dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion holds that statement number two in the affidavit in this case sets forth sufficient facts for the issuing magistrate to independently determine that the informer was reliable. The requirement that the magistrate independently determine the reliability of the informant when considering an affidavit which is based on hearsay information is the second part of the well-known AguilarSpinelli rule. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); People v. Peschong, 181 Colo. 29, 506 P.2d 1232 (1973); People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971).
Statement number two is almost completely conclusory. It provides only a smidgen of concrete fact. Based on statement number two, no magistrate could independently conclude that the informant was reliable. An analysis of statement number two shows: (1) That there is a hearsay conclusion that the informant once supplied “reliable” information concerning marijuana. (2) That there is the conclusion set forth that whatever information was supplied was “accurate.” (3) That the information is said to have “resulted” in conviction of some individual for possession of some narcotic drug.
The allegations in the affidavit, which are said to support the magistrate’s independent finding of reliability of the informant, in truth, give the magistrate no concrete specific facts upon which to base an independent judgment. The judge is simply asked to accept the police judgment that the informant once gave information which was reliable, accurate, and resulted in the conviction of some unnamed *243individual. Once the magistrate accepts these conclusions, he is asked to proceed from the particular to the general and then conclude that the informant is consistently reliable, although the affidavit set forth no facts which establish that the informant is reliable.
The majority relies on People v. Peschong, supra, where we held that a general and conclusory statement by the affiant police officer did not provide the necessary factual basis for the magistrate’s constitutionally mandated independent determination of the reliability of the informant. However, the majority feel that the details in the affidavit in issue dignify the officer’s conclusions and establish the required factual basis for the magistrate’s independent decision. In the instant case, the magistrate was told that the information previously given concerned marijuana and that the information had resulted in a conviction of some individual for possession of some narcotic drug. He was not told what the informant said concerning marijuana nor was he told what the connection was between the information and the “resulting” conviction. See Kraft v. State, 16 Md. App. 347, 297 A.2d 328 (1972).
A search warrant authorizes a serious invasion of a citizen’s privacy. The neutral and detached magistrate has the sacred duty of determining whether probable cause exists to override the constitutional right of a citizen to privacy and security in his home and habitation. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The judge must independently decide whether probable cause exists and must not merely rubber stamp the police decision.
The importance of the responsibility of the trial judge has been recognized by The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge:
“3.1 Issuance or review of warrants.
“Whenever a trail judge is called upon to issue a warrant for arrest or for search, or to review the issuance of such a warrant or the execution thereof, he should carefully observe *244constitutional and statutory norms and not permit these procedures to become mechanical or perfunctory . . . .”
For the reasons stated, I would uphold the ruling of the trial court.