dissenting:
I have no quarrel with the majority’s restatement of the parol evidence rule. Extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the terms of a written contract.1 However, where the contract contains ambiguous terms the rule has always been that parol evidence was admissible, not to contradict, but to explain the terms of the agreement. Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975).
In this case, parol evidence was offered to explain an ambiguity. The phrase “60% of crop at open market” is patently ambiguous. The majority implicitly recognizes as much; nowhere is it stated that the phrase is not ambiguous. Indeed, if it were, much of the majority’s subsequent analysis would have been unnecessary. Instead, it appears that the majority recognizes that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain, but only to the extent that it does not get in the way of the court’s view of other contract provisions. Hence, the majority somehow concludes that it, like the trial court, should resolve the ambiguity in accordance with its own interpretation of the contract, without permitting the defendant to explain the ambiguous phrase by parol evidence, while at the same time permitting the plaintiff Chapman to introduce parol evidence in support of his interpretation of the phrase.2
*30The parties’ contract provided that “the entire seed crop ... is, and shall remain at all times covered by this agreement the sole property of [Haney Seed], except as otherwise expressly provided for in this agreement(Emphasis added.) Although unstated, it is the above clause which the majority presumably finds to be in irreconcilable conflict with Haney Seed’s interpretation of the term “open market.” However, the proviso in the above clause contemplates that the parties may elsewhere in the agreement alter, in whole or in part, the title provisions of the printed form.
The question then becomes whether the handwritten phrase “60% of crop at open market” was intended to give the Chap-mans title to 60% of the crop to be disposed of as they wished on the open market. If this interpretation were accepted, there would be no conflict in the contract; the provisions in question would be harmonized.
The legislature has recognized that form contracts are likely to contain language which does not always accurately reflect the intent of the parties.
“29-109. CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS. — Where a contract is partly written and partly printed, or where part of it is written or printed under the special directions of the parties, and with a special view to their intention, and the remainder is copied from a form originally prepared without special reference to the particular parties and the particular contract in question, the written parts control the printed parts, and the parts which are purely original control those which are copied from a form, and if the two are absolutely repugnant, the latter must be so far disregarded.”
By emphasizing the printed form provisions of the contract, the majority has completely disregarded the literal language and intent of I.C. § 29-109. Haney Seed should have been permitted to introduce trade usage and other extrinsic evidence to assist the court in interpreting the handwritten “open market” language in a manner consistent with the true intent of the parties.
The majority neglects to discuss the case of Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975), although it is twice cited in the majority opinion. Werry and Phillips Petroleum Co. had entered into a lease agreement. The contract consisted of a printed form lease and three letters which had passed between the parties during negotiations. The issue was whether the contract required Phillips to install and maintain an operable heating system in the leased premises. The printed form contract gave Phillips wide (if not complete) discretion in constructing and maintaining improvements on the property. One of the letters, however, could be construed to require delivery of a functioning heating system.
The unanimous Werry Court held that the written letter created an ambiguity and that parol evidence was admissible to explain that ambiguity and determine the true intent of the parties (even though, as here, the proffered construction of the letter was seemingly in conflict with the contract’s form language). The court then concluded that the written language of the letter controlled over the printed form language pursuant to I.C. § 29-109. Not only is Werry indistinguishable, it also makes good sense. The Werry holding places helpful and relevant evidence in front of the trier of fact.
I recognize that even if the trial court had admitted Haney Seed’s parol evidence, it still might have ruled against Haney Seed. On appeal, this Court would have *31upheld such a ruling since it would have been supported by competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. Nevertheless, my concern is for that future case in which a trial judge, perceiving a conflict between printed and written clauses, admits only that parol evidence which favors the trial judge’s subjective interpretation of the printed provision; this in spite of the fact that the court might find the handwritten provision to be ambiguous. As a result, the jury will be permitted to hear only one side of the story, only one interpretation of an ambiguity which is by definition susceptible to differing interpretations.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial at which Haney Seed should be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence both as to trade usage and Haney’s understanding of the parties’ intent when they employed the phrase “60% of crop at open market.”
. While the majority’s statement of the common law parol evidence rule is accurate, it should probably be noted that the U.C.C.’s parol evidence rule for sales contracts is more liberal. I.C. § 28-2-202; Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 595 P.2d 709 (1979). The U.C.C. permits the addition of consistent terms under certain circumstances. Id. Under either party’s interpretation, the contract here in question was not a contract for sale. See I.C. § 28-2-106(1).
. The trial court’s exclusion of Haney Seed’s extrinsic evidence is even more surprising in view of the fact that much of Chapman’s parol *30testimony was similarly in apparent conflict with those printed provisions giving Haney Seed title to the growing crop. Chapman himself was unsure whether Haney Seed at all times retained title to the crop. At various points in his testimony, Chapman referred to the peas as “mine”, stated that he really wasn’t sure who owned the peas, and that ordinarily the crop would belong to him until paid for. It is clear that Chapman felt that Haney Seed was obligated to purchase the entire crop, but not that they necessarily retained title to it all along. Thus, assuming Haney Seed’s version of the “open market” provision is in conflict with printed form language, then so is Chapman’s.