(dissenting)—I dissent. It was error for the court to hold as a matter of law that Anderson's death resulting from Brosseau's act of self-defense was not covered by his insurance. The determination of whether an occurrence, which triggers coverage under the policy, took place is a disputed question of fact which precludes this case from being dismissed on summary judgment. Further, an injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not an expected or intended act from the standpoint of the insured. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for trial on the disputed factual issues regarding coverage.
Facts
Defendant Brosseau described the circumstances leading up to Anderson's death in answers given at his deposition:
Q When you saw his hand raise up, did you—were you under the impression it was a continuous motion that was meant to actually have the knife at your body?
A He was from here—
Q Was he walking towards you with the knife raised?
*102A No, he was—when I seen him, he was not walking. He was moving at a good pace.
Q He was walking fast?
A Very fast.
Q And he was lifting the knife up as you were walking forward.
A What I remember most is it was up and he was moving this way.
Q You have, just for the record, you have got your fists raised up about equal with your head, would you say that's basically about as far as he had it raised himself?
A I couldn't say because he was—I wouldn't say it was as high as his head. He was getting too close. I mean, he was already on it on a downward swing when I shot him.
Q So in your opinion he was actually trying to strike you with the knife?
A He was going to gut me, there was no doubt in my mind.
Q Could you tell what part? Did you have an opinion or any understanding as to what part of your body he was aiming for with your knife?
A Just the front of me.
Q When you shot him, how far would you estimate the knife was from you?
A Probably two feet.
Q Let's make sure we have got the sequence of events because I know that these things move very quickly, but I would like to get an exact understanding of what you saw right before you fired the shot. He was walking quickly towards you and raising the knife at you while he was walking, correct, is that what you saw?
A I did not see him pick up the knife from the, you know, all I seen was when he turned away from the table. And I glanced over to her because I did not see him pick up the knife from the table. He was reaching, apparently, and I seen him and I didn't even see him come in the door because I had been talking to her as we walked back, see. And I remember telling her that I'll pick up the kids Wednesday. And by that time I looked up and he was on me.
Q Did you look at his eyes before he—
A He was wild.
Q Could you tell if he was looking at you or looking at her?
A I think he was looking at me. I was ahead of her just far enough that I was the one that was going to get stuck first.
Q In your opinion he was aiming the knife for you?
*103A Oh, yes, yes, I was in his way.
Q And could you tell whether his arm was in a swing apart from the fact that his arm had been raised at you and he was advancing with his knife?
A No, he was moving this way when I shot him.
Q Was his arm moving as well as his body when you shot him, was his arm thrusting the knife towards you at the point in time when you saw him?
A I don't remember that. All I remember is when I shot him he was extended like this. I remember that real—everything started from then on.
Q And it appeared to you as though he was trying to hit you with the knife—
A There was no doubt in my mind.
Clerk's Papers, at 27-30.
Standards Governing Summary Judgment
The procedural question presented is whether the trial court correctly dismissed this case on summary judgment. In reviewing a summary judgment, the reviewing court must consider all evidence and inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Hontz v. State, 105 Wn.2d 302, 714 P.2d 1176 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to prove there is no genuine issue as to a fact which could influence the outcome at trial. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion, may questions of fact be determined as a matter of law. LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 (1975).
The policies in question provide coverage for bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Clerk's Papers, at 47, 60. Occurrence is defined as an "accident" which results in bodily injury. Clerk's Papers, at 43, 61. Each policy excludes coverage for bodily injury either "expected" or "intended from the standpoint of the Insured." Clerk's *104Papers, at 43, 60. The concept of accident includes deliberate acts where an "additional unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death." Detweiler v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wn.2d 99, 104, 751 P.2d 282 (1988), quoting Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 20 Wn. App. 261, 263-64, 579 P.2d 1015 (1978).
The substantive question presented, but glossed over by the majority, is whether the circumstances surrounding the subject act of self-defense constituted an "additional unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening". Because the determination of whether an "unforeseen happening" occurred is a factual determination necessitating a trial, the court erred in dismissing this case at summary judgment. See Detweiler v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., supra; McKinnon v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 25 Wn. App. 854, 860, 610 P.2d 944 (1980).
In Detweiler, the court stated:
Although the result of claimant's action (being struck by metal fragments in the neck, face and eye and sustaining injuries therefrom) was doubtless unintended, the means (shooting bullets from a gun at a nearby steel target) were obviously intended. It is thus arguable that claimant's injuries were a natural consequence of his actions and that no "additional unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening" occurred to bring them about. A motion for summary judgment, however, "should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable [persons] could reach but one conclusion." Under the facts presented, the rapidly moving pickup truck and moving shooter resulted in changing distances between shooter and pickup. Those and other variables inherent in this confused occurrence, such as angle of fire, make "accident" a factual issue since reasonable minds could disagree as to whether under the circumstances what happened was an additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening which brought about the injuries.
(Footnotes omitted.) Detweiler, at 108.
In the present case, Brosseau's deposition establishes that the sequence of events leading to the shooting was very quick, unexpected and confusing. Brosseau looked up *105and Anderson was upon him with a knife, looking wild in the eyes and walking quickly toward him, with the raised knife only 2 feet from his chest. Reasonable minds might differ as to whether Anderson's quick approach with a knife aimed at Brosseau's chest was an additional, unexpected, independent happening which brought about the injuries. Therefore, a factual issue exists as to whether what occurred here was an accident for which the subject policies provided coverage. Consequently, the trial court erred in determining this issue as a matter of law and in granting the insurer's motion for summary judgment.
Contrary to what the majority states, the issue we face is not one of first impression. The majority's holding conflicts with and ignores settled Washington case law. Earlier case law recognized that death intentionally inflicted by a third person upon an insured, during self-defense, is nevertheless due to accident where it was neither foreseen, expected, or anticipated by the insured. In Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 187 Wash. 437, 60 P.2d 228 (1936), the court stated
". . .we think the better reasoned cases, holds that injuries sustained by a person while defending himself from an unprovoked assault are within the terms of a policy insuring him against injury accidentally inflicted—that an injury inflicted on one who did not voluntarily enter into the affray in which he was injured is an accident. ..."
(Italics mine.) 187 Wash, at 444; see McGregor v. New World Life Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 677, 679, 1 P.2d 908 (1931); Buckley v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 113 Wash. 13, 25, 192 P. 924 (1920); Annot., Accident Insurance: Death or Injury Intentionally Inflicted by Another Due to Accident or Accidental Means, 49 A.L.R.3d 673 (1973).
This court has already determined that injury inflicted upon an insured while the insured is defending himself from an unprovoked assault is "accidental." Consequently it would be an anomaly for it to hold, as it does today, that when the insured inflicts injury while defending himself from an unprovoked assault, it is not "accidental." The better and more reasoned position is to focus, not on *106whether the insured inflicted or received the injury, but rather, on whether the circumstances surrounding the act of self-defense were unexpected and unforeseen and whether the actor thought he was going to be killed and/or seriously injured.
In addition to determining whether an occurrence took place, this case involves the interpretation of an exclusionary clause. In interpreting exclusionary clauses, several rules of construction apply. First, the clause should be strictly construed against the insurer. Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65, 659 P.2d 509 (1983), modified, 101 Wn.2d 830, 683 P.2d 186 (1984). Additionally, the policy language should be construed the way an average layman would interpret it. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976). The relevant clauses provide that the policies do not cover bodily injury either "expected" or "intended from the standpoint of the Insured."
This court in considering a similar exclusionary clause has rejected an objective interpretation of this clause. Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wn.2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986). In Rodriguez, the court stated:
[I]f an objective standard is used, virtually no intentional act would ever be covered. Intentional acts which result in injury generally can be expected to result in injury.
Rodriguez, at 386. Furthermore, under the wording of the policy, the intent to injure is a subjective determination.
" [T]he policy language itself is inconsistent with a blanket objective person standard, and the policy language must control." 107 Wn.2d at 386. Nonetheless the majority impliedly adopted an objective standard in construing the clause excluding coverage for injuries "expected" or "intended from the standpoint of the Insured." The majority states
Serious bodily injury, including death, was, from Brosseau's standpoint, obviously an expected result of his intentional act of shooting Anderson. . . .
*107. . . [T]here is no doubt that injury to Anderson was the intended, expected consequence of Brosseau's actions in chambering the cartridge, aiming, and firing at Anderson's chest at point-blank range, regardless of any ultimate purpose of self-preservation.
(Italics mine.) Majority, at 97, 99. The majority used an objective interpretation. It believed that a person would likely suffer injury from a shooting and that a reasonable person would expect such result to occur. Respondent contends that Anderson's injuries were expected by Brosseau regardless of his actual intent or belief and therefore the exclusion applied. While doubtlessly the average purchaser of insurance would believe that a shooting would harm a person, the policy specifically states that the insured must expect or intend harm. Thus, the plain language of the policy requires that the actual subjective intent of Brosseau be considered, which the majority finds irrelevant.
Brosseau stated that Anderson was a "wild" man and that there was no doubt in his mind that the decedent was going to "gut me." Clerk's Papers, at 28. Thus, even if Brosseau intended to shoot the gun, his subjective intent was to protect himself, not to kill Anderson.
This subjective intent analysis comports not only with the plain language of the policy, this court's interpretation of that policy but also with the majority view across the country that an injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not an expected or intended injury within the meaning of an intentional injury clause in a liability insurance policy, and therefore coverage for such injury is not precluded under such a clause. See generally, e.g., Annot., Acts in Self-Defense as Within Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended or Expected by Insured, 34 A.L.R.4th 761 (1984).
Conclusion
Even if Brosseau deliberately fired the shotgun at Anderson, Brosseau's deposition established that the events leading to the shooting were instant and unexpected. *108Therefore, a factual issue exists as to whether what occurred here was an accident for which the subject policies provided coverage. This issue should be resolved by the jury. Consequently, the trial court erred in determining this issue as a matter of law and in granting the insurer's motion for summary judgment.
Furthermore, when a person reacts in self-defense his intention is to protect himself. Thus, an injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense, from the subjective intent of the insured, is not an expected or intended injury to the victim.
I would reverse the summary judgment and remand this case for trial.