dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of issues related to the oral agreements between Desert Irrigation and the individual property owners. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that a directed verdict should have been entered against Desert Irrigation on its written contract with the Water Users Association. In my view, Desert Irrigation made a prima facie case for recovering the maximum sum specified in the written contract. Alternatively, I believe the evidence of reasonable value of labor and materials furnished was sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict.
In general, a person who performs work may claim compensation under an express contract, a contract implied in fact, or a contract implied in law (“quasi-contract”). If there is an express contract, its provision for compensation is binding. However, if the contract is silent on compensation, or if the contract is not fully performed as a result of circumstances which do not bar recovery entirely, then the measure of compensation is the reasonable value of labor and materials actually furnished. E.g., Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976); Julian v. Kiefer, 382 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.Ct.App.1964).
This case presents facts that do not squarely fit the pattern, but which fall within the penumbra, of these general rules. There was an express contract in this case. It was not silent on compensation. It provided for payment of a “sum not exceeding $25,000.00” when Desert Irrigation completed the work and submitted a “final invoice showing the precise amount due, not to exceed $25,000.00 total as aforesaid.” When Desert Irrigation completed the work, it submitted a final invoice showing the precise amount due. The invoice itemized the labor and materials charged on the job. However, a dispute arose over claims for adjustment to the $25,000.00 fig*678ure. The invoice exceeded the $25,000.00 ceiling by $987.42, which Desert Irrigation attributed to work changes orally requested by the Association. The Association, in its answer to Desert Irrigation’s complaint, admitted the contract but counterclaimed to recover for alleged delays or deficiencies in the work. A jury weighed these conflicting claims, and found that Desert Irrigation was entitled to $22,999.35 (including payments received or applied while work was in progress). On appeal, the Association does not contest the verdict directly. Rather, it argues that Desert Irrigation had not established a prima facie case for any recovery under the contract, when motions for directed verdict were made at trial.
As noted by the majority, one who seeks to recover the reasonable value of labor and materials has the burden of proving such value. However, by applying this principle without qualification to the instant case, the majority implicitly equates the case to one in which there was either no express contract, a contract silent on compensation, or a failure fully to perform the contract. I do not believe the case could have been so characterized when a motion for directed verdict was filed at conclusion of Desert Irrigation’s case-in-chief. At that time, the evidence disclosed an express contract, work fully performed, and an itemized final invoice stating a figure consistent with the contract (with alleged oral modifications). If the evidence were accepted, the literal requirements of the express contract had been fulfilled. The evidence was sufficient, when the motion for directed verdict was made, to establish a prima facie case for recovery of the maximum figure provided in the express contract.
At the completion of all evidence, the Association again moved for a directed verdict. At that time the record included evidence showing delays or deficiencies as alleged in the Association’s counterclaim. Such evidence, if believed, would have put this case in the category where an express contract existed but had not been fully performed. In such a case, Desert Irrigation’s claim would have been limited to the reasonable value of labor and materials actually furnished; and Desert Irrigation would have had the burden of proving such value. However, the Association’s proof of delays or deficiencies was disputed by Desert Irrigation. Ultimately, the jury resolved the conflict, largely in the Association’s favor, by finding that Desert Irrigation was entitled to less than it claimed under the written contract. But the district court, when considering the Association’s second motion for directed verdict, was in no position to weigh conflicting evidence. It would have been improper to take from the jury Desert Irrigation’s claim for the maximum contract compensation. As stated by the majority, the district court was bound to accept Desert Irrigation’s evidence as true, and to accord it the benefit of all legitimate inferences, in passing upon each motion for directed verdict.
Even if Desert Irrigation’s case had been narrowed to a claim for reasonable value, the record contained substantial evidence on this issue. It is well settled that the compensation agreed upon by the parties is some evidence of reasonable value. E.g., Ferrier v. Commercial Steel Corp., 142 Cal. App.2d 424, 298 P.2d 555 (1956); Grether v. Di Franco, 178 S.W.2d 469 (Mo.Ct.App. 1944); Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 113 Va. 643, 75 S.E. 220 (1912). In my view, a maximum figure set forth in a contract should also be accorded evidentiary weight. It would, in any event, impose a ceiling upon the available recovery for work done pursuant to the contract. See cases cited in 98 C.J.S. Work and Labor § 66(1), p. 824 (1957 & Supp.1981). I believe an agreed ceiling on compensation is some evidence of what the parties themselves deemed reasonable. Moreover, Desert Irrigation’s representative testified that his company had installed twenty-five to thirty water delivery systems similar to the one in question here. I believe the jury could have drawn legitimate inferences from this testimony, that the figure of $25,000.00 was negotiated in light of such experience and that it would have constituted reasonable compensation for labor and materials furnished in full performance of the contract.
*679In sum, the evidence was thin. I do not believe that any single component of the evidence, or any isolated inference, was sufficient to defeat a motion for directed verdict. But the evidence and inferences, taken together, in my view, were substantial enough to take the case to a jury.
I conclude that a directed verdict, against recovery of the maximum contract figure or of the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished, would have been inappropriate on the record before the district court. I would not disturb the jury’s verdict, or the judgment of the district court, concerning the written contract.