(dissenting). The following opinion was originally circulated as a proposed majority opinion. Review of the scholarly and carefully drawn opinion of my brother, which becomes the majority, does not persuade me to change my opinion.
This is a joint custody case.
On February 13, 1979, a judgment of divorce under the no-fault divorce statute1 was entered dissolving the parties’ marriage.
In this case, the trial court’s ruling regarding custody and visitation, as set forth in the judgment of divorce, provides:
"IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the custody of the two minor children of the parties herein, to-wit: Marni Darr Holmes Wilcox, born February 8, 1966, and Frank Stirling Wilcox, born December 17, 1969, shall be jointly in Elizabeth Wilcox, plaintiff, and Kent Wilcox, defendant. The parties shall exchange physical custody of the minor children on Friday of each week, or make whatever other arrangements which are mutually agreeable to the parties. The parties shall communicate with reference to any school, social or other events and activities which affect the interests of the children. *89During the time custody is with the other parent, the non-custodial parent shall have liberal rights of visitation as it is the intent of this order that the children have a full and rich relationship with each parent.”
Plaintiff mother appeals from this joint custody provision and also from the property settlement and gross alimony award.
I find nothing in the Michigan Child Custody Act of 19702 preventing joint custody in those cases where the parents, even though divorcing or divorced, have the level of communication, understanding and agreement so obviously necessary if joint custody is to be truly in the child’s best interest. By the same token, neither do I find anything in the Child Custody Act requiring or preferring joint custody.
In cases where divorcing parents can agree that joint custody is the arrangement that serves the best interests of the child, trial courts should give approval, except, perhaps, in the unusual case where a trial court finds evidence that such an arrangement is contrary to the best interests of the child. But, where a parent in good faith does not believe that joint custody will serve the best interest of the child, joint custody should not be awarded over such an objection.
This divorce judgment gave effect to the trial judge’s opinion which he rendered from the bench, providing, in part, as follows:
"The Court, as to custody — The Court, of course, as counsel is aware, has considered that particular aspect before in hearings on the matter, and counsel did not choose in their statements to the Court, did not choose to go into that matter in great detail.
"Of course, the Court is obligated to apply the factors *90set forth in the Child Custody Act, being MCLA 722.23. It appears to the Court that those factors, without enumerating them in any great detail here, we can all read them, that as to the factors that are set forth in that particular section of the statute, and I have it before me, love and affection, emotional ties appear to be equal between these parties; capacity of the parties to give the children love, affection and guidance appears equal between the parties; continuation of their education and raising the child in its religion or creed, does not appear to be any objection on the part of anyone to Marni being raised in her particular creed, if any, and therefore the parties do not seem to be diametrically opposed, or to any great extent opposed, to proper education and raising the child in its religion.
"The capacity and disposition to provide the children with food, clothing, medical care, there is no problem in the Court’s mind on the part of either parent.
"The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, the desireability [sic] of continuing and maintaining continuity, these parties have not been separated very long, and for a considerable period of time joint custody arrangements have been carried out to some extent. Permanence of the family unit, that does not appear to be totally applicable to the situation before the Court.
"Moral fitness of competing parties. I suppose there is some contention that Mr. Wilcox, having acquired another interest, is less morally fit, but I don’t believe that has been harmful to the children, and of course the judgment of divorce being granted, possibly that particular situation will resolve itself.
"Mental and physical health does not appear to be any problem. The mental or physical health of either parent.
"The home, school, community record, these children do not appear to be in any difficulty around the neighborhood; the school, they are doing well in school.
"Any reasonable preference of the child.
"Now, Marni, the oldest child, expressed to the Court that she would prefer to be in the custody of her mother, and from time to time visit her father. Frank *91has expressed no meaningful position one way or the other.
"Now, it seems to the Court that one of the problems with joint custody during this period of this attempt was Mrs. Wilcox’s reluctance to see to it that it worked, which is natural, I suspect. She didn’t approve of the Court’s granting the order in that manner, and therefore is not going to be receptive to attempting to work it out.
"At the same time, however, that does not stand in her credit; can’t give her credit for, at least in the Court’s view, attempting to destroy the effect of this Court’s order, or to negate its effect. So I can’t give her credit for that. So I must mildly chastise her on the record.
"It seems to me in my discussions with the children that they would be more amenable to this arrangement if it were encouraged rather than discouraged. To some extent I believe that Mrs. Wilcox has to take the blame for that discouragement. So for whatever purpose it may serve, she is mildly admonished here by the Court.
"The Court is going to continue the joint custody arrangement, even though it appeared that Marni is not entirely receptive to doing it. The Court is aware of Mr. Wilcox’s desire not to force that issue and allow Marni to continue to try to work out her own problems in her own way. The Court has had the opportunity to discuss the matter with her and has had an opportunity to observe Marni. It is impressed with her ability to give a reflective and thoughtful consideration to things. She is an intelligent 12-year-old individual. The Court, of course is reluctant to allow a minor to kind of direct what the Court should do. However, we have to be realistic. It appears that with encouragement from Mrs. Wilcox and Mr. Wilcox kind of continuing benign neglect, if you will, to the situation, I think it may work itself out.
"At any rate, the Court views that that at the present time is not harmful to either child. They understand the situation. I think they can work with it. At the same time, I think there has got to be some encouragement of that arrangement.
*92"Therefore, in that respect, the Court feels that this court-ordered support payment was too high on the prior occasion, and did not allow the proper encouragement. Therefor, the Court is going to set the support at $25.00 per week per child. Now, that is actually $50.00 per week per child, if you consider that the custodian of them has them only every other week, according to the terms of the custody order. So that I don’t feel is an unfair amount.
"On the other hand, if the encouragement is that the child not visit, of course, the support arrangement won’t be that much. Perhaps that would be an inducement or encouragement necessary in order to carry out some of the things that Dr. Stollak talked about, and others, respecting this request of Mr. Wilcox to remain a father and in constant contact with the children and have a more meaningful relationship which has been what the Court, and I am sure counsel, have seen over a period of time in divorces such as this and others. Mr. Wilcox has expressed the desire to continue to be a part of the lives of these children, and the Court is going to give him that opportunity, with, of course, the understanding that the Court’s judgment may be changed at any time, if that particular situation is not working out.
"So joint custody may continue on the same arrangement as previously ordered by the Court. I think that order set forth visitation too, but I don’t really think that is necessary where joint custody is provided. I don’t recall exactly what the order provided, but, at any rate, an arrangement of that nature, or similar to that nature, in consideration of the fact that the judgment of divorce has been granted, shall enter.”
At the outset, I note that orders which alternate custody of the children between parents for equal periods of time are not generally favored by this Court.3 As indicated, I believe that where parents agree and desire it, joint custody is a viable arrangement often in the best interests of the chil*93dren.* *4 However, such is not the case here, where the mother has consistently opposed joint custody as contrary to the best interests of the children.
I recognize that decisions as to custody are among the most difficult a judge must make. On appeal, this Court reviews custody orders de novo in the same way as other chancery matters.5 But, in so doing, this Court attaches great weight to the findings of fact of the trial judge, giving full consideration to his superior opportunity to form judgments regarding credibility of witnesses in seeing and hearing them.6 I do so here. However, in so doing, I note that the trial court’s only criticism of plaintiff mother was in her reluctance to accept his joint custody plan.7 Applying the age-old test of Solomon, I take note that her reluctance seemed to arise from a concern and from a conviction as to where the best interest of the children lay.8 She testified that she believes so strongly that joint custody was contrary to the children’s best interest that she would give up their custody rather than acquiesce in a permanent joint custody arrangement.
Contrary to the trial judge, I decline to penalize her for her strong desire to have custody of the children, a wish which, incidentally, was shared by a daughter who was then almost 13 and is now 14 and a son who is now 11.
In so finding, I have carefully reviewed the testimony. On direct examination, defendant hus*94band admitted that the reason for the divorce was his involvement with another woman, as follows:
"Q Your wife has from the witness stand indicated that your marital separation was because you advised her of your involvement with another woman, and upon cross examination by Mr. Taylor it was indicated that it was a year ago today. Is that the case?
"A Yes, it is.”
The next question and answer were as follows:
"Q What did you advise Mrs. Wilcox at that time?
"A I advised my wife that I did not feel we had made a success of our attempts to put together a relationship; that I was not happy; that I was not happy with the relationship as the relationship existed; that I did not see anything that was available to us to help us live together. Something to that effect.”
Proof of fault is no longer required to entitle one to a divorce; in fact, fault is irrelevant to whether or not to adjudicate a divorce. But fault was relevant to custody in this case, both as a factor to be considered under subsection 3(f) relating to moral fitness and as an explanation of why plaintiff mother preferred to sever her relationship with defendant father.
Where, as here, the cause of the divorce is the father’s expressed preference for another woman, I cannot share in the trial judge’s conclusion to give the mother bad marks, as did he, for her refusal to cooperate in a plan that requires her to maintain a constant, close, continuing relationship with her ex-husband concerning the care, custody, upbringing and control of their children. In this situation, the children’s best interests are served by placing their custody in one parent or the other after due consideration of the statutory factors.
*95I further find that, in determining the best interests of the children in this case, the trial court gave insufficient weight to three other factors: (1) the reasonable preference of the children,9 (2) the desirability of maintaining continuity,10 and (3) any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.* 11
In this case, Marni, the defendant’s stepdaughter, who at the time of trial was only a month or two short of 13, expressed a strong preference to live with her mother.12 The trial court specifically found that Marni was an intelligent child and had the ability to give reflective and thoughtful consideration to the matter. Under these circumstances, I feel that Marni’s preference to live with her mother should not simply be dismissed on the conjecture that she may have been influenced by her mother’s refusal to acquiesce in and give encouragement to the trial court’s joint custody plan, but rather, I hold that her expressed preference should receive substantial weight.
While I do not believe the preference of a child is the only factor in custody decision, where other factors are at least equal, I believe that where a child is over 12, performing satisfactorily in school and reasonably mature in social outlook the child’s preference as to custody should control unless there is other strong evidence to the contrary.
I note that the court found that Frank, age nine at the time of trial, made no meaningful expression as to whom he preferred to live with. How*96ever, I also note that the expert employed by defendant husband testified that Frank had stated that he preferred to live with his mother. Thus, while I give less weight to Frank’s custodial preference than Marni’s because he is younger, I would hold that Frank’s preference was entitled to some consideration. I also believe that the children’s obvious preference to stay together points to the conclusion that their best interests will be served by keeping them together in the custody of their mother.
Aside from the reasonable preference of the children, I also find that the trial court gave insufficient weight to the importance of maintaining continuity in the children’s lives. Any joint custody arrangement will disturb continuity in the child’s life to a certain degree because significant decisions in up-bringing will depend upon where the child is living and which joint custodian is in charge. I find that this joint custody arrangement, which shifts custody from one parent to another on a weekly basis, disturbs continuity in the children’s lives and is detrimental to and not in the best interests of the children.13
By my opinion here, I do not intend to discourage joint custody of children between parents who both want it. However, I believe that joint custody will only serve the best interests of a child where both parents genuinely believe that the objective of joint custody is desirable. In the present case, the trial judge appeared to recognize that fact in *97his reference to the mother’s disapproval of his joint custody plan.
In this case, the balance between the parents on the scale of statutory factors was not and is not equally balanced. The definite preference of these children, given their respective ages, for placing their custody in their mother, together with the other evidence in her favor, greatly preponderates over any possible advantages of this joint custody arrangement and mandates reversal of the trial court’s order.
In approving of joint custody in cases where the parents want it, I do not intend to establish joint custody as a third viable alternative to custody in the mother or custody in the father. I do not consider that correct analysis here requires a choice between custody in the mother and joint custody. Rather, I would rule out joint custody where, as here, the mother, for sincere reasons, does not choose to voluntarily enter into a joint custody arrangement.
Also, there is another factor here which makes an award of joint custody unnecessary. The parties live close together, as defendant has rented an apartment a few blocks from the plaintiffs home. This close proximity of the parties makes it easy for the children, whose interests are paramount, to have frequent contact with the noncustodial parent without the necessity for constant changes in custody to achieve this continuing relationship.
Accordingly, I find that the trial court erred in granting joint custody in this case, and I would set aside the trial court’s custody order and award custody of both minor children to plaintiff, Elizabeth Wilcox, subject to reasonable visitation in defendant, Kent Wilcox.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in *98computing the amount of property settlement and alimony in gross. I disagree.
It is well settled that a division of marital property or award of alimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.14 This court will not reverse unless it is convinced that, had it been in the trial court’s position, it would have reached a different result.15
I cannot say that I would have reached a result different from that of the trial court. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order of alimony and property settlement.
Consequently, I would affirm in part and reverse in part, remanding to the trial court for a determination of child support and visitation rights.
1971 PA 75, effective January 1, 1972; MCL 552.6, 552.7, 552.19, 552.29; MSA 25.86, 25.87, 25.99, 25.107.
MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq.
Schilleman v Schilleman, 61 Mich App 446; 232 NW2d 737 (1975).
Id.
Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354; 230 NW2d 430 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 794 (1975), Outcalt v Outcalt, 40 Mich App 392; 198 NW2d 779 (1972).
GCR 1963, 517.1.
It should be noted that defendant husband’s expert witness disavowed the plan as his own, characterizing it as the trial court’s plan.
See, Neilson, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26 UCLA L Rev 1084,1106, fn 105 (1979).
MCL 722.23®; MSA 25.312(3)®.
MCL 722.23(d); MSA 25.312(3)(d).
MCL 722.23(j); MSA 25.312(3)®.
Plaintiff and defendant were married October 5, 1968. Marni is the child of plaintiff mother by a previous marriage, who has been adopted by defendant with the consent of plaintiff.
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 799, p 909, provides as follows:
"Where some division of custody is warranted, a frequent shifting of the child from home to home is unnecessarily harmful and should not be permitted. Thus, the courts should avoid committing a child to one home during the week and to another home for each weekend, although cases may be found wherein the appellate courts have affirmed an order for such shifting of custody.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich 418; 78 NW2d 216 (1956), Pinney v Pinney, 47 Mich App 290; 209 NW2d 467 (1973), Van Ommen v Van Ommen, 25 Mich App 652; 181 NW2d 634 (1970).
Paul v Paul, 362 Mich 43; 106 NW2d 384 (1960), Simmons v Simmons, 58 Mich App 480; 228 NW2d 432 (1975), Feldman v Feldman, 55 Mich App 147; 222 NW2d 2 (1974).