The issue presented by these two consolidated cases is whether a defendant convicted of leaving the scene of an accident without performing statutory duties may be sentenced to pay restitution for damages resulting from the accident. We granted the state’s petition for review in this case, along with petitions in State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 637 P2d 602 (1981) and State v. Tuma, 292 Or 194, 637 P2d 614 (1981), in order to clarify the circumstances in which a sentence of restitution is authorized.
Defendant Eastman’s car collided with a motorcycle at an intersection. Two people riding the motorcycle were severely injured. Defendant left the scene without giving information to the other driver as required by ORS 483.602. He was convicted of a Class C felony for failure to stop and perform those statutory duties. ORS 483.602(4)(a). The trial court placed defendant on probation and sentenced him to pay $25,180.74 restitution to the injured motorcyclists for their medical bills.
Defendant Kovach’s car collided with a parked car. The parked car was damaged and its occupant injured. Defendant left the scene without leaving his name and address. He was convicted of a traffic infraction under ORS 483.604(3) enhanced to a Class A misdemeanor under ORS 484.365(3)(a).1 The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 15 days in the county jail, to pay a fine and costs, and to pay restitution of $1,649.92 to the owner/occupant of the vehicle for medical expenses, repair bills and car rental expenses.
The Court of Appeals vacated both restitution orders, holding that the restitution statute requires a causal connection between the conduct for which defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers. It did not find such a causal connection in either of these cases.
The amounts ordered for restitution could be pecuniary damages, as that term is used in ORS 137.103(2) *188and they result from the accidents upon which these charging documents are based. They are statutorily permissible in those respects. Under ORS 137.106(1), the remaining question is whether they “result” from the defendants’ “criminal activities.” That term is defined in ORS 137.103(1):
“ ‘Criminal activities’ means any offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant.”
That question requires that we give the term further definition than that in the statute.
“Criminal activities” is a broader term than “crime” or “elements of crime,” and is intended to communicate a larger meaning. It includes, by definition, “other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant,” which would seem to refer to the circumstances of the crime as well as other crimes the defendant might own up to as in a plea bargain situation. Thus, there need not be an exact equivalency between the terms of the criminal statute or the allegations of the charging document under which a defendant is convicted and the acts which cause the special damages.2 Conceivably, the damage may result from only some of the acts which constitute the crime, for they could be deemed “criminal activities” as long as they were done in the commission of the crime. We do not mean by this opinion to fully construe the term. We mean to recognize its breadth and at the same time to express a limitation that affects these cases.
ORS 483.602, which defendant Eastman violated, stated:
“(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident which results in injury or death to any person or causes damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person, immediately shall stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (2) of this section. Every *189such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
“(2) The drivers of any vehicles involved in any accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to any such vehicles shall:
“(a) Give to the other driver or surviving passenger, or any person not a passenger injured as a result of such accident, his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle which he is driving, and the name and address of any other occupants of such vehicle.
“(b) Upon request and if available, exhibit and give the number of his operator’s or chauffeur’s license to the persons injured, or to the occupant of or person attending any vehicle damaged.
“(c) Render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the conveying or the making of arrangements for the conveying of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such conveying is requested by any injured person.
"* * * *"3
ORS 483.604(1), which defendant Kovach violated, states:
“The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended immediately shall stop and [perform specified duties].”
Here, the damages for which restitution was ordered resulted from the accidents. They did not result from the defendants’ failures to remain, provide information or render reasonable assistance. Under the statute, the accident itself is neither criminal nor an activity. It is rather an event, the existence of which imposes duties upon certain people. Failure to perform those duties is criminal. By way of example, it is analogous to driving with a suspended operator’s license. It is not criminal to drive and it is not criminal for one’s license to be suspended, but if the latter condition exists, the criminal law prohibits driving and otherwise lawful driving becomes a criminal act. It is also analogous to failure of a person with taxable income in any year to file a tax return for that year. It is not a *190criminal activity to have taxable income, but if that fact exists, there is a duty imposed to file a tax return and the performance of that duty is enforced by a criminal sanction. Here, driving a vehicle which is involved in an accident is an element of a crime only in the sense that it is a fact which must be proved under the criminal statute, but it is not an act which defendant performed in the course of committing the crime. It is merely a part of a description in the first sentence of subsection (1) of persons who must stop and perform the duties specified in subsection (2). Activities which were criminal commenced after the accident occurred. Failure of such a person to stop and perform statutory duties arising from the accident would be criminal activity, but the preceding accident is not.
The damages not having resulted from defendants’ criminal activities, the restitution orders are unauthorized. The sentences are vacated and new sentences must be imposed.
Affirmed.
ORS 483.604(3) has since been amended to make violation a misdemeanor and ORS 484.365(3)(a) no longer applies. Or Laws 1981, ch 818, §§ 12 and 33, and ch 803, § 26.
Similarly, the legislature intended a broad meaning by its definition of “pecuniary damages” to include those recoverable “in a civil action arising from the facts and events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities,” ORS 137.103(2). See the dissent of Joseph, C. J., below. This, however, goes to the definition of pecuniary damages, not to the issue of causation.
ORS 483.602 has also been revised. The changes are not material to our holding. Or Laws 1981, ch 818, § 11.