specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court and would discharge the rule to show cause. I write separately to express my view that a legislative grant of authority to practice law in Colorado without a license is invalid without specific permission from the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Respondents’ agents personally appear before referees in the Division of Employment and Training, a division within the Department of Labor and Employment, as the “representatives” of various employers who are contesting claims for benefits filed by former employees. Whether a person is practicing law by representing another in a hearing before an administrative agency such as the Division of Employment depends upon the circumstances of the case and the character of the representation. One who, in a representative capacity, protects and defends the legal rights of another and offers advice and assistance regarding those rights is engaged in the practice of law. Denver Bar Association v. PUC, 154 Colo. 273, 279, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (1964). The hearing master determined in the present case that the unlicensed “lay representatives,” agents of the respondents and intervenors, participate at various times in nearly all phases of the quasi-judicial proceedings before Division of Employment referees. The lay representatives give individual advice to employers and claimants, issue subpoenas, appear at referee hearings to make legal arguments and cite appropriate statutes, and prepare written “legal briefs” on appeal to the Industrial Commission. I agree that the agents of the respondents and intervenors engage in the practice of law.
The lay representatives are not licensed to practice law in Colorado. However, section 8-74-106(1)(e), 3 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), gives unlicensed persons the right to represent interested parties at Division of Employment hearings. Article III of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the exercise of judicial powers by any other branch of government unless expressly allowed in the constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court possesses exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law in Colorado. People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968); Denver Bar Association v. PUC, 154 Colo, at 273, 391 P.2d at 467; Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Association, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957). The Colorado statutes also direct that the supreme court regulate the practice of law. Section 12-5-101, 5 C.R.S. (1985), requires that persons practicing law in Colorado first obtain a license for that purpose from the supreme court. Section 12-5-112, 5 C.R.S. (1985), provides that unlicensed persons who hold themselves out in any way as an attorney or who actually practice law are guilty of contempt of the Colorado Supreme Court. Offenders may be enjoined from such conduct under C.R. C.P. 237(a). It is clear that the grant of authority in section 8-74-106(1)(e), not specifically authorized by the Colorado Consti*465tution, is an invalid legislative infringement of the exclusive, constitutionally granted power of the supreme court to regulate the practice of law in Colorado.
As we held in Denver Bar Association v. PUC, we sometimes “grant permission” for the unlicensed practice of law in appropriate, limited circumstances such as where there are few disputed legal principles and where the monetary amount in issue is too small to justify hiring an attorney. 154 Colo, at 281-82, 391 P.2d at 472. In the present case, the lay representatives do make certain limited legal arguments. However, in view of the small dollar value of the claims, the simple, informal nature of the hearings, the need for speedy and inexpensive adjudications, and the long tradition of lay representation before Division of Employment referees, I see no harm to the administration of justice in allowing lay representation to continue.
The court apparently gives as its only reason for allowing the legislative infringement in section 8-74-106(l)(e) the fact that the hearing master determined the statute was merely a “gratuitous” limit on supreme court authority to regulate the practice of law. Maj. op. at 464. The definitions of “gratuitous” and “abortive” legislative infringements come directly from Denver Bar Association v. PUC, 154 Colo, at 277, 391 P.2d at 470. However, our holding in Denver Bar Association does not in any way turn on the distinction between the two categories and does not even determine which definition applies to the facts of that case. Our decision was based entirely on our fact-specific limited “grant of permission” for the unlicensed practice of law. 154 Colo, at 281-82, 391 P.2d at 472.
Accordingly, I would grant permission in the limited circumstances present here for the unlicensed practice of law before the Division of Employment as specifically outlined in section 8-74-106(l)(e), 3 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), and would discharge the rule to show cause.
I am authorized to say the Justice VOL-LACK joins in this special concurrence.