(dissenting).
I hereby adopt as my dissent the majority opinion of the court of appeals as appended herein in full.
APPENDIX
OPINION
ALARID, Judge.Defendant appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), claiming the arresting Los Alamos police officer had no authority to stop and arrest defendant in Santa Fe County because: (1) DWI is not a “misdemeanor” under the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit (Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 31-2-1 to 31-2-7 (Repl.Pamp.1984), or NMSA 1978, Section 31-2-8 (Repl.Pamp. 1984), and (2) pursuit into Santa Fe County was not justified as an emergency measure or as a citizen’s arrest. We agree, and reverse and remand.
FACTS
A uniformed Los Alamos police officer, driving a marked patrol unit, observed defendant driving his vehicle within Los Ala-mos County. Following defendant for several miles, the officer observed defendant make an improper left turn, touch or straddle the white side line of the road, and touch or straddle the yellow center line of the highway. The officer then attempted to stop defendant’s vehicle while still in Los Alamos County but did not effect the stop until defendant entered Santa Fe County.
After the stop, the officer asked defendant to submit to' a field sobriety test, subsequently arresting defendant in Santa Fe County for DWI in Los Alamos County. Defendant also submitted to a breath-alcohol test which determined his blood contained .10 alcohol by weight.
In Los Alamos Municipal Court, pursuant to a Los Alamos municipal ordinance, defendant was convicted of DWI. On appeal, the district court concluded the arrest of defendant in Santa Fe County, by an officer acting for Los Alamos County, was proper pursuant to Section 31-2-8, and found defendant guilty of DWI.
DISCUSSION
1. THE MEANING OF “MISDEMEANOR” IN THE ACT.
Section 31-2-8 provides:
A. Any county sheriff or municipal police officer who leaves his jurisdictional boundary while in fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant whom he would otherwise have authority to arrest shall have the authority to arrest that misdemeanant anywhere within this state and return him to the jurisdiction in which the fresh pursuit began without further judicial process.
B. For purposes of this section, “fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant” means the pursuit of a person who has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the pursuing officer____ [Emphasis added.]
NMSA 1987, Section 31-1-2 (Repl.Pamp. 1984), provides:
Unless a specific meaning is given, as used in the Criminal Procedure Act [31-1-1 to 31-3-9 NMSA 1978]:
K. “misdemeanor” means any offense for which the authorized penalty upon conviction is imprisonment in excess of six months but less than one year: and
L. “petty misdemeanor” means any offense so designated by law or if upon conviction a sentence of imprisonment for six months or less is authorized.
The parties do not dispute that the crime of DWI is a petty misdemeanor under the definitions of Section 31-1-2. See NMSA 1978. § 66-8-7 (Repl.Pamp.1987) and § 66-8-102 (Supp.1988). Defendant argues that Section 31-2-8 authorizes a police officer to arrest outside his jurisdictional boundaries when a person has committed a misdemeanor, as defined pursuant to Section 31-1-2(K), in the presence of the officer and while the officer is in fresh pursuit of that person. Defendant concludes that the officer had no authority to arrest him pursuant to Section 31-2-8, since under the Act DWI is a petty misdemeanor rather than a misdemeanor.
Los Alamos County (county) contends that “fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant,” as used in Section 31-2-8, refers to pursuit of persons committing both “petty misdemeanors” and “misdemeanors” as defined in Section 31-1-2. Arguing absurdity results if “misdemeanant” is interpreted in any other manner, the county notes that any pursuit across jurisdictional boundaries to enforce local ordinances prohibiting DWI would be unauthorized, and suspects would be immune from arrest by a pursuing local police officer once they crossed a county or city line.
While we recognize and appreciate the county’s concerns, we are not inclined to ignore the clear language of Section 31-2-8. Legislative intent is to be determined primarily by the language of the statute, and words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. State v. Pedroncelli, 100 N.M. 678, 675 P.2d 127 (1984).
Section 31-2-8(B) specifically states the meaning of the phrase “fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant.” Under subsection B, the legislature has limited fresh pursuit of misdemeanants to “pursuit of a person who has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the pursuing officer.” The legislature made no reference to pursuit of a person committing a petty misdemeanor. Section 31-1-2 states that, unless a specific meaning is given, the definitions therein are applicable to the Act. No specific meaning of “misdemeanor” is given in Section 31-2-8: therefore, the definitions of Section 31-1-2 apply.
We commend to the legislature the question of whether the Act should be amended to include pursuit of DWI suspects in the future. In so doing, we note DWI has repeatedly been characterized by our courts as a “misdemeanor.” See Boone v. State, 105 N.M. 223, 731 P.2d 366 (1986); State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1057, 105 S.Ct. 2123, 85 L.Ed.2d 487 reh’g denied, 472 U.S. 1013, 105 S.Ct. 2715, 86 L.Ed.2d 729 (1985); State v. Calanche, 91 N.M. 390, 574 P.2d 1018 (Ct.App.1978). Moreover, Section 66-8-7 states that it is a “misdemeanor” for any person to violate any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, and DWI is an offense under the provisions of the Code. See § 66-8-102. However, for the purposes of Section 31-2-8, DWI is a petty misdemeanor, and the statute does not permit fresh pursuit except for a misdemeanor as defined by Section 31-1-2(K).
2. WHETHER PURSUIT WAS JUSTIFIED AS AN EMERGENCY MEASURE OR A CITIZEN’S ARREST.
The county offers authority from other jurisdictions recognizing the right of police, acting without statutory authority, to engage in fresh pursuit of DWI offenders. Citing State v. McCarthy, 123 N.J.Super. 513, 303 A.2d 626 (Law Div.1973), the county suggests the officer’s pursuit across the county line be justified as an emergency measure. We do not see the evidence before us as sufficient to justify the officer’s pursuit as an emergency measure. Prior to stopping defendant, the officer observed only minor traffic violations. There is no evidence indicating defendant’s driving was so erratic as to lead the officer to believe defendant presented a threat or menace to the general public. See id.
Alternatively, the county urges we validate the officer’s pursuit and subsequent stop of defendant as a citizen’s arrest. See State v. Sellers, 350 N.W.2d 460 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Historically, a citizen’s power to arrest in New Mexico has extended only to felonies. See State v. Barreras, 64 N.M. 300, 328 P.2d 74 (1958); Territory v. McGinniss, 10 N.M. 269, 61 P. 208 (1900), overruled on other grounds. State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976, 87 S.Ct. 1171, 18 L.Ed.2d 136 (1967). More recently, this court has noted that at common law a citizen was privileged to arrest for a breach of the peace committed in his presence. Downs v. Garay, 106 N.M. 321, 742 P.2d 533 (Ct.App.1987). Our courts have also recognized DWI as an offense involving a breach of the peace in order to allow justices of the peace jurisdiction to hear such complaints. State v. Rue, 72 N.M. 212, 382 P.2d 697 (1963). We do not read the holdings in Rue and Downs as recognition of common law power in citizens of New Mexico to arrest for traffic offenses such as DWI, and we decline to do so here for two reasons.
First, specific to the facts of this case, the legislature has addressed the question of the authority of' police officers acting out of their jurisdiction in the Act. We believe it is improper to circumvent the clear language of Section 31-2-8 by characterizing an officer’s actions as a citizen’s arrest in every instance of pursuit which goes beyond the authority conferred by the Act. To hold otherwise would render Section 31-2-8 useless. See State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 573 P.2d 213 (1977).
Moreover, we will not employ common law citizen’s arrest powers as a vehicle to broaden the authority of police officers acting beyond their jurisdiction, because we envision such a holding as potentially creating problems more numerous and onerous than those arising from the question we decide today. As the court stated in Commonwealth v. Grise, 398 Mass. 247, 496 N.E.2d 162 (1986), “[sjince ‘breach of the peace’ may be construed by laymen as a somewhat elastic concept, empowering private persons to arrest for such misdemeanors might only encourage ‘vigilantism and anarchistic actions’.” Id. at 251, 496 N.E.2d 164-165. Facing a similar question in Settle v. State, 679 S.W.2d 310 (Mo.Ct.App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 2701, 86 L.Ed.2d 717 (1985), the Missouri court questioned the wisdom of authorizing stops and detention by private citizens for ordinance violations \>r traffic offenses, concluding such a grant of authority “would invite more breaches of the peace than the number hoped to be prevented.” Id. at 318. We share the concerns expressed by the courts in Grise and Settle in declining to justify the Los Ala-mos officer’s arrest of defendant as a citizen’s arrest. We believe it most appropriate and prudent to leave to the legislature the question of whether the Act should be amended to include pursuit of suspected DWI offenders. See Garrison v. Safeway Stores, 102 N.M. 179, 692 P.2d 1328 (Ct.App.1984); Varos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct.App.1984). We agree with the statement in Grise, 398 Mass, at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 165, that there is a
strong public policy ... against drunk driving, and [a] necessity for removing intoxicated motorists from the roads before they harm themselves or other persons. We also appreciate that these interests might best be served by allowing police officers to apprehend intoxicated motorists outside of the officers’ territorial jurisdictions. However, we decline to reach this result through the circuitous route of empowering private persons to arrest for misdemeanors involving a breach of the peace. If the Legislature in its wisdom wishes to broaden the powers of police officers acting outside of their territorial jurisdictions, it may amend [the statute] to accomplish this purpose. [Citation omitted.]
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Los Alamos County police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest defendant for a petty misdemeanor in Santa Fe County. Since the evidence was obtained as a result of a violation of defendant’s statutory rights, it should have been suppressed. State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 582 P.2d 826 (Ct.App.1978). We reverse and remand for new trial with instructions that all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop and arrest be suppressed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BIVINS, C.J., concurs. HARTZ, J., dissents.