(concurring) — I concur in the result, but would confine our holding to State v. Aver, 109 Wn.2d 303, 745 P.2d 479 (1987), which is dispositive under the facts presented here. In Aver, the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting willful obstruction of a "lawfully operated" train was not unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "lawfully operated" was not directed toward the conduct of the accused. Aver, 109 Wn.2d at 308. In support of its holding, the Aver court specifically cited State v. Miller, 103 Wn.2d 792, 698 P.2d 554 (1985) in which a state statute that prohibited resisting a "lawful arrest or detention" withstood a vagueness challenge. Aver, 109 Wn.2d at 308. Clearly, this authority provides a firm foundation for our holding in this case.
Notwithstanding this precedent, however, the reasoning of Judge Scholfield unnecessarily dwells on State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 759 P.2d 372 (1988). Smith, in retreating from the court's holding in Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wn.2d 728, 612 P.2d 792 (1980), created a confusing set of standards *43for reviewing whether a statute prohibiting "unlawful" conduct on the part of the defendant is unconstitutionally vague. Here, we need only be concerned with evaluating whether the term "lawful arrest" as it applies to the arresting officer is void for vagueness. Like the "lawfully operated" train in State v. Aver, supra, the defendant's conduct is not implicated by SMC 12A.16.050 and thus, the term "unlawful arrest" is not unconstitutionally vague.