(dissenting in part).
While I concurred in the decision rendered in the second Pressley case and find myself in accord with many of the holdings in the instant case, particularly as to the matters covered under “Election”, yet, I am impelled to dissent to the majority (holding that the statutorily defined word “compensation”, when separately used in Section 56-949, supra, has two diametrically opposed meanings.
In determining the legislative intent regarding third party suits brought under. Section 56-949, supra, I think the court is *423doing more than merely filling in the interstices of the law, which is always permissible in construing statutes. It would seem that the inherent weakness in the majority opinion is that the court has failed to consistently follow the legislative definition of the word “compensation”, which definition includes both compensation as such and accident benefits. See Section 56-930. Within one section, 56-949, the court now holds the word “compensation” to have two different meanings, i. e, in the first sentence it does not include “accident benefits” and in the second sentence it docs include them. This destroys the legislative definition and in my opinion such inconsistent interpretations cannot be justified by invoking the rule of liberal construction. Nor do I find the authorities relied upon pertinent for the reason that in none of them is there a controlling statutory definition of the term or word in question.
In the case of Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528, 534, 173 A.L.R. 480, we stated:
“And it is a firmly established rule that definitions of terms given within the framework of a statute itself control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute. Sisk v. Arizona Ice & Cold Storage Co., 60 Ariz. 496, 141 P.2d 395; Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300; Gaskin v. Wayland, 61 Ariz. 291, 148 P.2d 590.”
In the most recent revision of Sutherland’s work on statutory construction, the following rule is stated:
“It is a proper exercise of the legislative function to define words contained in the statute and to prescribe rules for their interpretation. When a legislature defines the language it uses, its definition is binding upon the court and this is so even though the definition does not coincide with the ordinary meaning of the words used. * * ” Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 4814.
Irrespective of the right of the Commission to recover the accident benefits theretofore paid by it to Pressley, it would, in my opinion, still have the right to intervene in the present suit pending in the Pima County Superior Court to protect its rights in this third party suit; first, on the question as to whether Pressley had made an election; and second, if so, to be in a position as assignee to take over the law suit and prosecute it'to conclusion. I therefore agree that the alternative writ of mandamus should be made peremptory.
My primary purpose in writing this partial dissent is to highlight the deficiencies in the workmen’s compensation Act as regards the liability of third persons to injured employees, Section 56-949, in the hope that the legislature may “spell out” with more particularity the substantive rights of all parties, this being a legislative rather than a judicial function.