concurring.
This case raises the question of whether a felony conviction under the former grand larceny statute can be used as a prior felony for purposes of imposing a presumptive sentence. The statute in question, AS 12.55.-145(a)(2) provides:
(a) For purposes of considering prior convictions in imposing sentence under this chapter.
(2) a conviction in this or another jurisdiction of an offense having elements substantially identical to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska law is considered a prior felony conviction ....
The state has argued that the former grand larceny statute, AS 11.20.140, (Ch. 40, § 1 SLA 1976), which punished as felonies thefts of property where the value is in excess of $250, is “an offense having elements substantially identical” to theft in the second degree, AS 11.46.130, which punishes thefts of property where the value is $500 or more. The state argues that both crimes involve theft of property of substan*120tial value and that the main reason the element of the offense which sets forth the value of the property has changed is because of inflation.
Both sides have agreed that the value of the property which Wasson was convicted of stealing in 1978 was $387. The state agrees that even with inflation it would be difficult to argue that the value of what Wasson stole would be worth $500 on January 1, 1980, the effective date of the current code. It therefore follows that even if we allow for inflation, Wasson’s theft has “elements substantially identical” to AS 11.46.140, theft in the third degree, which is a misdemeanor offense which punishes thefts of property of “$50 or more but less than $500.”
It seems to me that the principle that criminal statutes should be strictly construed does not allow us to do anything other than strictly construe the element of value in a theft statute. 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.04 (3rd ed. 1974). I do not believe we can rely on the legislature’s former determination that the theft of a certain amount of property was a felony. I also note that the legislature did not say that in order for a prior offense to be a felony that can be used for presumptive sentencing it must be “substantially identical to a felony” under Alaska law. The legislature said that the prior offense must have “elements substantially identical” to a felony under Alaska law. The element of value is a critical element in a theft offense. See Post v. State, 635 P.2d 1194 (Alaska App.1981). That element of value has simply not been shown to be “substantially identical” to a felony under the current code. Therefore Wasson’s former grand larceny conviction is not “an offense having elements substantially identical to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska law.”