The issue on appeal is whether a judgment has become dormant pursuant to 12 O.S.1971 § 7351 for failure to issue execution on it within five years of the last execution. The appellee, Chandler-Frates & Reitz, an insurance agency, paid insurance premiums on behalf of the appellant, Walter Kostich, d/b/a/ Rivair Flying Service, a fixed aircraft base operator. After Kostich failed to reimburse the agency for the premiums, on January 5,1972, the agency obtained a $4,395.67 judgment against him, together with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from August 1, 1968, and judgment for $194.15 with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent per annum from February 3,1969. On January 17, 1972, the agency filed a writ of execution which was returned “no property found.” Chandler-Frates attempted to collect its judgment from Kostich by conducting hearings on assets, initiating garnishment proceedings and negotiations with Kostich. The agency was successful in recovering a portion of the judgment. On October 17, 1975, Kostich filed an application to determine the amount due under the judgment. The court entered an order on August 23, 1976, in response to the application. The judgment was modified because the court found prejudgment interest had erroneously been granted at the rate of ten percent per annum2 instead of at six per*1289cent as provided by 15 O.S.1971 § 266.3 The court determined that it had been “without jurisdiction” to enter the judgment. The 1972 judgment was modified and reduced by $815.88.
Chandler-Frates sought to execute on the judgment on February 16, 1977. The writ of execution was returned “no property found.” After attempts were made to enforce the judgment, another hearing on assets was scheduled. Kostich filed a motion to quash and plea to the jurisdiction. He asserted that the judgment was dormant and had been extinguished pursuant to 12 O.S.1971 § 735. The court denied his motion.
The determinative question is whether the 1976 order adjusting the interest rate constituted a correction of the initial Journal Entry or was it a rendition of a subsequent judgment. If the court corrected the judgment, the 1977 execution was untimely because the judgment had become dormant by operation of law. If the subsequent modification was a vacation of a void judgment and entry of a new judgment, the judgment is still viable.
I
Although the trial court found it lacked jurisdiction to assess prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent, what it lacked, in fact, was the authority to do so. A similar situation was presented in the case of Kubatzky v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 119 Okl. 236, 249 P. 412, 415 (1926). In Kubatzky, the trial court had foreclosed a mechanic’s and materialman’s lien and set the rate of post-judgment interest at ten percent.4 Although the case was reversed on other grounds, the Court said:
“While under the pleadings the court might have rendered judgment for interest from the date the account was due, had the evidence and the law sustained such finding, the court was without authority to set such rate of interest above 6 percent per annum.”
The record reveals that the judge imposed the exact amount claimed by the agency. The record also reflects that these payments were past due prior to the commencement of the action. The date from which and to which interest should be computed is clearly ascertainable. Under these circumstances, the liability for interest is fixed by law and is not dependent on any facts submitted to the court.5 Where the court errs and imposes a rate of interest which exceeds the legally allowable interest rate permitted by statute, the judgment is subject to reformation to allow the proper rate of interest to be imposed without vacating the original judgment.6 The proper assessment of interest on a final judgment, at the time judgment was entered, [unless otherwise provided by contract] bore interest at the rate of ten percent from the date of entry and at six percent from the date due, as a matter of law. It is not necessary to set out this in a judgment.7 The entry of the order correcting the balance due under the judgment was merely a clerical act, and *1290the dormancy statute continued to run on the original judgment.8
II.
The appellant urges that the trial court erred in failing to find the judgment had become dormant, and that the interim order tolled the running of the five year period provided by 12 O.S.1971 § 735.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary a partial payment will not prevent the running of a dormancy statute.9 Similarly, ancillary proceedings such as hearings on assets and garnishment proceedings do not prolong the life of a judgment, in the absence of the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the judgment within the statutory period.10
Actions on judgments are frequently limited by specific statutes which proscribe any actions after the lapse of a certain number of years following the rendition of the judgment or the issuance of the last execution upon it. There was no judgment lien at common law. In granting a right which did not exist at common law, the legislature can prescribe certain conditions which must be met by all judgment creditors if dormancy is to be prevented and the lien of a judgment to be continued. There is no limitation other than that of a dormancy statute upon the effective duration of a judgment. A statute prescribing limitations in actions on judgments is a restriction on the common law right of action on a judgment,11 and general statutes of limitation including exceptions imposed thereby have no application to either actions or judgments or the limitation period prescribed specifically for judgments.12
This Court held in State v. Sterling, 198 Okl. 398, 179 P.2d 125, 126 (1947) that there is a clear distinction between a statute of limitations and a dormancy statute. A statute of limitation is one of repose and the holder of a right of action cannot, by any act on his part, disturb the quiescence produced by the running of the period of limitation; while a dormancy statute constitutes a condition imposed upon the holder of a judgment which adheres to, and is a part of, the judgment. Under 12 O.S.1971 § 735, the judgment becomes dormant if no execution is issued within five years of the entry of the judgment or if five years intervene from the date of the last execution issued on the judgment and the time of suing out another writ of execution on the judgment.13
The provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 735 must be strictly construed.14 Although several attempts were made to satisfy the judgment by garnishment proceedings and asset hearings, these attempts did not comply with the statutory mandate requiring issuance of execution.15 Because of the failure of the agency to issue execution on its judgment during the five years which intervened from the date of the last issuance of execution, the judgment became dormant on January 17, 1977.
The appellant requests that the cause be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to order the appellee to return to the appellant any and all sums paid by him on the judgment since January 17, 1977. We find this is a separate cause of action which has not been litigated and is not a proper issue for consideration in this appeal.
REVERSED.
*1291LAVENDER, DOOLIN and HAR-GRAVE, JJ., and WILSON and BOX, S.JJ., concur. IRWIN, C. J., BARNES, V. C. J., and OPALA, J., dissent. WILSON, S. J., sitting in place of WILLIAMS, J., excused. BOX, S. J., sitting in place of SIMMS, J., disqualified.. It is provided by 12 O.S.1971 § 735:
“If execution shall not be sued out within five years after the date of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be rendered, in any court of record in this State, or if five years shall have intervened between the date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of suing out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment shall become dormant, and shall cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor: Provided that this section shall not apply to judgments against municipalities.”
. The rate of interest effective at the time judgment was entered was ten percent from the date of rendition. It was provided by 12 O.S. 1971 § 727 [which was amended by 12 O.S. Supp.1979 § 727 to provide a ten percent rate] that:
“All judgments of courts of record shall bear interest, at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, from the date of rendition, provided that:
1. When a rate of interest is specified in a contract, the rate therein shall apply to the judgment debt and be specified in the journal entry of judgment; however, said rate shall not exceed the lawful rate for such obligation; or
2. When a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries is accepted by the trial court, the court in rendering judgment shall add interest on said verdict at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date the suit was commenced to date of verdict.
. The legal rate of interest prior to judgment is six percent pursuant to 15 O.S.1971 § 266:
“The legal rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) in the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest, and by contract the parties may agree to any rate as may be authorized by law, not in effect or hereinafter enacted.”
. The applicable statutory rate under 15 O.S. 1961, § 274 was six percent. This action was on an open account, and there was no suggestion that there was an agreement for a higher rate of interest. [See Okl.Const. art. 14 § 2]. The statute provided:
“All judgments of courts of record and justices of the peace shall bear interest from the day on which they are rendered at the rate of six percent per annum.”
. See Whale v. Rice, 173 Okl. 530, 49 P.2d 737, 740 (1935); and St. Louis E. R. & W. Ry. Co. v. Oliver, 17 Okl. 589, 87 P. 423, 427 (1906).
. Stanaway v. Stanaway, 70 Mich.App. 294, 245 N.W.2d 723, 725 (1976); Putnam v. Otsego Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 A.D.2d 556, 360 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (1974); Counts v. Dobbs, 235 S.W. 716, 719 (Tex.Civ.App.1921).
. Cochran v. Cochran, 49 Ala. 178, 269 So.2d 884 (1970); rev’d in part on other grounds 289 Ala. 615, 269 So.2d 897 (1972); on remand, 49 Ala.App. 749, 269 So.2d 905 (1972).
. See Baker v. Martin, 538 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okl.1975).
. Lewis v. Smith, 99 Ga. 603, 27 S.E. 162 (1896).
. Charles Banfield & Co. v. State, 525 P.2d 638, 640 (Okl.1974); First Nat’l. Bank of Norton v. Harper, 161 Kan. 536, 169 P.2d 844, 849 (1946).
. Susskind v. Freund, 147 Misc. 486, 263 N.Y.S. 300 (1933).
. Thomas v. Murray, 174 Okl. 36,49 P.2d 1080, 1081 (1935).
. Prusa v. Hejduk, 205 Okl. 379, 238 P.2d 304, 307 (1951).
. Thomas v. Murray, supra.
. See Charles Banfield & Co. v. State, 525 P.2d 638 (Okl.1974).