dissenting.
In the instant case, section 8553 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the Act), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8553, requires that seventy-two claimants, including the estates of seven persons who were killed in the gas explosion and many who were seriously injured and maimed, seek recompense for their injuries from a paltry pool of $500,000.00, the maximum aggregate liability that may be imposed against the City of Philadelphia, or any other political subdivision in this Commonwealth, for damages arising out of the same cause of action.
For the reasons stated in Justice Papadakos’ dissenting opinion, which I join, I believe the Act clearly and palpably violates Article I, section 11 and Article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Additionally, I repeat the objection voiced in my dissenting opinion in Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981) that political subdivisions are not “the Commonwealth” and that, therefore, Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by any interpretation could not provide a basis for legislation designed to limit the liability of political subdivi*142sions. 496 Pa. at 379-381, 437 A.2d at 402-403 (dissenting opinion by Larsen, J., joined by Flaherty and Kauffman, JJ.). As I stated in Carroll:
The majority opinion glosses over the complex issues in this case by the simple expedient of equating “political subdivisions” with “the Commonwealth.” The majority hones in on the second proviso of Article I, § 11 (“suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner and in such cases as the legislature may by law direct.”) and, on exceedingly meager authority, concludes “[sjurely the Legislature’s authority ‘to choose cases in which the Commonwealth should be immune’ encompasses political subdivisions.” At 496 Pa. 367, 437 A.2d 396. By use of this legal slight-of-hand, relying only on a case which states that municipal corporations are agents of the state, City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976), the majority concludes that “the conferring of tort immunity upon political subdivisions is within the scope of the legislature's authority pursuant to Article I, Section 11.” 496 Pa. at 367, 437 A.2d at 396.
The second sentence in Article I, § 11 provides: “Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the legislature may by law direct.” (emphasis added); it does not say “suits may be brought against the Commonwealth and its subdivisions, etc.” It is quite obvious that this proviso is irrelevant to the instant case. Whatever authority this proviso may grant to the General Assembly to enact legislation conferring immunity upon the Commonwealth (see Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978)), it has no bearing on the authority of the General Assembly to confer immunity upon political subdivisions.
A political subdivision is most certainly not “the Commonwealth” ____
Id., 496 Pa. at 379-380, 437 A.2d at 402-403. Also, compare Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 *143(1973) with Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
Furthermore, I continue to adhere to the view that the classifications established by the Act based solely on the status of the defendant are arbitrary and violate equal protection principles embodied in the Constitutions of this Commonwealth and of the United States. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137, 149-152, 477 A.2d 1302, 1308-09 (1984) (Larsen, J., dissenting). Article I, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, adopted May 16, 1967, provides: “Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” And the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
As I stated in Carroll, supra:
serious equal protection problems are raised by legislative classification based solely on the identity and/or status of one of the parties. [As] this Court’s recent decisions have uniformly and unequivocally stressed, there are “no reasons whatsoever ” for immunities that are strictly status-based. Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, supra, 453 Pa. at 592, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (emphasis added). We further stated in Ayala, per Justice Roberts, “we must agree with Chief Justice Tray-nor of the California Supreme Court that ‘the rule of governmental immunity is an anachronism, 'without rational basis....”’ Id., 453 Pa. at 592, 305 A.2d 877.9
*144Carroll v. County of York, supra at 496 Pa. 381-382, 437 A.2d at 403-404.
This Court subsequently decided in James v. SEPTA, supra, that an intermediate or heightened standard of review was the appropriate standard for reviewing the Act in light of the “important,” but not “fundamental,” interests at stake. In my view, regardless of whether we employ a “strict scrutiny,” “heightened scrutiny,” or “rational basis” standard of review, the classifications created by the Act based solely on the identity and status of the tort-feasor are arbitrary, do not bear a fair and substantial relation to any legitimate state purpose, and deny to the claimants the enjoyment of their civil rights and equal protection of the laws under the state and federal constitutions. See Martin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 306-326, 466 A.2d 107, 119-130 (1983) (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by Flaherty, J.)
PAPADAKOS, J., joins this dissenting opinion.Thus, even under the traditional “rational basis” test (i.e., whether a classification is reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. See Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1971) and Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975)) a classification based solely on status is in a grave constitutional predicament. An argument might, moreover, be legitimately advanced that the standard of review of this legislation should be "strict scrutiny”, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Com*144monwealth Dep’t of Labor and Industry, 461 Pa. 68, 83 n. 11, 334 A.2d 636 n. 11 (1975), as "it is fundamental to our common law system that one may seek redress for every substantial wrong.” Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, supra 453 Pa. at 594, 305 A.2d 877 quoting Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 403, 261 A.2d 84, 85 (1970).