concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully coneur with the majority's holding that there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the commission's determination of discrimination in this matter. I respectfully dissent, however, from their conclusion that the prejudice of the hearing officer did not deny a fair hearing to SIGECO.
The trial court found that "the transcript of the hearing is replete with instances where the Hearing Officer evidenced bias or prejudice against the position of SIGECO," that "a fair hearing was not conducted," and that "the record of this matter leads inescapably *692to the conclusion that it did not receive such a hearing."
In its findings, the trial court set forth repeated and specific instances of prejudice on the part of the hearing officer. These instances include the following:
First, prior to the hearing, counsel for all parties stipulated to the introduction of deposition testimony. The stipulation was approved by the hearing officer in his final pretrial order. In a footnote to his findings, the hearing officer makes the following comment:
"Ostensibly this method of securing testimony, requested by SIGECO's counsel ... was utilized to avoid bringing these witnesses to Indianapolis for the hearing. ... Nevertheless, this method was a good trial tactic of SIGECO's counselor, as it allowed his witnesses to present their testimony, which is of overwhelming importance to this matter, in the atmosphere of his law firm rather than the more stark, neutral ground of a hearing room under more formal conditions."
Second, the hearing officer noted that the claimant had received an affirmative action letter from the chief executive officer of the respondent. This letter was sent by SIGE-CO's chief executive officer to all employees in compliance with federal law. Notwithstanding such fact, the hearing officer stated:
"For the president of SIGECO to have sent a letter to each employee which included a statement that the employees would not be denied a promotion because of a physical handicap is unusual and unexpected and makes one wonder what would have motivated such an epistle."
Third, in his deposition testimony, Millard New, one of SIGECO's supervisors, responded to a question of whether he knew the claimant prior to the interview saying:
"Well, I knew Jim. I was stationed at the Culley Station for about a year and a half, so I knew of him, although I didn't know him professionally that much."
From this answer, the hearing officer drew the following inference:
"It is most curious that New would select the words, 'I knew of him.... [TJo say 'I knew of him,' ... can reasonably lead to the inference that New had formed a personal opinion about, or was aware of the reputation of, or opinions of others, about Bauermeister and the perceived limitations of his hook prior to New's interviewing him."
Fourth, the hearing officer noted that New testified in his deposition that he could not remember whether the subject of Bauermeis-ter's hook came up during his interview and quoted item 3 of New's interview notes which provided: "Feels that he would be able to perform any normal duties of an EM after he adapts. Can climb ladders." From these notes, the hearing officer concludes that New used the word "adapts" because he was considering the petitioner's hook. He states, "It means adapting with his hook to the procedures rather than merely learning the procedures." Notwithstanding the fact that New's note provides to the contrary, the hearing officer stated, "New thought it would be difficult if not impossible for one with a hook to climb ladders while performing the duties of an electrician." Finally, he concludes, "Item 3 in New's interview notes, in both of its subparts, has significance only because it addresses the prejudice of New that a man with a hook should not be an electrician.... Bauermeister's hook was considered by New in his interview of Bauermeister to the detriment and later rejection of Bauermeister." From these comments, the trial court concluded, "It is difficult to understand how these conclusions can be obtained from this one quotation from a deposition, absent prej-udicially reading more into it than is warranted from the language."
Fifth, the hearing officer set forth the following portion of New's deposition:
"Q. What did Dennis tell you, Dennis Glancey?
A. First question he says, he said, well I said, 'Well, what about his work habits?" He said, 'Well, he's, he's made some mistakes like going out and troubleshooting his equipment, as I recall. And he said 'By the way, what job are you looking for him for?
I said, 'Well, electrical maintenance.
*693He said, 'Boy,? He said, 'I couldn't ree-ommend that.' "
From the fact that the court reporter inserted quotation marks about lancey's statements, the hearing officer concluded: "However, New surprisingly remembered his conversations with Glancey down to the exact words each used.... New has either a most unusual (and perhaps abnormal) memory and recall or his veracity is seriously in doubt." The trial court noted that the deposition did not indicate, other than by the court reporter's quotation marks, that New intended his recollection to be a verbatim statement and concluded, "the Hearing Officer has taken court reporter notation and used it to attack the witness' credibility."
Sixth, the hearing officer stated:
"New did not agree with Industrial Relations that a man with a hook could perform the job or was qualified to be an electri-clan. There was absolutely no doubt in New's mind that any man with a hook could not perform the job as well as a man with two (2) hands. Therefore, it forever would be impossible for a man with a hook to be as well qualified as other applicants with two (2) hands and unthinkable that a man with a hook could ever be the most qualified for an AE position." (Emphasis added).
The trial court found that from the evidence in the case and having read the deposition of Mr. New, that it could not "comprehend how anyone could say what doubts were or were not in Mr. New's mind or that something was forever preempted."
Seventh, the trial court commented on the choice of language used by the hearing officer, stating:
"There are other examples of the type of language above demonstrated within the Findings of the Hearing Officer. Others, such as the 'seornful attitude' of Van Meter when discussing his opinions on hiring handicapped. How one can detect a seornful attitude in the fact situation described in this deposition, without the witness in front of you, is difficult to understand."
The court continued stating that the "most illustrative example ... of bias in the Hearing Officer is the language used by the hearing officer in regard to the initial determination that Petitioner was qualified." In response to the question of whether Bauer-meister was sent out for an interview, Mr. Woodall, the Supervisor in Personnel stated: "He was allowed an interview at the A.B. Brown plant." The hearing officer made the following comment: "What an unusual choice of words, 'allowed', in response to the question posed. How regal; how condescending." (Emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded that although there was "some evidence ... that in fact there was discrimination, the fact remains that the Respondent was also entitled to a full and fair hearing of its case. The record of this matter leads inescapably to the conclusion that it did not receive such a hearing."
The ultimate factual determination in this case was whether SIGECO's reasons for its employment decision were pretextual. This determination, which rests upon an assessment of the credibility of all parties, was undermined by the hearing officer's repeated demonstrations of prejudice toward the employer. The trial court was correct in its determination that SIGECO was denied a fair hearing. I would affirm the trial court and remand for a new hearing.1
. In so stating, I am not unmindful of the fact that this case is already nearly a decade old. James Bauermeister's complaint was filed on October 1, 1985. The Commission did not enter its order until 1991. Such delays are unconscionable and operate to deprive all parties of the rights of due process and fair hearing.