(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the majority conclusion that summary judgment was properly granted in this case.
A review of the cases cited in the majority reveals that there was no return receipt in either case to indicate that another adult living in the household had received the communication from the insurance company. In both Phillips v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 69 Mich App 512; 245 NW2d 114 (1976), and Good v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 67 Mich App 270; 241 NW2d 71 (1976), the notices were mailed by general delivery. I perceive this to be a significant distinction.
In the case at bar, two receipts came to defendant from plaintiffs residence, indicating that the mail was received. It is my belief that the statute in question was satisfied by this method of service. The majority opinion, in effect, requires personal service beyond that required in the General Court Rules — actual hand delivery. See Raptis v Safeguard Ins Co, 13 Mich App 193, 199; 163 NW2d 835 (1968).
Even if no presumption arises from the fact that the receipts were returned to the defendant, I believe that a genuine question of material fact was presented. The plaintiff asserts he did not receive notice. The defendant asserts that he did. A trier of fact should have had the opportunity to decide whether actual notice was received.
I would reverse and remand for trial.