Plaintiff was employed by Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company as a boilermaker-welder at the Richland nuclear works. Defendant ITT-Federal Support Services, Inc., had a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission to "inspect, maintain and render safe" a government owned welding machine made available for use by plaintiff. The welding machine was energized by electricity. Plaintiff contended that in the course of his employment, while using the welder, he received two electrical shocks. The first shock occurred in 1968. No claim is made against this defendant as to that shock and its consequences. However, plaintiff alleges that a second shock occurred in early 1970 and that his traumatic neurosis condition is a result of *490the 1970 shock. Plaintiff's action is based upon the defendant's contractual responsibility to inspect, maintain and render safe the welding machine which he used.
A judgment for plaintiff was entered upon a jury verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Goodell v. ITT-Federal Support Servs., Inc., 15 Wn. App. 639, 550 P.2d 1171 (1976). We granted a petition for review. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm plaintiff's judgment.
To deal with the two issues raised on review, it is necessary to detail the facts. Plaintiff was engaged in fabricating a heat exchange vessel, a large metal container. A welding unit which the plaintiff was using used an AC current to generate a DC current. The unit was on wheels but had been used in the same location for 5 years. The welding unit was grounded to the building in which it was located. An uninsulated shunt had been attached to the welding machine. It conducted electricity from the generator to the welding leads. Its purpose was disputed. Some witnesses said it was to facilitate changing welding leads by clamping them directly to the shunt; other witnesses believed that instruments would be clamped to the shunt to get a reading on the electrical output.
It was undisputed that in both shocks, if in fact the second one occurred, the uninsulated energized shunt slipped out of position and came in contact with the metal case of the welding unit. Electricity thus shorted through the ground into the building and into an overhead crane which the plaintiff grasped in connection with his work on the metal vessel.
In both incidents the plaintiff, in the course of his normal work, reached for and took hold of an uninsulated crane hook. Electrical energy had thus shorted into the welding machine case, into the building ground, into the overhead crane, into the crane hook and when he touched the crane hook, into the plaintiff. In both instances, the presence of a dangerous level of voltage in the crane hook was confirmed by subsequent testing.
*491Plaintiff was treated for the 1968 shock, applied for workmen's compensation benefits, but continued to work. Plaintiff contends that the 1970 shock occurred in January or February of that year. He left employment in April of 1970 and has never returned. Defendant challenges the very occurrence of the 1970 shock and argues, even if it happened, the plaintiff's condition is related to the 1968 shock.
Plaintiff's petition for review raised two issues decided by the Court of Appeals. No other issues are before this court.
First, did the trial court err in instructing that RCW 19.29.010 (Rulel4)1 was applicable to this defendant? This is the major contention between the parties. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that RCW 19.29 set standards only for those entities which distribute electric power and to equipment installed within a structure for the receipt and further distribution of electricity. The Court of Appeals held that this welding machine was not within the ambit of the statute. Plaintiff argues that the statute sets a standard of conduct not only for the distribution of electric power, but also for the maintenance and use of electrical apparatus.
RCW 19.29 is hardly a model of clarity as to legislative intent. As noted by the Court of Appeals, a 1965 amendment (Laws of 1965, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 65, § 1) was entitled "An Act relating to electrical construction." The 1965 amendment was to the 1913 law which was entitled "An Act relating to electrical construction and the maintenance and use of electric wires, apparatus and appliances . . .", Laws of 1913, ch. 130, § 1.
Defendant argues that the requirements of RCW 19.29 apply only to electrical power companies. If that were the legislative intent, the statute failed to so express and limit its application. By its express terms, it applies to the State of Washington, any county, city, or other political *492subdivision, or to any other person, firm or corporation. The statute makes it unlawful to run, place, erect, maintain or use any electrical apparatus or construction except as provided in the statute. RCW 19.29.010.
The subparts of the act likewise dictate a broad application. RCW 19.29.010 (Rule 4) refers to telephones, telegraphs, call bells, fire and burglar alarms. Rule 10 applies to support fixtures on roofs of buildings which may well be private rather than part of the power company distribution scheme. Rule 12 applies to trolley wires. Rule 32 governs work on any live wire, cable or appliance. There is no indication that the statute applies only to power company activities.
Rather we believe that the legislature intended that the basic safety rules of RCW 19.29 would apply to all persons and firms, within its scope, when distributing or using the hazardous and potentially lethal electrical current.
The fact which makes the statutory code particularly applicable to these circumstances is that the welder was not simply a device which was plugged into a wall plug and which used available electricity. If that were the case, it would be a different matter. A simple appliance which merely plugs in and consumes electricity is not what the statute is about. Rather, here, there was an apparatus which took four times the ordinary circuit voltage, generated a different current, distributed it for an industrial purpose, after being specifically grounded into a complex system of extremely hazardous potential. One can hardly equate the plugging in of a toaster with the potential of the plaintiff becoming the final link of the electrical circuit within this welding unit.
The statute says that no person, firm or corporation shall maintain or use any electrical apparatus except as provided in the rules of the statute. Rule 14 states that energized wires or appliances for the distribution of electrical energy shall be insulated or guarded as to protect any person from injury. The shunt was energized, it was installed as an integral part of the welding device, for 5 years it distributed *493electricity without which the welding unit would not function.
We conclude that Rule 14 imposes a duty on defendant to maintain the welding device in a manner sufficient to protect the plaintiff from electrical shock. Therefore, it was proper for the court to instruct the jury that violation of that statute by defendant is negligence as a matter of law.
The second issue upon which review was granted related to the defendant's cross-examination of plaintiff. Defendant sought to introduce testimony and documentary evidence that plaintiff had filed an industrial insurance claim, an application to reopen that claim and claims with private insurance carriers, all of which attributed his claimed injuries to the 1968 incident rather than the 1970 shock for which he was claiming damages from defendant.
Upon plaintiff's motion in limine and upon defendant's offer of proof, this proposed evidence was not allowed. Defendant recognized that it was not entitled to introduce evidence of compensation from collateral sources. However, defendant earnestly contended that it was entitled to introduce evidence, not to prove compensation, but to prove that defendant related his condition to the 1968 shock rather than to the 1970 incident.
There are two controlling principles. First, the admission of evidence largely lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent abuse of that discretion, there is no error. E.g., Hill v. C. & E. Constr. Co., 59 Wn.2d 743, 370 P.2d 255 (1962).
Second, in evaluating the offered evidence, the trial court and this court need to evaluate the probative value of the offered evidence in the defendant's case versus the prejudicial effect upon the plaintiff's case. Rothman v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 7 Wn. App. 453, 500 P.2d 1288 (1972).
Doctors, including psychiatrists, testified for the plaintiff and for the defense. Defendant’s theory that plaintiff related his condition to the 1968 shock was borne out by his vague testimony as to whether or not he had *494mentioned the second shock to various treating and examining doctors. Other doctors stated that he mentioned the second shock. In short, the defense theory was presented to the jury. While it might have been more effective to present documentation of claims in connection with industrial insurance and private coverage, it was only cumulative and it cannot be said that the defense theory was not presented to the jury. Injection of any industrial insurance coverage or private carrier coverage might well have been more prejudicial than helpful to the jury and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Wright, C.J., and Rosellini, Hamilton, Utter, Horowitz, and Dolliver, JJ., concur.
Rule 14. All energized wires or appliances installed inside of any building or vault, for the distribution of electrical energy, shall be sufficiently insulated, or so guarded, located, or arranged as to protect any person from injury." RCW 19.29.010.