(dissenting) — I am in accord with the law as stated in the majority opinion. I dissent because, like the trial court, I see nothing that can be regarded as libelous per se in the advertisement which is quoted in its entirety in the majority opinion, and it is clearly fair comment.
It is undisputed that a court has the power to sustain a demurrer to a complaint in a libel action, when it is clear from the alleged publication that reasonable minds could find no inference therein which would amount to a libel.
The sufficiency of a complaint in a libel action brought by a public officer or a candidate for public office, based on statements or advertisements published by his opposition, cannot be considered in a vacuum. The sufficiency of the plaintiff’s third-amended complaint must be considered against the background of the controversy between public and private power. That issue has been seriously debated upon the basis of the economic, social, and political philosophies involved.
But often partisans, more influenced by their preju*756dices and their emotions than the principles involved, have engaged in name calling with implications that no one in his right mind, and without some ulterior motive, could possibly be on the other side of the question. Thus to some champions of public power anyone who espoused the cause of private power was, as a bare minimum, a hireling of the power trust, an enemy of the people, and a millstone around the neck of progress; and, with an equal lack of restraint on the other side, the champions of public power were labelled socialists, demagogues, tax dodgers, and termites destroying the economic foundation of the Republic.
The plaintiff, Ralph Purvis, had ably championed the cause of public power. He was seeking re-election to the legislature; he was also attempting to collect an attorney’s fee from the Kitsap county public utility district, which was then a nonoperating district; and, obviously, any fee which it paid would have to be from its only source of revenue, i.e., taxes.
Some of those opposing the re-election of Representative (now Senator) Purvis, apparently (but quite mistakenly) believing that he was vulnerable — both because he was suing for a fee, which would have to be paid from taxes, and because he had been a leader in the effort to develop a combination of public utility districts by which the Puget Sound Power and Light Company could be taken over in its entirety (as an alternative to possible piecemeal dismemberment) — attempted to exploit that situation with the paid advertisement published in several Kitsap county newspapers, which is now alleged to be libelous per se.
The plaintiff has made a blanket allegation of the falsity of the publication. Actually, the basic facts are either specifically admitted in the third-amended complaint, or were matters of common knowledge.
The fact that the plaintiff was claiming ten thousand five hundred dollars for legal services rendered the public utility district is set forth in his complaint in his action to recover for those services. That complaint was part of the record in this case in support of a motion to stay proceedings until the plaintiff’s claim for legal fees had been fully litigated. *757It was a matter of which the trial court could properly take notice. Parenthetically, one phase of the plaintiff’s litigation over his fee is reported in Purvis v. Public Utility Dist. (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 204, 310 P. (2d) 233, in which his right to the fee claimed was unanimously upheld, though his right to recover a portion thereof was barred by the statute of limitations.
He also specifically alleged that he was an attorney practicing law in Bremerton; that he was serving in the state legislature; and was, at the time of the publication of the advertisement alleged to be libelous, a candidate for reelection; that he served as attorney for the public utility district between March 1949, and December 1, 1952; that during that period the public utility district had engaged Mr. Guy C. Myers in connection with negotiations for the purchase of the properties of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company.
The plaintiff’s blanket allegation of falsity of the publication cannot and should not be construed to cover these specific facts which he has affirmatively alleged to be true. Language used in a pleading should be construed as a whole to determine the intention of the pleader (Spangler v. Glover (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 473, 313 P. (2d) 354); where there is ambiguity in the pleading, the specific allegation must control over the general allegation. Cohen v. Cowles Publishing Co. (1954), 45 Wn. (2d) 262, 273 P. (2d) 893.
What this advertisement actually says, behind its colorful language and discernible sneer, is that the plaintiff has presented a claim to the public utility district; that the taxpayers of Kitsap county will have to pay that claim, if it is successfully pressed; and that the party who, by contract, should actually be held to pay the plaintiff’s claim is Mr. Guy C. Myers. That is a view which, no matter how mistaken, the plaintiffs were entitled to express. The advertisement says that not only has the plaintiff been an attorney for the public utility district, but he has also furthered the interests of the public utility district in his service in the legislature, and that he can be expected to continue to do so in the future, if re-elected. Believing in the public utility *758district program, there is certainly nothing reprehensible in furthering it in the legislature. The advertisement says that this public utility district has been a costly and ill-advised venture for the taxpayers of Kitsap county, which is certainly a matter of opinion.
The merits of the public utility district and its past project of taking over the Puget Sound Power and Light Company in its entirety is the real theme of this article. The plaintiff is being attacked for taking a part in this controversial project, a part which the authors of this advertisement, in their own political judgment, do not approve. When it is said that the plaintiff “has cost Kitsap County taxpayers thousands of dollars,” the meaning is obvious: he has supported a public project which “already has spent $66,547.95 of the public’s money in foolhardy schemes” and “today hasn’t a dollar’s worth of property to show for this lavish expenditure of your money.” That also was a point of view the authors were entitled to express; whether the “schemes” were foolhardy and whether the expenditures were “lavish” is a matter of opinion. When it is said that the plaintiff wants to be re-elected “to fix up the PUD laws so they [he] can milk the taxpayers of additional thousands,” the meaning is equally obvious: He will continue to support the public utility districts in an effort to expand their activities. There is no imputation here that the plaintiff would “fix up the PUD laws” through any means other than the legitimate process of legislation.
The charge that inheres in this article is simply that the plaintiff has taken an unwise stand (or so it seems to the authors of the advertisement) upon a public issue. This is a standard form of political criticism, which certainly does not in itself impute any dishonesty, want of integrity, or lack of fidelity to a public trust. Expressions of opinion, even in the form of severe criticism, cannot be libelous per se if they clearly go only to the merits of a public controversy. Our political system requires a freedom of comment on the positions that a candidate for office has taken, or could be expected to take, on the public issues of the day.
The public utility district is a municipal corporation and *759a public enterprise, created by the vote of the people of a county or a portion thereof, and intended to serve their interests by providing certain utilities. To say that the plaintiff has “served” the public utility district constitutes a criticism to some people and an accolade to others. A legislator is commonly expected to represent the best interests of his constituents in the legislature, and it would be far more defamatory to say that he ignored them or opposed their interests; on many issues what best serves the interest of constituents is debatable. Compare this present case with Ziebell v. Lumbermens Printing Co. (1942), 14 Wn. (2d) 261, 269, 127 P. (2d) 677, wherein it was held libelous per se to charge that a public utility district commissioner opposed his district’s interests by being “a confessed tool of Wall street.”
The majority places, or so it seems to me, undue emphasis on the word “slavishly.” It is purely a color word, like the word “lavish” in a phrase heretofore quoted. I am unable to read into “slavishly” a libel, where the surrounding context of the article gives no support to any imputation of wrongdoing. If it adds any meaning to this publication, it expresses the authors’ doubt that one who has had previous public utility district connections could give disinterested consideration to further legislation concerning public utility districts.
This publication, read as a whole, or read part by part, fails to constitute any charge of want of official integrity or of failure of ethical principles. It simply is not the type of defamation from which the law will presume that damage will flow.
The writers have spoken unfavorably of the plaintiff, but they have not libeled him. Their opposition to the plaintiff as a candidate is obvious, but they are free to express it; this is the customary type of political appeal commonly heard before election day. I would sustain the demurrer to the third-amended complaint and affirm the judgment of the trial court.