dissenting.
The majority recognizes the applicability of Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977), where it is stated:
“Where there is a coincidence of a negligent act and the occurrence of damages a ‘wrongful act’ has been committed for which a legal remedy in damages is generally available. Therefore the applicable statutes begin to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act albeit the full extent of the damages may be unknown or unpredictable at that initial time.” 98 Idaho at 227, 560 P.2d at 1317.
The majority also notes that Ralphs would appear to be dispositive of the issue presented by appellants absent “compelling reasons” for distinguishing the circumstances of the two cases.1 I fail to see such reasons.
*403The statutory scheme established by the Idaho Tort Claims Act requires that all claims against the state, i. e., written demands to recover money from the governmental entity, I.C. § 6-902(7), shall be presented to and filed with the secretary of state within 120 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. I.C. § 6-905. This provides the state time in which to analyze the claim and determine whether to allow or deny the claim. I.C. § 6-909. No action is allowed on the claim unless it has first been properly presented and filed and denied by the governmental entity involved. I.C. §§ 6-908, 910. We have expressly held that the notice of claim requirement of the ITCA embodied in the above sections is mandatory and in the nature of a condition precedent to the maintenance of a tort action against the state or governmental subdivision. Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Agost v. Idaho, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S.Ct. 419, 46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975).
Appellants filed such a notice of claim against the city of Nampa on October 10, 1973, and at that time were apparently aware of the state’s potential liability. This awareness is reflected by the fact that a letter of complaint, though not of notice of claim, dated August 21, 1973, was delivered to the state Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, some two months prior to the filing of notice of claim against the city. This letter, the record indicates, was followed by a meeting and a detailed written response from the state. Moreover, appellants filed, on April 11, 1974, an action sounding in tort against the state as well as the city. Thus the record reflects that appellant’s claim against the state, which under Ralphs requires but the occurrence of a wrongful act together with damage, was probably known as of August or October, 1973; at any rate, it was necessarily and certainly known prior to the filing of the suit against the state and others in April, 1974.
Even assuming that knowledge of the claim against the state was not had by appellants until shortly before the filing of the April action, notice of the claim, as required by the act, was not filed until over 120 days had passed. Not only was the time limit for providing notice of claims not met, the statutory scheme providing for prelitigation notice and allowance or denial of claims was frustrated. As we noted in Newlan, supra, 96 Idaho at 716, 535 P.2d at 1353, the language of the ITCA, that no claim or action shall be allowed unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits and in the manner prescribed by the act, is clear and unambiguous and without such compliance the suit cannot be maintained. I believe dismissal of the action was proper.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.. One of these “compelling reasons” appears to be based on the argument that damages or the extent of liability may be difficult to determine in the case of a “continuing” tort. Here, how*403ever, the nature of the liability and the amount of damages were specified in the claim filed against the city in October, 1973. These injuries, and the amount of damages claimed therefor, reappeared in virtually identical form in the notice of claim against the state filed in August, 1974, as well as in the complaint filed in April, 1974, and later amended.