dissenting.
The majority’s interpretation of the statute that a proper designation in the notice of appeal of the order or judgment appealed from is a jurisdictional requirement is not unreasonable, but in my opinion is not compelled. For this reason I would adopt an interpretation that unless the respondents are prejudiced by appellants’ error, the appellants can have their case decided on its merits.
The essence of the majority opinion is:
«* * * Despite our cases holding that many of the requirements within these sections are not jurisdictional, it must have been intended that some contents of the *40notice were necessary to the court’s jurisdiction. Otherwise, ORS 19.029, which at that time concerned only the contents of the notice, would not have been included within the jurisdictional confines of ORS 19.033(2).” (Footnote omitted.)
However, we stated to the contrary in Pohrman v. Klamath Co. Comm., 272 Or 390, 396, 538 P2d 70 (1975):
"If we continue to follow our past course the state of the law will be that the failure to comply with some of the statutory requirements for the contents of the notice of appeal will be jurisdictional and others will not. The distinction will not be based upon any rational basis.”
In Pohrman we stated by way of dictum that while the 1959 legislature required certain information to be in the notice of appeal, the statement of such information was not a jurisdictional requirement.
"* * * The 1959 legislature added the requirement that the notice shall contain the names of the attorneys as well as the names of the parties. As far as we can determine this was added for the convenience of the court clerk’s office. It would seem the essence of mechanical jurisprudence to dismiss an appeal out of hand because the attorney failed to insert the attorneys names in the notice. * * *.” 272 Or at 396.
Under the majority’s reasoning, as this requirement of stating the attorneys’ names on the notice of appeal was added in 1959, this requirement is jurisdictional.
In my opinion the intention of the 1959 and ensuing legislatures, consistent with the intention of the bar which requested the legislation, was to create jurisdiction in the appellate court if a document was timely served and filed, which reasonably could be construed to give notice to court and counsel that the party filing the document was appealing a decision of the trial court in a certain case. If the appealing party’s failure to comply with the statute in any way prejudices the other party, the appellate court can dismiss the appeal for failure to comply. ORS 19.033(3). Any more *41restrictive interpretation of our appellate procedure statutes is a reversion to narrow formalism which, in my opinion, is not required by the language of the statute.
Linde, J., joins in this dissent.