I respectfully dissent. The 1977 legislation at issue here (SEERA) is plainly unconstitutional as a gross infringement upon the powers of the State Personnel Board (SPB). Under article VII, section 3, subdivision (a), of the state Constitution, the SPB “shall enforce the civil service statutes and... shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions.” Inherent in the SPB’s mandatory obligation to enforce the civil service laws and prescribe “classifications” for state employees is the additional task of assuring that all civil service appointments and promotions are made “under a general system based on merit....” (Art. VII, § 1, subd. (b).) The foregoing responsibilities of SPB are constitutionally imposed.
A “merit” system of civil service includes the predominant and fundamental principle that state employees shall receive “like pay for like work.” (See State Trial Attorneys' Assn. v. State of California (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 298, 304 [133 Cal.Rptr. 712].) To discharge its constitutional responsibilities, including the maintenance of “merit” principles in state service with “like pay for like work,” it is essential that the SPB retain and exercise not only its historic power to specify particular job classifications for state service, but also to fix the salary ranges appropriate for each classification within the gross amount appropriated each year by the Legislature. SPB must carefully adjust the salaries both vertically in accordance with duties, and horizontally to maintain parity .both between comparable classes of public employees and with the private sector. The establishment of job “classifications” without control over the salaries for the affected positions within the classification would constitute a meaningless act. Without exercising such power to prescribe salary classifications, the SPB could not possibly assure that the constitutionally mandated merit principle is respected and enforced.
Nevertheless, despite the almost syllogistic truth of the foregoing proposition, the majority upholds a statutory scheme which removes from the SPB all effective controls over the salaries to be paid to rank and file state employees. SEERA purports to transfer the fixing of salaries for nonmanagerial or nonsupervisorial employees entirely to a bargaining process which will inevitably, and inherently, be governed by *204political considerations. Thus, under SEERA the salaries for these state employees are negotiated by the Governor and the applicable employee bargaining representative. Although the SPB presumably may suggest guidelines or make recommendations, it can exercise no restraint over the negotiated salaries, maintaining no consistency or equivalency over salary classifications statewide. The SPB’s constitutional authority to classify state employees in accordance with the civil service merit principle thereby is reduced to the empty and anemic formalism of selecting the titles to be assigned to the various job categories in state service, while the Governor and bargaining representative negotiate and settle the critical salary issues. What neither the Governor nor the majority can explain is how it can reasonably be said that such a bargaining process, inevitably tainted by the familiar pressures of political give-and-take, can possibly comply with the mandate which the sovereign people of California in their Constitution have imposed upon the SPB to enforce a civil service system “based on merit” and removed from politics.
The history of the creation and administration of the civil service system in this state reinforces my conviction that SEERA represents an unconstitutional invasion of the authority and responsibility of the SPB. An historic review and analysis of the problem is contained in the careful opinion of Presiding Justice Puglia for the Third District Court of Appeal in this case. Finding its reasoning eminently sound, I set forth and adopt the following pertinent portions of his opinion:
“In 1913, California’s first civil service system was created by statute to eliminate abuses in the political spoils system and to establish instead a nonpartisan system of state employment based upon merit. Among the Civil Service Commission’s duties were the classification and grading of positions \ . . within each class with respect to salaries, to the end that like salaries shall be paid for like duties. . ..’ (Stats. 1913, ch. 590, § 5.)
“In 1927, the commission was given additional powers regarding salary setting; an amendment specified that appointing powers authorized by law to fix the compensation of civil service employees must do so in accordance with the commission’s classification and salary schedules subject to the approval of the commission. (Stats. 1927, ch. 719, § 5.)
“In 1934, the state civil service was elevated to constitutional status (Cal. Const., art. XXIV). By initiative, the voters of the state created *205the nonpartisan, politically insulated, five-member State Personnel Board as successor to the previous statutory commission. The Constitution vested the SPB with ‘all of the power, duties, purposes, functions, and jurisdiction’ in administering and enforcing ‘any and all other laws relating to the state civil service. ...’ (Cal. Const., art. XXIV, § 3.) Constitutionally delineated powers and duties of the SPB included ‘. .. the creation and adjustment of classifications and grades,.. . ’ for state civil service employees. (Cal. Const., art. XXIV, § 2, subd. (c).)
“In 1937, the Legislature adopted the State Civil Service Act implementing a comprehensive state personnel system and directing the SPB to fix salary ranges ‘for each class of position in the State civil service.’ (Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 70; see § 18850.) The new law emphasized the Legislature’s intent not to add to or detract from the constitutional powers, duties and jurisdiction of the SPB. (Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 243.)
“In 1970, article XXIV of the Constitution was revised... .The powers and duties of the SPB delineated in the original sections 2 and 3 (discussed above) were restated and consolidated in new section 3, subdivision (a): ‘The board shall enforce the civil service statutes and. . .shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions.’
“The overall intent of the constitutional provisions respecting the civil service remained unchanged; permanent appointment and promotions ‘shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination.’ (Cal. Const., Art. XXIV, § 1, subd. (b).)
“SEERA substantially increases the rights of state civil service employees to bargain collectively. Under its provisions, the Governor, not the affected state department or agency, is designated as the ‘state employer’ for purposes of bargaining and meeting and conferring in good faith. (§ 3513, subd. (i).) The Governor is required to meet and confer in good faith with respect to wages and hours and other terms and conditions of employment with the exclusive representatives of civil service employees; he is obliged to ‘endeavor’ to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation (§ 3517). Agreements are to be reduced to a written memorandum of understanding (§ 3517.5). The *206memorandum of understanding takes precedence over any of 122 designated sections of the Government Code, relating generally to salaries, compensation, and other terms and conditions of state employment, with which it is in conflict. Where a memorandum of understanding conflicts with any of another nine specified provisions of the Government Code relating generally to layoffs, the terms of the memorandum control unless the SPB finds they are inconsistent with merit employment principles established by the Constitution (§ 3517.6). If a provision of a memorandum of understanding requires the expenditure of funds or other legislative action for its implementation, such provision shall not become effective unless approved by the Legislature (§§ 3513, subd. (i); 3517.6). Only a ‘recognized employee organization’ may enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Governor (§ 3515.5).
“From its inception as a constitutional agency the SPB has been charged with prescribing classifications for civil service positions and enforcing the civil service statutes. The main body of the civil service statutes is locatfed] in title 2, division 5, part 2 of the Government Code commencing with section 18500. That section contains a broad declaration of purpose. ‘As though to demonstrate the preeminent and predominant role for the like-pay-for-like-work principle, the Legislature has listed it among the cardinal objectives of the Civil Service Act. Government Code section 18500 proclaims in part: “It is the purpose of this part:... [U] (c) To provide a comprehensive personnel system for the state civil service, wherein: [II] (1) Positions involving comparable duties and responsibilities are similarly classified and compensated.... ”’ (State Trial Attorneys' Assn. v. State of California [supra] 63 Cal.App.3d 298, 304.) Accordingly, civil service positions are allocated to a single class where they impose like duties and responsibilities, require similar qualifications for appointment and where ‘The same schedule of compensation can be made to apply with equity.’ (§ 18801.)
“Section 18850 provides in part: ‘The [SPB] shall establish and adjust salary ranges for each class of position in the state civil service. The salary range shall be based on the principle that like salaries shall be paid for comparable duties and responsibilities. In establishing or changing such ranges consideration shall be given to the prevailing rates for comparable service in other public employment and in private busi*207ness. The [SPB] shall make no adjustments which require expenditures in excess of existing appropriations which may be used for salary increase purposes.. ..’ [Fn. omitted.]
“The process of classification of civil service positions was explicitly related to the principle of like pay for like work in California’s first civil service statute. It was there provided that the Civil Service Commission classify positions ‘in accordance with the duties attached to such positions’ and ‘grade all positions within each class with respect to salaries, to the end that like salaries shall be paid for like duties.’ (Stats. 1913, ch. 590, § 5.) Although the principle of like pay for like work was not expressly carried over into the Constitution, it remains a part of the statutes which article XXIV directed the SPB to ‘administer and enforce.’ Except for certain modifications not pertinent here, later amendments to article XXIV have not altered its substantive effect but have merely simplified the language and deleted the anachronistic reference to the Statutes of 1913. (Fair Political Practices Com. v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 52, 57-58 [143 Cal.Rptr. 393].)
“Our review of the evolution and history of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions satisfies us that the responsibility to classify civil service positions conferred by the Constitution upon the SPB is inseparable from the responsibility to insure like pay for like work. The latter is thus as much a constitutional command upon the SPB as the former. The uniform application of equal compensation for commensurate duties and responsibilities is essential to an employment system based on classification according to merit. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, the principle of like pay for like work permeates the entire civil service statutes, the enforcement of which the Constitution delegates exclusively to the SPB (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 3, subd. (a)). Therefore we conclude that the authority to fix salaries of civil service employees necessarily reposes in the SPB alone as an integral part of its constitutional power to classify positions. We further conclude that the exclusive exercise of these functions by the politically insulated SPB is essential to the maintenance of ‘a general system based on merit’ as contemplated by article VII, section 1 of the Constitution. (Fair Political Practices Com. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 57.) It is in the assignment of the salary-setting function to the bargaining process between the Governor and employee representatives that SEERA comes into fatal conflict with the Constitution.
*208“[We find] unpersuasive. . .respondents’ assertion that the Legislature alone has exclusive jurisdiction to establish salaries with the SPB relegated to a statutorily derived secondary role in which it serves merely as a collector of data upon which to base salary recommendations to the Legislature. The contention overlooks the essential fact that legislative appropriations for salaries are dispensed in a lump sum. While it is true that the SPB cannot ‘make. . .adjustments [to salary ranges] which require expenditures in excess of existing appropriations which may be used for salary increase purposes’ (§ 18850), within that limitation the SPB still retains exclusive power to differentiate salaries equitably according to merit classifications in order to foster the ‘preeminent and predominant role for the like-pay-for-like-work principle, . . . ’ (State Trial Attorneys' Assn. v. State of California, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 304.)
“Finally, PERB, joined by the Governor, contends the source of its authority derives from the Constitution and therefore is at least of equal dignity with the powers of the SPB. PERB claims under article XIV, section 1 of the California Constitution which grants the Legislature the authority to ‘provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for those purposes [the Legislature] may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers.’
“Article XIV concerns minimum wages for all workers within the state. Unlike article VII, the civil service article, it has no specific application to state employees as distinguished from all workers generally. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a specific provision controls a more general one. (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 637 [268 P.2d 723].) Thus assuming, arguendo, the argument has some abstract validity, article XIV does not afford PERB a source of constitutional power coextensive with that of the SPB. PERB’s claim of constitutional authority under the general police power fails for the same reason.
“. .. [T]he act is constitutionally infirm in the particulars heretofore identified and, because the offending parts relating to wages and salaries are not susceptible to severability, the entire act must fall. (In re Portnoy (1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 242 [131 P.2d 1].)
*209“Ever since the 1913 statutory reform, the vitality of the California merit system has been intimately linked with the principle of like pay for like work. Such constitutionally enshrined precedent is formidable in contrast to the will of a transient, politically sensitive legislative majority in enacting SEERA. (See City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Com. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 680, 696 [125 Cal.Rptr. 779, 542 P.2d 1371].) The 1934 constitutional provision and subsequent amendments thereto clearly manifest ‘a purpose of centralizing civil service administration in the State Personnel Board as an agency immune from.. . external and internal pressures.... [If] The civil service system and its import, established by constitutional amendment, may not now or in the future be diluted or derogated by legislative enactment.’ (Fair Political Practices Com. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 58.) Regardless of the salutary motives of the legislative majority in enacting SEERA (see § 3512), any alteration of the import of article VII requires a constitutional mandate by the People.”
I would issue the peremptory writ of mandate directing the named respondents to perform their statutory and constitutional duties without regard to the provisions of SEERA.
Clark, J., concurred.
Petitioners’ application for a rehearing was denied April 22, 1981. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.