with whom MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
Given the particular facts of this case I cannot agree that the Lords proved by clear and convincing evidence that the natural mother’s reasons for not communicating with her daughter did not constitute “justifiable cause” under AS 25.23.-050(a)(2)(A). In light of the mother’s youth and indigency throughout the period in question, the impact of her indigency on her efforts to regain custody of her minor daughter, and the obstructive conduct of the natural father and several members of his family, I conclude that the Lords failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, lack of justification on the part of the natural mother.
In Delgado v. Fawcett, 515 P.2d 710 (Alaska 1973), we agreed with the Supreme Court of Minnesota’s observation that:
The correlative rights and duties inherent in the parent-child relationship are natural rights of such fundamental importance that it is generally held that parents should not be deprived of them “except for grave and weighty reasons.” In an adoption proceeding, where an absolute severance of this relationship is sought, the consent provisions are designed to protect the natural rights of a parent to the custody, society, comfort and services of the child.
Id. at 712 (quoting In re Parks’ Petition, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1964) (footnote omitted)). Alaska’s forfeiture of consent statute provides in part that consent to adoption is not required of *1228a non-custodial parent if that parent for a period of at least one year has “failed significantly without justifiable cause ... to communicate meaningfully with the child.” AS 25.28.050(a)(2)(A). In D.A. v. D.R.L., 727 P.2d 768 (Alaska 1986), we observed:
In past decisions this court has strictly construed these statutory consent provisions, in order to protect the rights of the natural parent. S.M.K. v. R.G.G., 702 P.2d 620, 623 (Alaska 1985); R.N.T. v. J.R.G., 666 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Alaska 1983); D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834, 837 (Alaska 1981) Matter of Adoption of K.M.M., 611 P.2d 84, 87-88 (Alaska 1980). We also have read the term “meaningful communication” broadly. See K.M.M., 611 P.2d at 88. Contra In re: J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986). Thus, in circumstances where the child is too young to read or communicate over the telephone, we have relaxed the requirement of meaningful communication under the “without justifiable cause” language of AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(A). S.M.K., 702 P.2d at 624.
Id. at 770.
Irma Addison, at 18 years of age, gave birth to Becky Sue in November of 1980. In April of 1982 Irma received information that her father was terminally ill. Before departing for California Irma made arrangements to leave Becky Sue with Pamela Danielson (now Pamela Lord), the sister of Becky Sue’s natural father. On the day of Irma’s father’s burial she received a call from Rick advising her that he had Becky Sue with him in Alaska.
Upon Irma’s return to Colorado she was informed that the local social services department had intervened and filed charges that she had abandoned and mistreated Becky Sue.1 Irma contacted the district attorney’s office as well as legal aid, and was advised that they could not assist her in obtaining the return of Becky Sue from Alaska to Colorado. A hearing on the abandonment charges was subsequently held in May of 1982. At this hearing the charges were dropped, and the case against Irma was dismissed.
Also of significance is the fact that after her return to Colorado from her father’s funeral, Irma had a telephone conversation with Rick, who was in Alaska. According to Irma she was told by Rick that he would never allow her to see Becky Sue again, and that if she attempted to come to Anchorage for that purpose she would not get “past the airport.”
In July of 1982 Irma married Roger Addison and subsequently gave birth to a daughter. Thereafter, and throughout the entire three-year period in question, Roger and Irma experienced extreme financial difficulties. As the majority notes, during this three-year period Irma made attempts to obtain custody of Becky Sue. In this regard Irma consulted an attorney and welfare officials in Ohio, as well as legal aid and social services representatives in California, all of whom advised her that they could not assist in securing legal custody of Becky Sue until the child could be located.2
My analysis of the record and the parties’ arguments leads me to the conclusion that the superior court erred in holding that the Lords had proven by clear and convincing evidence Irma’s lack of justification for her failure to communicate with Becky Sue. Here I think it evident that a youthful and immature Irma believed that any attempts on her part at communication, short of obtaining physical custody of Becky Sue, would be hindered by the Dan-ielson family. Further, it is apparent that Irma’s indigency3 and her lack of legal *1229sophistication hampered her efforts throughout this three-year period to communicate with and obtain custody of Becky Sue.4 Given this record and the rules of construction we alluded to in D.A. v. D.R.L., 727 P.2d at 770,1 conclude that the superior court erred in holding that the requirement of Irma’s consent to the adoption of Becky Sue had been forfeited.
. These charges were based in part on "false” allegations of Rebecca Danielson, the mother of Rick Danielson.
. In April of 1982, Rick had custody of Becky Sue in Anchorage; in November of 1982 Becky Sue was in the custody of Rebecca Danielson in Ketchikan and Thorne Bay; in February of 1985 Becky Sue was back in Anchorage with Rick; in May of 1985 Rebecca Danielson again had custody of Becky Sue in Ketchikan; and in December of 1985 Pamela Danielson had custody of Becky Sue in Texas.
. The instant facts resemble those in S.M.K. v. R.G.G., 702 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1985). In that case the father took his son from Alabama to Alaska. Id. at 621. When the mother eventually located her son two years later, she did not attempt to communicate with him because (a) she did not believe her letters would reach him and (b) she believed the son was too young to understand what was going on. Id. at 622. Nor did she personally visit her son, because she lacked the financial ability to travel to Alaska. Id. at 624.
We found the mother’s beliefs reasonable. Id. at 625. Further, we expressly rejected the notion that one can remove a child from an indigent mother and then call the mother’s failure to visit unjustified:
[W]e are astonished that the Kayes could plea to this court the "unjustified” actions of Stuart’s mother, when it was the Kayes and other members of [the father’s] family who collaborated to wrongfully deny Stuart access to his mother during Stuart’s first few years of life. To hold that Ruth’s failure to communicate was not justifiable in these circumstances would only serve to encourage the obstruction of court-ordered custody rights, and trap the indigent parent.
Id. at 625.
.Alaska Statute 25.23.050(a)(2) specifically mentions indigency as a justification. I think it apparent that any lack of sophistication on Irma’s part in locating or communicating with *1229Becky Sue could have been overcome had Irma hired a competent lawyer and been able to afford to travel to Alaska. In particular, with the assistance of a competent lawyer Becky Sue could have been located, and early custody proceedings could have been commenced, particularly at times during which Becky Sue was in the physical custody of persons other than her father.