dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The dispositive question here is whether the injuries sustained in the fall were caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of Irwin’s employment. The answer is yes.
Section 8-41-108(1), C.R.S., reads:
“ ‘Accident’ means an unforeseen event occurring without the will or design of a person whose mere act causes it; an unexpected, unusual, or undesigned occurrence; or the effect of an unknown cause or, the cause being known, an unprecedented consequence of it.”
Section 8-41-108 must be read in conjunction with § 8-52-102, C.R.S., which provides:
“The right to the compensation provided for in articles 40 to 54 of this title, in lieu of any other liability to any person for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:
(a) Where, at the time of the accident, both employer and employee are subject to the provisions of said articles and where the employer has complied with the provisions thereof regarding insurance;
(b) Where, at the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment;
*767(c) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.
Here, the injuries sustained by claimant arose from an accident which occurred while she was performing services arising out of and in the course of her employment. Further, the injuries for which the referee awarded compensation were limited to those proximately caused by the accidental fall which arose out of and in the course of her employment.
Although claimant had previous blackouts, none of them resulted in injuries. The injuries sustained here were caused by falling against the marble wall and onto the floor of the lobby in the building claimant was assigned to guard.
Therefore, whether we analyze the case as an unexplained fall, see 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 10:31, (1984) or as internal weakness causing the fall, 1 A. Larson, supra § 12:10, under the facts of this case, the referee properly awarded compensation for the injuries caused by claimant’s work site fall.
Thus, although the cause of claimant’s fainting spells are not compensable, see Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968); Velasquez v. Industrial Commission, 41 Colo.App. 201, 581 P.2d 748 (1978), the injuries she sustained during her fall are. Cases relied upon by the Industrial Commission and the majority are inapposite either on their facts or the applicable statutes.
I would therefore set aside the order of the Industrial Commission and remand to the Commission with instructions to reinstate the referee’s order granting benefits for the injuries sustained in the fall.