dissenting, in which ROSE, Chief Justice, joins insofar as it addresses itself to the issue of the appointment of a private investigator and a chemist at the State’s expense.
I dissent from the majority opinion because I cannot join in this court’s conclusions that (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he limited the cross-examination of the State’s expert witness and (2) because of the state of the record this court cannot reach the question of whether defendant was entitled to a court-appointed expert to conduct an independent test of the alleged controlled substances.
Cross-examination of the State’s expert witness
Defendant objects to the trial judge’s refusal to allow his counsel to question the State’s expert witness, either during voir dire or cross-examination, about the grades he received during graduate school. This court rejects this contention; however, it is unclear upon what basis this is done.
Under carefully controlled circumstances, X, a private citizen, made- four buys from defendant of what was claimed to be heroin and cocaine, which were the subject of the charges. The State, in its case-in-chief, had an expert witness testify that he had tested each of these substances and that these substances were in fact controlled substances.
On direct examination, the State’s expert testified he was a forensic chemist, who had been employed by the State of Wyoming, Division of State Laboratories, for the last 12½ years. The expert witness also described his educational background as follows:
“I have a bachelor of science degree in chemistry, and I completed one year of graduate school in chemistry.”
The State’s case turned upon the credibility of this expert’s testimony as to whether the substances allegedly sold by appellant were in fact controlled substances, so this witness’s testimony and his credibility with the jury were of the utmost importance.
In an offer of proof, appellant demonstrated that the State’s expert witness had attended two years of graduate school; however, during these two years he received only 12 hours of credit because of the number of courses he failed. A review of the State expert’s college transcript reveals the following courses taken and grades received during this two-year period:
*759After the offer of proof and the State’s objection to questioning of the expert concerning the grades that he received, the trial judge sustained the State’s objection. In so ruling the trial judge stated:
“... [T]he document itself with nothing more, may be misleading and has a greater tendency to mislead than it does to advise. Quite frankly, there is nothing in this document [the official University of Wyoming transcript] to show what these grades measure, what they represent or stand for.1 He was graduated with a BS in chemistry, as indicated on the face of this exhibit. It may indicate a ranking in class, I don’t know; it may indicate performance on a test, I don’t know.”
After being interrupted by appellant’s counsel, the trial judge continued:
“These may, as you [counsel for the State] indicate, have a greater relevance at the time of graduation, but he has been employed by the University, who has granted him this degree, for twelve and a half years, and in the very same area that he has obtained his experience since that time. I think it has more of a tendency to embarrass, as you indicated, or to confuse than it would to illuminate what has happened.”
After appellant was allowed to make his offer of proof, and an extensive colloquy between court and counsel took place, the trial judge once again stated that he did not know what the grades received by the expert meant and, therefore, they were not admissible.
The majority begin their inquiry by expounding the well-recognized rule that once an expert offers his opinions he opens himself up to a more rigorous cross-examination than is normally allowed with an ordinary witness. Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123, 1132-1133 (1978). However, they then go on to state:
“... Even where this rule prevails, the area of cross-examination must remain within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 270 A.2d 837, 844 (1970)....” 624 P.2d at 754.)
This restriction is in direct conflict with our own holding in Chrysler Corporation where we stated in essence that a denial of cross-examination of an expert witness cannot be protected under the guise of judicial discretion. Chrysler Corporation, supra, 580 P.2d at 1133. I believe that this court should follow the dictates of Chrysler Corporation:
In Chrysler Corporation, supra, 580 P.2d at 1133, this court held that the trial judge committed prejudicial error when he refused to allow the defense to question plaintiff’s expert witness on cross-examination about safety standards for automobile seating systems that were adopted pursuant to federal law. As this court stated:
“... It appears that the questioning was designed to test the knowledge, competency and qualifications of the expert witness . ..
“At this point in the trial counsel for Chrysler was confronted with the problem of cross-examination of an expert witness for the plaintiff who had stated his opinion as to the proper method of designing and manufacturing the part that failed. This testimony related the expert’s standard, and it was a critical aspect of the plaintiff’s proof... Fairness to Chrysler in such a situation demands that it be afforded reasonable opportunity to test by searching questions *760the knowledge, competency and qualifications of such an expert witness. In such an instance a ruling of a trial court refusing to permit cross-examination which is based upon an improper ground cannot be protected by the principle that the ruling was discretionary. The denial of an interrogation by Chrysler at this point in the trial constituted prejudicial error because it did not permit a fair opportunity to test the knowledge, competency and qualifications of the expert witness. Whatever the rule may be on cross-examining an expert witness as to the substance of his opinion testimony, the proper rule with respect to cross-examination designed to test his expertise is that it is in no way limited by his testimony on direct examination. Having offered his expert opinion the expert witness exposes himself to interrogation which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-examination of a factual witness, but the expert exposes himself to the most searching kind of investigation into his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge and the reasons for his opinion, including the facts and other matters upon which it is based ... The cross-examiner can raise any subject fairly designed to test his expertise whether touched upon in his direct testimony or not....” (Emphasis added.)
When an expert testifies, he invites investigation into his qualification, the extent of his knowledge, and the reasons for his opinions. Chrysler Corporation, supra, 580 P.2d at 1132-1133. Such investigation cannot be limited by the trial judge because the facts revealed might embarrass the expert.
Here, appellant should have been allowed to test “the knowledge, competency and qualifications” of the State’s forensic chemist. The State’s witness was qualified as an expert by the trial judge; however, the question of credibility was for the jury. The denial of the right to question the expert’s qualifications and knowledge was prejudicial error and “cannot be protected by the principle that the ruling was discretionary.” Chrysler Corporation, supra, 580 P.2d at 1133. However, the majority have rejected the principles set forth in Chrysler Corporation, finding that the ruling here is protected by the principle that the trial judge has broad discretion in limiting cross-examination of an expert.
The majority have also concluded that the expert chemist’s grades received in graduate school could have been properly excluded under Rule 403, W.R.E., because it “could tend to mislead and confuse a jury who might not well understand the grading system or its effect.” I find this reasoning specious because it questions the very intelligence and integrity of a jury. How can the majority question a juror’s ability to understand the meaning of failing grades received in academic classes, while presumably at the same time believing that a juror is sophisticated enough to judge the credibility of witnesses, to weigh conflicting testimony or to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged? I do not believe that the evidence was properly excluded because it would have misled or confused the jury. Quite to the contrary, I believe that this evidence was essential to the jury’s determination of the expert’s qualifications.
Finally, while I agree with the majority that the case cited by defendant’s counsel in support of this contention is not pertinent, I believe that a cogent argument was raised. This court has a duty, therefore, to address the contention. Furthermore, in the face of Chrysler Corporation, a case I believe to be directly in point, I cannot agree with the majority that we must assume no authority exists to support defendant’s contention.
Appointment of a private investigator and a chemist at the State's expense
The majority have also incorrectly concluded that they cannot reach the question of whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to hire a private investigator and a chemist with State funds because the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the motions or a *761formal order. While it is true that the hearing on the motions was not transcribed, the record does contain the motions and a letter concerning the denial of these motions written by the trial judge and addressed to all counsel. I believe that the letter denying the motions in and of itself requires this court to address the question, and by failing to do so, this court has unjustly denied defendant his right to appeal from the trial court’s decision denying his motions.
At his own expense, appellant retained a private attorney, but that attorney later applied for permission to retain an investigator and chemist at State expense, representing in the motion that these services were necessary and that his client was without funds to defray the expense. In his motion requesting funds for a chemist, counsel represented to the court:
“I
“THAT in the State’s investigation of the companion case of Roberta Freeman, on similar and related charges, two State laboratories obtained absolutely contrary results in chemical testing of the supposed controlled substances.
“II
“THAT the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory, which had tested the above-mentioned supposed controlled substances with negative results later declined to perform testing of the supposed controlled substances involved in this case.
“V
“THAT Defendant is unable to provide for the full payment of both an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation, to-wit: the services of Robert Shapiro.
* * * * * *
“VII
“THAT the employment of Robert Shapiro is both necessary and proper in this case; that the refusal to grant Robert Shapiro will critically hurt the defense; and, that if Defendant had the financial resources he would employ Robert Shapiro to assist in his representation.”
In a letter addressed to all counsel, the trial judge stated in pertinent part:
“Further, it would seem that the Court in exercising its discretion should find that the services to be provided are necessary in order to afford the defendant an adequate defense in his case, that the defendant is financially unable to obtain those services, that the Court determine reasonable value of such services and compensation therefor. Here, there is no evidence that the proposed expert witness which the defendant desires to employ is able to controvert the findings and opinions of the State’s witness; and on its face it would appear that the State’s own witnesses are in conflict with regard to the presence or lack thereof of a controlled substance. Also, so far as the chemist is concerned, it appears to the Court that the services requested are somewhat on the extravagant side, especially in view of the affidavit indicating that a substantial portion of these services will be involved in training counsel for the defendants. Training of counsel would seem to be an area of responsibility for retained counsel. Incidentally, little evidence has been submitted to the Court by way of designating other persons who might provide similar testimony at a more reasonable fee.” (Emphasis added.)
From this letter it can be concluded the trial judge found that although the defendant was needy, the request was extravagant and, even though serious questions existed as to the validity of the State’s case, there was no evidence presented showing that an independent expert would be able to controvert the findings of the State’s expert. Defendant was therefore denied State funds to hire a chemist and an investigator. The question, which the majority have chosen not to consider, is then whether such funds were properly denied.
Section 7 — 1—108(a)(iv), W.S.1977, defines a “needy person” as one
*762“. .. who at the time his need is determined is unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 7-1-110, W.S.1977, provides in pertinent part:
“(a) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled:
“(i) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled; and “(ii) To be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation).
⅜ if: ⅜ * ⅜
(d) A needy person’s right to a benefit under subsection (a) or (c) of this section is not affected by his having provided a similar benefit at his own expense, or by his having waived it, at an earlier stage.” (Emphasis added.)
Our statute directs that a needy defendant be afforded legal and other necessary services. The purpose and intent of such a statute are disclosed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (1975). In that case the court reversed defendant’s conviction of attempted robbery of a savings and loan association while armed with a dangerous weapon, holding that the trial judge’s denial of the indigent defendant’s request for the administration of an electroencephalogram was reversible error. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), like our own § 7-1-110, W.S.1977, provides that an indigent defendant after a proper request is made will be provided with necessary investigative and expert services if there is a finding that the services are necessary. The court said:
“Our determination of this issue is reinforced by a consideration of the Congressional purpose in enacting U.S.C. § 3G06A(e) and the due process requirement of fair administration of justice, guaranteeing the crucial right of an indigent to reasonably fair equality with those who have adequate financial means to protect their rights. If the fairness of our system is to be assured, indigent defendants must have access to minimal defense aids to offset the advantage presented by the vast prosecutorial and investigative resources available to the Government. A contrary position might well result in a system wherein the outcome of criminal trials would be determined by the poverty of the accused rather than the integrity of the fact-finding process.” 513 F.2d at 258.
As the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in State v. Sahlie, 245 N.W.2d 476, 478-479 (1976):
“... Due process cannot be satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity to examine possible exculpatory evidence long enough before trial so as to have at least an opportunity to determine if such evidence is or is not exculpatory.”
To be effective, of course, examination of chemical substances must of necessity be made by an expert in the field. In State v. Hanson, S.D., 278 N.W.2d 198 (1979), the South Dakota court reversed and remanded for a new trial a conviction on five counts of distributing marijuana, because among other things the trial court refused to appoint an expert to conduct an independent test of the alleged controlled substance. In so holding, the court stated:
“We conclude that where doubt exists as to whether an independent test of an alleged contraband substance is material and exculpatory and the nature of the substance is critical to the State’s case, the defense must be given an opportunity to have an independent determination made. This is particularly the case where the question of materiality turns on expert evaluations of the alleged contraband ... A lay person is not equipped to refute an expert determination that a substance is, or is not, marijuana. Without an independent test by an expert, it would be very difficult for defendant or his attorney to effectively cross-examine *763the State’s expert, whether on the validity of the tests done, the methods of testing used or the correctness of the test results...
“... [I]t was also incumbent on the trial court to provide defendant with an independent expert to evaluate the substance in question, although the expert need not be of defendant’s choosing.” 278 N.W.2d at 200.
While our statute directs that a needy defendant be afforded legal services and other necessary services, it does not mandate that in every case defendant be provided with investigators and experts merely upon application. The statute requires that before ordering the expenditure of state money the trial judge must determine (1) that the defendant is at the time of the application unable to pay for those services, and (2) that the requested investigators and experts are necessary to insure that defendant will be able to present an adequate defense. There is no requirement that the defendant show that by use of the requested service he will be able to prove his innocence.
It has been said that “the supplying of expert pretrial services to indigent defendants in criminal cases at public expense is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Collins v. State, 14 Md.App. 674, 288 A.2d 221, 224 (1972). In Chrysler Corporation, supra, 580 P.2d at 1133, we recognized the pertinence of this rule but held that error in refusing admission of certain pertinent cross-examination could not be approved on the “principle that the ruling was discretionary.” I find no evidence in the record to support a finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant appellant’s request for a private investigator. However, there is no question but that the issue of whether the substance delivered was a controlled substance was material and critical. Defendant could not be convicted unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the substances delivered were heroin and cocaine, within the definitions of the statute. If the identification of the substances was questionable, information concerning that fact was most important to the defense and it could be supplied only by an expert witness.
Sufficient information to establish the necessity and pertinence of this crucial test was presented to the trial court. That there existed some real doubts as to the validity of the State’s proposed evidence was recognized by the trial judge in his letter when he said that “on its face it would appear that the State’s own witnesses are in conflict with regard to the presence or lack thereof of a controlled substance.” This brings into play the test set forth in United States v. Hartfield, supra, 513 F.2d at 257:
“The test for deciding whether the district judge should have granted such a motion in these circumstances was set forth by our court in United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). There, the opinion reads:
“ ‘A clear standard for deciding what constitutes “necessity” under § 3006A(e) has not yet been stated in this circuit. We agree with the views of Judge Wisdom, concurring in United States v. Theriault, 400 F.2d 713, 716-717 (5th Cir. 1971). The statute requires the district judge to authorize defense services when the defense attorney makes a timely request in circumstances in which a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client having independent financial means to pay for them.’ (emphasis added).
477 F.2d at 725.”
It is further stated in United States v. Hartfield, again quoting from Judge Wisdom’s concurring opinion in Theriault (an opinion that that court had expressly approved in Bass):
“ ‘The trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of the attorney, who has the primary duty of providing an adequate defense... [I]t comes close to putting the indigent defendant in the same position as a non-indigent defendant, where the defense attorney would *764determine whether to engage the services’ ” (Emphasis added.) 513 F.2d at 258.
Admitting that the outcome of the test in the case at bar was problematical, it is still apparent that the attorney should leave no stone unturned to get a solution of the conflict in tests and the reluctance of the Wyoming Criminal Division Laboratory to be involved in presentation of the case. I ask, would any attorney retained and paid by a client having the wherewithal to investigate all pertinent avenues of defense, and seeking to protect the best interests of his client, fail to secure the services of an independent and competent chemist to analyze the substance charged by the state to be heroin and cocaine? The answer is found in United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 258:
“... [0]nce the court-appointed physician had reported that an EEG would be ‘helpful’ in arriving at a proper diagnosis, Hartfield’s attorney, had Hartfieid possessed the necessary financial means, might have been charged with legal incompetency had he failed to resort to the EEG and all other sophisticated diagnostic aids.”
The State, however, contends that because appellant did not have State-appointed counsel he was not entitled to public funds to hire a private investigator and chemist. The attorney general argues that the statutes contemplate State-assisted services only in the context of the public defender system and that to permit an accused to retain his own private counsel and then seek to tap the public treasury would make a shambles of the system. Sections 7-1-108 and 7-1-110, supra, were enacted as part of the Public Defender Act, Ch. 170. S.L. of Wyoming 1977, the whole purpose of that act being to provide a proper defense for all needy persons, not merely those who must in the first instance elect to proceed with the aid of the public defender. It was not intended to bar from assistance those who may have consumed what resources they had in an uncompleted defense of the charge. The request is to be appraised at the time of need, not by what has gone on before. It is not difficult to envision situations where an accused may have had sufficient funds to retain an attorney and commence his defense, then found his funds exhausted before the defense was fully developed. This may result from loss of income due to inability to find work during the progress of the case; it may result from exhaustion of savings or other reasons, but it is the present lack of funds that determines his right to necessary assistance at State expense. This is made clear by the provisions of subparagraph (d) of § 110 where it is specifically said that the defendant’s right to a benefit under the section “is not affected by his having provided a similar benefit at his own expense, or by his having waived it, at an earlier stage.” The extent of his need for help is not lessened because he may have been able to pay his way to that point. Also, the question is whether he is able to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses. Perhaps he can pay one and not the other, and that would be to the advantage of the State.
It is also apparent from the trial judge’s letter denying the motion that he was concerned that the particular request, representing a proposed expenditure of $2,500 was somewhat extravagant, “especially in view of the affidavit indicating that a substantial portion of these services will be involved in training counsel for the defendants.” However, as said in State v. Hanson, supra, 278 N.W.2d at 200, the expert appointed “need not be of defendant’s choosing.” Nor do I think that the trial court was required to have counsel trained at State expense. It is not unusual for a trial court to give a litigant less than he requests, but reduction is not the same as denial. In this case the trial judge’s decision was not primarily influenced by the amount of the request; he was led to the denial because of his determination that there was “no evidence that the proposed expert witness which the defendant desires to employ is able to controvert the findings and opinions of the State’s witness.” To impose such a standard ignores the purpose and intent of the statute which is that a *765needy person have available to him the same services as ‘“a reasonable attorney would engage ... for a client having independent financial means to pay them.’ ” United States v. Hartfield, supra, 513 F.2d at 257.
Because the record reflects that there is at least a reasonable basis to believe that an independent test might be exculpatory, and because conviction turns upon the nature of the substance, I would have held that defendant must be given an opportunity to have the substance tested by a private chemist. Fundamental fairness requires that the State provide defendant with an independent chemist. It does not require that the court blindly accept the recommendation of counsel, but some knowledgeable and competent person should have been designated to conduct a proper test.
For these reasons, I would have reversed the cause and remanded for further proceedings.
. The back of the official University of Wyoming transcript provides the following information concerning student academic record (transcript):