specially concurring.
I agree with much which is stated in the Court’s opinion,1 and I am in agreement that the district court judgment should be reversed; however, I do not find it necessary to reach the issue of procedural due process — this simply based on the proposition that in this case the Idaho statutory procedures afford procedural due process, and are even substantially more protective than is constitutionally mandated. Those procedural requirements were respected.
The Van Ordens’ entire argument that a denial was made prior to hearing rests on their assertion that the September 14th letter from state health officer Dr. John Ashley constituted such within the meaning of I.C. § 39-3303. This assertion is untenable for two reasons. First, I.C. § 39-3303 empowers the director to deny a license application only after notice and hearing. Even if a staff member, such as Dr. Ashley, prior to hearing attempted to issue the final denial contemplated by I.C. § 39-3303, such would be without the requisite authority. Second, and I think more pertinent, the letter itself, while opening with language capable of being interpreted as a final denial, goes on to state that “a decision has been made to deny” — which clearly imports the notion that denial may take place in futuro —-which language, coupled with other language in the same letter which language provides unambiguous notification that a hearing will be held, and that the provisional license will continue in effect until the hearing, should have left no genuine doubt that the issue of final denial remained open. A hearing officer (not Dr. Ashley) conducted the November hearing and recommended to the director that the application be denied. The director, after reviewing the record, including the recommendations of both Dr. Ashley and the hearing officer, then denied the application. As a factual matter, then the Van Ordens were afforded a hearing prior to denial, within the meaning of I.C. § 39-3303, of their license application.
It is a well established principle that this Court will not pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary for determination of a case. Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977); Curtis v. Child, 95 Idaho 63, 501 P.2d 1374 (1972). Hence there is no need under the facts and circumstances of this case to reach and discuss the constitutional issue.
. I do not see the reason for the majority’s citation to I.C. § 67-5214(c). Subsection (c) applies by its terms only to “revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any license .... ” We are here concerned with a denial of an initial application for a license— which requires a prior hearing by virtue of I.C. § 39-3303. I.C. § 67-5214(a) provides that “When the grant, denial, or renewal of a license is required to be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing, the provisions of this act concerning contested cases apply.” This specifically makes application of I.C. §§ 67-5209— 67-5213 dependent, at least as to initial applications for licenses, upon separate code provisions such as I.C. § 39-3303.