dissenting: The majority opinion causes me grave concern for two reasons. First, I believe the result reached by the majority is not legally correct. Second, I am disturbed by the reasoning expressed in the opinion.
The majority opinion considers the holdings of Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969), and Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456, 521 P.2d 262 (1974), as merely two equal alternatives from which the court may choose. The majority characterizes Carroll v. Kittle as being more “nearly in point” — actually, it is precisely on point. Carroll’s well-reasoned opinion is controlling herein. Vaughn v. Murray has absolutely nothing to do with the abolition of governmental immunity. The abolition of judicially imposed governmental immunity can have tremendous fiscal impact across the state and involves major policy considerations which need to be dealt with by the legislature. Carroll *382acknowledged the legislature’s control over the entire field of governmental immunity when it held:
“We recognize the authority of the legislature to control the entire field of governmental immunity including matters covered by judicial decisions.” Syl. ¶ 4.
This court, in Carroll, determined the retroactivity question as follows at 851:
“There remains the consideration of the time when the abrogation of the immunity as herein stated shall take effect. We are of the opinion that reasonable time should be given the various public bodies to meet the new liabilities implicit in this decision. We find ample authority for the proposition that in departing from the rule of stare decisis, the court may restrict application of a newly established rule to the instant case, and cases arising in the future, where it is clear that the retrospective application of the new rule will result in a hardship to those who have relied upon prior decisions of the court. (See Molitor v. Kaneland Com. Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89; Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. (2d) 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, and cases cited therein.)
“Except for the instant case, the effective date of the abolition of the rule of governmental immunity as applied to proprietary enterprises shall be August 30, 1969. Except for the instant case the new rule shall not apply to torts occurring prior to August 30, 1969.”
Vaughn v. Murray involved only the guest statute and affected only actions between drivers and their passengers. Considerations in determining retroactivity are so grossly different in the two cases that they are not comparable. As noted in Vaughn at 466, “ ‘Guest statute’ cases are generally in the liability insurance field and are defended on behalf of insurance companies.” I would affirm the trial court on the basis of Carroll v. Kittle.
Various aspects of the rationale in the majority opinion herein disturb me. The majority opinion reasons it could not justify favoring a damaged tree over a damaged child. This may have a certain emotional appeal, but it is hardly a proper basis for a legal determination as to whether abolition of judicially imposed governmental immunity pertaining to municipalities should be applied retroactively. The issue herein is strictly a question of law and it matters not whether the legal issue arises in a case involving a damaged hubcap, a damaged pet frog, a damaged tree, or a damaged person.
The majority also states, “It has now been nearly three years since our opinion was filed in Gorrell and no great hardship upon the cities of Kansas or the administration of justice in the courts has been shown.” It would be difficult to visualize how the City *383of Newton could have introduced any reliable evidence on how much courts or cities across the state were burdened. This does not mean no hardship has occurred or will occur. One of the reasons mentioned in Carroll for the legislature controlling the field is that the legislature is equipped to determine these questions.
Also, I note that the majority acknowledges the speedy imposition of statutory immunity following this court’s abolition of judicially imposed immunity in order to give time for the enactment of legislation relative to governmental tort liability and “to give cities an opportunity to purchase liability insurance.” Such liability insurance could only apply to injuries occurring during the policies’ effectiveness. I know of no insurance available which would insure the cities retroactively. The legislature obviously believed, after input from the cities, that time was needed for the cities to prepare for their new exposure to liability. The majority of this court, with no input from anyone, has apparently determined no such time is needed.
The effect of the majority opinion is to leave the one year’s immunity created by K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 46-902(b) an island of immunity floating in a sea of liability. The majority opinion appears to raise some question about the statute’s validity by its determination that, “Assuming the 1978 amendments to K.S.A. 46-902 were valid, a question not before the court at this time, they would only apply to causes of action arising after May 16, 1978, the effective date thereof.”
It remains to be seen whether the majority will conclude this statute is “fair.” If it is held not to be valid then, contrary to Carroll, the judiciary rather than the legislature will control the field of governmental immunity. The law will then have undergone the complete 180 degree turn.
I am convinced the trial court should be affirmed herein.
Schroeder, C.J., joins in the above dissent.