(concurring). I concur in the result arrived at by the majority in this case, but I arrive at that result by a slightly different route.
First, the Declaration of Policy section in the Employment Security Act of the State of Michigan, MCL 421.2; MSA 17.502, provides that the act was enacted "for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own”. Emphasis added.
The reason for not finding in favor of the plaintiff is succinctly stated by Judge Allen in Dueweke v Morang Drive Greenhouses, Inc, 91 Mich App 27, 39-40; 282 NW2d 823 (1979):
"The issue raised is a question of law. Do such reasons constitute 'good cause’ for refusal to work as that term is used in the statute? That question is answered in Losada v Chrysler Corp, 24 Mich App 656, 660; 180 NW2d 844 (1970), lv den 383 Mich 827 (1970), which held that personal reasons were not good cause under the statute. That decision was followed in a split decision in Keith v Chrysler Corp, 41 Mich App 708; 200 NW2d 764 (1972), affirmed by an equally divided Court 390 Mich 458; 213 NW2d 147 (1973). While the split in the Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the vitality of the Losada ruling, we are bound by the decision until it is changed by the higher Court. See Lasher v Mueller Brass Co, 62 Mich App 171; 233 NW2d 513 (1975).” (Emphasis added.)
This decision was followed by another panel of this Court in Allied Building Service Co v Michigan Employment Security Comm, 93 Mich App 500; 286 NW2d 895 (1979).
It is recognized that the above cases refer to *107"good cause” under MCL 421.29(l)(e); MSA 17.531(l)(e) and this case is being considered under MCL 421.29(l)(a); MSA 17.531(l)(a). However, in light of the Declaration of Policy mentioned above, a cause not attributable to the employer would be applicable wherever the term is used.
Under current law "good personal reasons” do not equate with "good cause” under either section.
The plaintiff, Margaret Cooper, displayed an unusual determination and desire to utilize her best efforts in her employer’s interests and being thwarted in her efforts she resigned. This is commendable and it seems unjust that she should be denied unemployment benefits.
It is not proper, however, for the courts to amend or broaden the statute by reading in provisions not included by the Legislature. Alexander v Employment Security Comm, 4 Mich App 378, 383; 144 NW2d 850 (1966).
Courts have no authority to pass upon the wisdom, policy or equity of the legislation. Wojewoda v Employment Security Comm, 357 Mich 374, 379; 98 NW2d 590 (1959).
In spite of the commendable industry of the plaintiff, neither the current statutes nor case law support her claim.