specially concurring.
I concur in the majority’s opinion for the issues raised by Mr. Gee, and write only to express reservations with respect to the validity of his guilty plea. The offense charged was alleged to have occurred on October 29, 1978, which was also the date of the filing of the complaint. Following a preliminary hearing, the defendant, represented by the public defender, was held to answer in district court. An information was filed on November 9, to which defendant and his counsel entered a plea of not guilty. In December, the public defender withdrew in favor of private counsel being arranged for by defendant’s parents. Jailed for over six months, the defendant, with new counsel, on May 7, 1979, appeared before the court on the date before a scheduled trial for the purpose of withdrawing his plea of not guilty and entering a guilty plea. The court inquired as to the voluntariness of the plea.
The court inquired of defendant’s counsel if he was acquainted with I.C. §§ 18-211, -212, and -213, and further asked counsel whether he felt any of those defenses should be pursued. Counsel answered that he was aware of the cited sections and stated that the defenses would not be pursued. Those statutes, of course, are those which were brought into promi*995nence and apparent disrepute in the wake of State v. Hightower, 101 Idaho 749, 620 P.2d 783 (1980), and the more publicized case of United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C.Cir.1982).
Following the acceptance of the guilty plea the defendant was thereafter sentenced and committed to begin serving his sentence. Worthy of mention is that at sentencing defendant submitted the testimony of Dr. Frank Allred Garner, a practicing psychiatrist of Salt Lake City, Utah, who told the court that he would not suggest letting the defendant go without supervision, and that if he were released it was likely that he might do the same thing again. The psychiatrist, however, did state that the defendant could be taught not to do what he did. Examination of the 20-year-old defendant revealed that when he was about 16 years old a juvenile court had ordered counseling from the Department of Health and Welfare — which counseling he never received.
The district judge, in explaining the sentence he was about to impose, commented as to Dr. Garner’s input:
I am not unmindful of the fact that Mr. Gee is twenty years old. Dr. Garner feels that he is rehabilitatable under circumstances, and I am sure Dr. Garner will agree that motivation is really one of the problem areas of psychotherapy. ...
... I will specially include in the order, Mr. Fuller, a recommendation of psychiatric counseling.
Tr., pp. 61-62.
The court advised the defendant of the 42-day period in which to appeal, but no appeal was taken, even though the court reminded those present of the right of an indigent to have appointed counsel which the court would cause to be provided.
My concern with the proceedings below is that it does not appear from the record that Mr. Gee was ever informed of I.C. § 20-223. That statute has significant impact in determining the length of incarceration of a defendant such as Gee. Thus, prior to sentencing, a district judge should fully inform a defendant of the applicability of I.C. § 20-223 in advising of the ramifications of pleading guilty to the type of offense with which Gee was charged. Such is constitutionally essential in guaranteeing that a defendant’s plea of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily made — a requirement embedded in both our federal and state constitutions. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1920); State v. Col-yer, 98 Idaho 32, 36, 557 P.2d 626, 630 (1976). Furthermore, on appeal, the record must clearly reveal that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily made such a plea. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Roderick, 97 Idaho 82, 83, 540 P.2d 267, 268 (1975). Failure on this account renders the plea invalid.
Thus, while I concur with the majority’s disposition of the issues raised by Mr. Gee, which did not include the voluntariness of his plea and a full understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty to the crime charged, I do not wish to be misunderstood as upholding the validity of the guilty plea if Mr. Gee was not fully informed — a matter for the trial court in the first instance should there be a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief.