dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the statutory limits on an automobile franchisor’s ability to terminate a franchise. In my view, the notice of intended termination of franchise which Ford provided Jones-West was exactly the sort of notice contemplated by NRS 482.36352. Therefore, the receipt of this notice by JonesrWest triggered the thirty-day period during which Jones-West had an opportunity to file a protest of the termination with the DMV. By failing to file a protest within this time period, I believe that Jones-West waived their right to do so.
NRS 482.36352(l)(a) provides that an automobile manufacturer or distributor cannot terminate a franchise without first giving “written notice of its intention [to terminate] to the dealer and the director.” NRS 482.36352(2) further provides:
The notice required by this section must be given to the dealer and the director:
(b) At least 60 days before the effective date of the intended termination .... [And] must include a statement of the particular grounds for the intended termination ....
The statute concludes that “[a] dealer who has received a notice pursuant to this section” has thirty days from receipt of this notice to file a protest with the DMV. NRS 482.36352(3)(b).
It is well settled that where “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court should give that language its ordinary meaning and not go beyond it.” City Council of Reno v. Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. 886, 891, 784 P.2d 974, 977 (1989).
The majority here concludes that NRS 482.36352 contemplates a notice which provides an exact date upon which the termination *778will be effective. Therefore, the majority reasons that notice which is subject to a franchisor’s internal appeals process does not trigger the thirty-day time limit for filing a protest with the DMV. In my view, this interpretation belies the plain and unambiguous language of NRS 482.36352.
First, there is nothing in the text of the statute which requires the franchisor to provide an exact date of intended termination; the statute merely requires that the notice be given, depending upon the circumstances, either fifteen or sixty days prior to termination. Moreover, the statute at issue provides that the franchisor must give notice of its intention to terminate a franchise. The use of the word “intention” implies that the legislature wished to require that notice be given to the franchisee before the termination was a fait accompli. Thus, the legislature clearly understood that at the time a franchisor gives notice, the termination will be, to some extent, conditional upon future events such as an administrative appeal to the DMV or negotiations between the franchisor and the franchisee. Therefore, I believe that a notice of termination of a franchise pursuant to NRS 482.36352 need not provide an exact date of termination.
In my view, Ford’s July 3, 1995 notice of termination satisfied the clear requirements of the statute in that: (1) it stated Ford’s intention to terminate Jones-West’s franchise pursuant to NRS 482.36352(1); (2) it was sent to both the dealer and the director pursuant to the same section; (3) it stated grounds for terminating the franchise (i.e., deficient sales and poor customer service) pursuant to NRS 482.36352(2)(b); and (4) the notice was given to Jones-West at least sixty days prior to the effective date of the intended termination pursuant to NRS 482.36352(2)(b). Accordingly, pursuant to NRS 482.36352(3)(b), Jones-West had thirty days from receipt of this notice in which to file a protest of the termination with the DMV. By failing to timely file such a protest, Jones-West waived this right.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and reinstate the order of the DMV dismissing Jones-West’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.