Cook v. Cook

SHEPARD, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority opinion of today is an indication of this Court’s disturbing tendency to overturn precedents and doctrines of established law in the field of domestic relations. In my view, today’s opinion implicitly overrules Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977), without providing any rationale therefor. In my view, the majority opinion attempts to arrive at what it has already perceived as a “right” result. In so doing, I suggest it lends nothing to the stability of the law in Idaho, but rather can only promote conflict and confusion among our district courts and the practitioners at the bar.

It is too clear to require the citation of authority that the fruits of one’s labor constitute community property whether they be in the form of direct wages or otherwise. The majority attempts to convince the reader that when a workman is injured during the course of his employment an award therefor has nothing to do with employment. It does so by suggesting that a workmen’s compensation award stands in the place of an employee’s common law right to recover against his employer for negligence. If that premise is to be accepted, it remains clear that an award resulting from an employee’s common law right of action against his employer would be community property. The majority cites Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974), as authority for the proposition that a wife’s recovery in tort is not community property. In Guy v. Guy, supra, however, it was pointed out that the Yellowstone rule applied only in a situation involving liability between husband and wife and that in the usual third party tort situation the rule remained unchanged, i.e., the award was community property.

In my opinion, the instant case cannot be distinguished from Guy v. Guy, supra. Either Guy was wrongfully decided or the instant case is wrongfully decided. In Guy the husband’s employer, although not statutorily so required, purchased a disability insurance policy as a fringe benefit of the husband’s employment. The husband by reason of illness became totally disabled and received a monthly benefit. This Court in a unanimous opinion held that benefits to be paid following dissolution of the marriage were community property of the husband and wife. Therein the Court rejected the rationale of certain California cases and pointed out that California follows a rigid rule that all community property must be equally divided and in contrast the Idaho courts have the equitable power and discre*657tion to divide community property toward the end of achieving a just and equitable result. I.C. § 32-712(1).

In the instant case, of course, the learned district judge attempted to, and hopefully did, accomplish such a just and equitable result by awarding the husband the future workmen’s compensation benefits, albeit they were community property, and making an offsetting award to the wife from the other community property, which it should be noted was not insubstantial.

In the instant case, the husband’s employer, as required by statute, obtained a policy of insurance covering the husband-employee against accidental injury incurred during the course of employment. The husband was so injured and received an award. The majority does not tell us whether such award was paid to the husband in a lump sum payment pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 72-404 or what difference, if any, such a lump sum payment might or would make in today’s decision.

Hence, today's decision is founded on facts identical to those of Guy in all but two minor respects. Guy involved an employer’s voluntary insurance procurement while today’s employer obtained statutorily mandated insurance coverage. Guy involved total disability by reason of illness while today’s case involved total disability by reason of accident. Both cases involve benefits resulting from employment and both cases allegedly involve the right to benefits which vested during marriage and which may be payable following dissolution of the marriage.

I would affirm the decision of the district court.