with whom HUNTLEY, Justice, concurs, dissenting.
The result obtained by the majority today is an absurdity and totally guts the *1129concept of “vouching in” established by the common law and by statute in the State of Idaho. By its decision, the Court encourages a putative defendant in a products liability action to refuse to participate when properly vouched in and thereafter complain that the trial in which he refused to participate was somehow improperly conducted, that the findings of the jury were not sufficiently detailed or specific, and that he is not bound by the result. The decision then enables such a recalcitrant putative defendant to require that a second jury be impaneled to somehow discern the basis of the first jury’s findings or, in the alternative, to retry the entire cause. Such is not only a foolish waste of judicial resources, but it places an unnecessary burden on the parties who participated in the first action by requiring them to participate in a second trial, the results of which are, as to them, foreordained and res judicata.
The majority states, “There exist genuine issues of material fact as to what was actually determined in Farmer____” I submit that such statement demonstrates the incomprehensibility of Part II of the majority opinion and hence of its result. The majority does not undertake to explain how a second jury will determine those “genuine issues of material fact,” i.e., “what was actually determined in Farmer.”
The majority suggests that “several factual issues were not specifically addressed by the Farmer jury.” Among those factors are, whether the defective steering gear manufactured by TRW caused some or all of the injury suffered by the original plaintiffs; whether some or all of the injuries were proximately caused by the seat manufactured by UOP; and whether IHC itself was guilty of negligence other than mere failure to inspect the products. Our decision in Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 750-751, 553 P.2d 1306, 1314-1315 (1976), made clear that “the steering gear box and the driver’s seat at issue herein are purchased as complete units by International Harvester from independent suppliers. International Harvester only visually inspects such component parts and the entire unit is given only a brief driving test ... Insofar as the allegation that appellants [IHC] were negligent in their duty of inspection and testing and the instruction based thereon ... such issues were properly submitted to the jury by correct instructions.”
We further held in Farmer that “the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to determine whether respondent’s injuries were proximately caused or rendered more serious by reason of the design and construction of the driver’s seat. The jury was properly instructed on that issue.” Id., 97 Idaho at 751, 553 P.2d at 1315. We explained, 97 Idaho at 750, 553 P.2d at 1314: “An expert witness testified to examination of the steering mechanism and concluded that the damage to the gear box occurred prior to the final impact of the truck in the crash, and that a portion of the gear box mechanism would not have fractured unless it contained faulty material____” . We stated, “It is undisputed that the steering malfunctioned in some way during the course of normal operation and there is an absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes for which defendants-appellants were not responsible.” Id., 97 Idaho at 751, 553 P.2d at 1315.
Hence, it is simply incorrect to state that those factual issues were not before and specifically addressed by the Farmer jury. Clearly, all of those issues were before the jury on the basis of very extensive expert testimony and evidence, and both the trial jury and this Court had before it the actual damaged gear box which the jury clearly concluded had caused the Farmer truck to run off the road.
The real crux of TRW’s argument is not that the issues were not before and properly submitted to the jury on proper instructions, but rather that the jury did not return a sufficiently specific verdict as to IHC’s ratio of culpability, vis a vis that of TRW and UOP. The answer to that argument is that if TRW and UOP had availed themselves of the offered opportunity to participate in the Farmer action, they *1130could have demanded such a special verdict. Having had such an opportunity and rejecting it, TRW should not now be heard to complain.
As stated by the Court in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw’s Sales & Service, Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, 579 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Ct.App. 1978):
“Appellant presents the following question for review:
‘Is a manufacturer liable to indemnify a distributor on a judgment based solely on strict liability in tort where the manufacturer was timely notified of the action but refused to appear and defend? ’ ”
******
“Litton claims that having notified Shaw of the pendency of the action by Smith, Shaw is bound by the judgment and must indemnify Litton. It bases its contention on the Restatement (Second) [sic] of Judgments, § 107, which sets forth the rights of an indemnitee against an indemnitor after judgment. The pertinent part of § 107 states:
‘In an action for indemnity between two persons who stand in such relation to each other that one of them has a duty of indemnifying the other upon a claim by a third person, if the third person has obtained a valid judgment on this claim in a separate action against
(a) the indemnitee, both are bound as to the existence and extent of the liability of the indemnitee, if the indemnitee gave to the indemnitor reasonable notice of the action and requested him to defend it or to participate in the defense, ...’ § 107 at 511.
The rationale for the above rule is contained in Comment c to the above section of the Restatement. When there has been reasonable notice of the action and a request to defend or participate in the defense, the comment states:
'... since by hypothesis his is the ultimate liability, it is fair that the indemnitee should be able to throw off the burden of the trial and that the indemnitor should respond to a request for assistance by the indemnitee. If he fails to give this assistance at the time when it is of greatest importance, it is fair that he should abide by the result of the trial. The fact that it may be inconvenient to him to respond at the time when the indemnitee is sued does not change the equities of the situation, because of his primary duty to satisfy the claim of the creditor or the injured person; if he permits the matter to result in an action his should be the responsibility to see that it does not result in an improper judgment.’ § 107 at 513.”
As was more pungently stated in Hessler v. Hillwood Manufacturing Co., 302 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1962):
“We do not think that Hillwood was in a very good position to question whether the defense of the New York case had been skillfully handled by the lawyers employed by Hessler. They were reputable attorneys. There was no claim of fraud, collusion or bad faith on their part ... If Hillwood was of the view that it could defend the case better with its own lawyers, it had full opportunity to do so but declined. It is not very difficult, after a case has been tried and lost, using ex post facto wisdom, to find fault with someone else’s work.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The accident which is the subject of both Farmer and this action occurred in 1971. The trial of the action took place in 1974 and was well tried by able and competent counsel, albeit not with the degree of specificity and detail which TRW now suggests to be necessary. The decision of this Court affirming the trial court judgment was rendered in 1976. To require, as does the majority, that the parties return to court and retry stale facts with the difficulty of finding proof and witnesses after so many years is, in my mind, obscene, an abuse of the judicial process, and a disservice to that which we call justice.