Husband appeals an order denying his motion to modify the dissolution judgment to eliminate spousal support after wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion at the close of his presentation, because he had not shown a substantial change in circumstances. He argues that remarriage is a substantial change of circumstances and, alternatively, that the court should not have denied his motion without requiring wife to put on evidence. We affirm.
The parties were married 27 years and were divorced in 1979. At that time, husband worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at a salary of $30,000 to $35,000 per year. He testified that wife was also employed at that time, earning $5 or $6 per hour. Under the dissolution judgment, husband was obligated to pay $300 per month spousal support until he retired and $150 per month thereafter.1 He remarried in December, 1980, and began living in his new wife’s home with her and her daughter by a former marriage.2 In October, 1986, he retired from his government position and began working as a private consultant, at a salary of approximately $48,000 per year. In addition, he receives about $1,000 per month from a civil service annuity. He continued to pay $300 per month spousal support to wife after his retirement.
Husband moved to modify the judgment, requesting that his support obligation be terminated because wife had remarried. Wife was called as a witness during husband’s presentation of evidence. She admitted that she had remarried but contended that her new husband did not provide her with any financial assistance. She explained that he continued to live at his residence in Skamokawa, Washington, while she maintained her Portland residence so that she could continue working in that city.3 One of her adult sons also lives with her and apparently makes some contribution toward meeting household expenses. She testified that she would eventually *486move , into her new husband’s home, possibly by the end of 1988. She also testified that she did not know anything about her new husband’s financial condition, other than that he was a retired truck driver and received $610 per month as Social Security benefits. At the close of husband’s evidence, the court, on its own initiative, denied his motion, stating:
“There’s been no material unanticipated substantial change of circumstances.”
Husband appeals.
The effect that a supported spouse’s remarriage has on a duty to pay spousal support is described in Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 46, 733 P2d 1363 (1987):
“[R]emarriage of the supported spouse may represent a change in circumstances; as we have pointed out, however, it will not automatically terminate a spousal support award. This is so because remarriage of a supported spouse will not always supplant the purposes behind the initial award. Support should be terminated when the purposes of the initial award have been met.”
Husband contends, however, that once a payor spouse shows that the supported spouse has remarried, the supported spouse has the burden to establish that the reasons for spousal support still exist.
ORS 107.135(2)(b) authorizes the modification or termination of a spousal support award when there has been a substantial change in the parties’ economic circumstances. As stated in Bates, remarriage may result in such a change. However, nothing in the statute suggests that the economic effects of remarriage should be treated differently than any other change of circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no authority or justification for shifting the burden of proof in cases where the alleged change of circumstances is remarriage.
' The dissent relies on Wilson and Wilson, 62 Or App 201, 660 P2d 188 (1983), for the proposition that remarriage should be treated differently than other changes in circumstances and that the supported spouse who has remarried has the burden to prove that the reasons for the original support award still exist. However, the court’s analysis in Wilson was *487dependent on the “policy” established in Nelson v. Nelson, 181 Or 494, 182 P2d 416 (1947):
“It would not be good public policy to compel a divorced husband to support his former wife after she has remarried, except under extraordinary conditions which she should be required to prove.” 181 Or at 500. (Citations omitted.)
The policy in Nelson was clearly rejected in Bates and Bates, supra, 303 Or at 44, where the court recognized that spousal support may be based on a variety of the factors in ORS 107.105(1) (d) and that the determination of whether spousal support should be modified or terminated on remarriage depends on whether the purposes of the initial award have been satisfied. Some of the purposes of spousal support maybe altered by remarriage. Others may not. The Bates decision concluded that, in most instances, as here, preserving the parties’ standards of living established during the marriage remains as the gauge of the continuing fairness of the support award, even after remarriage.
The dissent reasons that the supported spouse should have the burden of proving that the purposes for the original spousal support award still exist, because that spouse is in the best position to provide the court with information on that issue. However, that reasoning would apply to many, if not most, circumstances that can change. For example, when the income of the supported spouse increases, the supported spouse will usually be in the best position to provide the court with information on the issue. If the payor spouse does not believe that the information provided by the supported spouse is reliable, there are, as in any other instance, legal procedures available, such as discovery.4
In this case, husband was given a full opportunity to present evidence. In fact, he called wife as a witness. At the close of his case, the trial court concluded that he had failed to show a change of circumstances that justified termination of *488spousal support. There is no indication in the record that the purpose of the original support award was other than to provide an equitable distribution of income between the parties. Thus, our task on review is to determine whether, in view of the changed circumstances, a change in the support award is necessary to “maintain the relative positions of the parties as established in the initial decree.” Bates and Bates, supra, 303 Or at 47. In doing so, it is appropriate to examine the “potential shared income” of the parties, as well as the number of persons in the households of the respective parties. Hall and Hall, 86 Or App 51, 738 P2d 218 (1987).
3. Husband’s income has increased from approximately $35,000 per year to about $48,000. In addition, he receives approximately $1,000 per month from a civil service annuity. He has remarried and lives with his wife and her daughter. His new wife works occasionally, and she owns the home in which they live. Wife has remarried, but is not living with her husband, because her present home is closer to her work. She has plans to live with him, but the date of that is indefinite. She lives with an adult son, who makes some contributions to household expenses. Wife’s income has not changed substantially. Her new husband is retired and receives $610 per month in Social Security. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that wife’s remarriage did not substantially affect her economic circumstances and, therefore, husband has failed to prove that there has been a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of spousal support.5
Affirmed. No costs to either party.
The parties’ seven children are all over 18 years of age, and there is no child support obligation.
Husband’s new wife receives $200 per month in child support from her child’s father. She is not employed outside the home.
At the time of the hearing, wife was not working, due to recent back surgery. Before surgery, she earned $8.35 per hour. She expressed a desire to return to work when her back condition would allow it.
Our conclusion that the rule in Wilson was rejected in Bates is not inconsistent with our opinion in Ho and Ho, 93 Or App 421, 762 P2d 344 (1988), where we held that the husband’s presentation of evidence as to the wife’s change in employment and domestic association was sufficient to justify modification or termination of the spousal support, “unless wife were to show that her need for support [continued] substantially as it has originally.” 93 Or App at 424. In this case, husband presented no evidence regarding changes in wife’s circumstances, other than the fact that she has remarried.
In view of our holding that husband had the burden to establish a substantial change in circumstances, there is no merit to his argument that the court should not have denied his motion without requiring wife to put on evidence.