dissenting.
Whether to grant a continuance is a question committed to the discretion of the trial court. Neilson v. State, 623 P.2d 304, 307 (Alaska 1981). We should not overturn such a decision unless we can honestly say that there was an abuse of discretion. Such an abuse can only be found if the court gave no appropriate reasons at all for the decision, or the reasons given were clearly untenable. Here the trial court denied the motion to withdraw and the accompanying motion for continuance because it feared that granting them would facilitate perjury. There is substantial evidence in the record that Newcomb did contemplate perjury and that his disagreement with his attorney, which prompted the motion to withdraw, was solely over this contemplated perjury.1 The overwhelming majority of cases that have addressed this issue find judicial concern about contemplated perjury an appropriate reason for denying withdrawal under similar circumstances. Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.App.1976); People v. Sehultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo.1981); State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136, 138 (1970); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc.2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y.Sup.1980); Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (opinion on rehearing); Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer’s Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 Den.L.J. 75 (1981).
I do not see how it can be an abuse of discretion to base a decision on reasons accepted by most of the courts that have considered the issue under discussion.
Since Judge Hanson’s reasoning in denying the withdrawal was to prevent perjury, it necessarily follows that the state’s acquiescence in the request for withdrawal is irrelevant. The issue is not whether the state would lose witnesses or be handicapped in presenting its case if trial were delayed, but whether a delay would enable Newcomb to either find an unethical attorney indifferent to perjury or, having been warned by his difficulties with Davis, fool an ethical attorney. The record is clear that Judge Hanson understood the prosecutor’s suggestion that another attorney might not have the same problem with Newcomb to be based on the prosecutor’s assumption that one of these two alternatives would transpire. In either case, as Judge Hanson found, the administration of justice would suffer. People v. Sehultheis, 638 P.2d at 14-15.
In this regard, I suggest that the only fair interpretation of the colloquy between Judge Hanson and the prosecutor regarding the state’s position on Davis’ motion to withdraw was that the state felt it had such a good case against Newcomb that it was indifferent to any contemplated perjury. A responsible judge can never be indifferent to perjury no matter how often he sees it or how cynical others may become.
Judge Hanson’s decision maintains the integrity of the judicial system without sacrificing Newcomb’s right to obtain relief if he can show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, i.e. that Davis misunderstood him and failed to adequately put on a defense. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977); Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c)(1). See Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 425 n.20 (Alaska 1974). I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
. I believe the requirements of Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) were met. Davis clearly communicated to Judge Hanson his belief that the sole controversy between Newcomb and him involved Newcomb’s desire to perjure himself. To go further and require the trial court to hold a pretrial adversary hearing to determine if Newcomb in fact intended perjury would destroy the attorney-client privilege and necessitate a preview of the defense in violation of Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 783-85 (Alaska 1974). For this reason an extended inquiry has not been required by the courts considering the issue. See, e.g., People v. Sehultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 12-13 (Colo.1981).