Funk, 7 Ariz.App. 595, 442 P.2d 153 (1968); Christy v. Baker, 7 Ariz.App. 354, 439 P.2d 517 (1968); Beaty v. Jenkins, 3 Ariz.App. 375, 414 P.2d 763 (1966).
. Orlando v. Northcutt, 103 Ariz. 298, 441 P.2d 58 (1968) (motor vehicle statute requiring drivers to signal before turning); Brand v. J.H. Rose Trucking Co., 102 Ariz. 201, 427 P.2d 519 (1967) (Interstate Commerce Commission Motor Carrier Safety Regulations); Dobbertin v. Johnson, 95 Ariz. 356, 390 P.2d 849 (1964) (traffic ordinance); Young Candy & Tobacco Co. v. Montoya, 91 Ariz. 363, 372 P.2d 703 (1962) (statute relating to the operation of motor vehicles); Caldwell v. Tremper, 90 Ariz. 241, 367 P.2d 266 (1962) (concerning liability for death which resulted when defendant’s illegally modified and overloaded trailer broke loose from his panel truck); Campbell v. Brinson, 89 Ariz. 197, 360 P.2d 211 (1961) (statute requiring that vehicles be "in such safe mechanical condition as not to endanger ... any person upon the highway”); Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220 (1958) (motor vehicle statute); Anderson v. Morgan, 73 Ariz. 344, 241 P.2d 786 (1952) (motor vehicle statute); Valley Transp. System v. Reinartz, 67 Ariz. 380, 197 P.2d 269 (1948) (statutory duty to move stalled vehicle off the roadway); Phoenix v. Mullen, 65 Ariz. 83, 174 P.2d 422 (1946) (motor vehicle statute); Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person), overruled in part by Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200; Hall v. Mertz, 14 Ariz.App. 24, 480 P.2d 361 (1971) (city ordinance requiring that nothing be erected or maintained at a comer so as to interfere with traffic visibility across the corner).
. A.R.S. § 32-2181(A)(1) (Supp.1993).
. A.R.S. § 32-2181(A)(9) (Supp.1993).
. A.R.S. § 32-2181(A)(19) (Supp.1993).
. A.R.S. § 32—2181(A)(15) (Supp.1993).
. The majority’s observation that section 286 does not include the term safety is a distinction without a difference. Saying that a statute’s purpose is "to protect ... against [a] particular hazard” is, in my mind, no different than saying its purpose is safety. The dictionary defines hazard as: "A chance of being injured or harmed ... a possible source of danger____” American Heritage Dictionary 830 (3d ed. 1992). Clearly, the opposite of this is safety or protection.
. Subsection (A)(ll) requires that the notice contain: "A statement of the provisions ... limiting the use or occupancy of the parcels in the subdivision, together with copies of any restrictive covenants____” A.R.S. § 32-2181(A)(ll) (Supp.1993).