(dissenting) — The majority holds the Short-ers did not assume the risk of Dr. Drury's negligence. I fully agree. The refusal form did not specifically state that Dr. Drury was released from damages resulting from his negligence, nor is there evidence the Shorters were specifically aware of the precise nature and extent of possible injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B, comments b, d (1965); Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc. 2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1979); Martin v. Kidwiler, 71 Wn.2d 47, 426 P.2d 489 (1967).
The majority further holds the Shorters assumed the risk of death at the point where Dr. Drury's negligence created a life-threatening situation; that holding is tantamount to a holding that the Shorters assumed the risk of Dr. Drury's negligence. Thus, the majority seeks to accomplish its desired result through an analysis that attempts to mask its real effect: substantially excusing the doctor from liability for his negligence. I do not agree with this analysis or result. I therefore dissent.
The majority's holding necessarily decides the Shorters assumed the risk of death from refusal to take blood, no matter how the necessity for blood arose. I would agree that if the necessity for blood resulted from the nonnegli-gent performance of the procedure, the Shorters assumed the risk of death resulting from their refusal to take blood. See Colton v. New York Hosp., supra. But, if the need for blood arose from the doctor's negligence, the majority would hold the Shorters still assumed the risk of death resulting from their refusal to take blood. Unlike the majority, I see a significant difference between the two scenarios.
The risk of excessive bleeding inherent in the nonnegli-gent performance of the procedure was increased by the *661Shorters' refusal to take blood; that is a risk properly allocated to the Shorters. The refusal form signed by the Shorters represents their assent to relieve Dr. Drury of his duty to administer blood if required by the nonnegligent performance of the procedure. Mr. Shorter testified that such was his understanding at the time the procedure was performed. If Dr. Drury had performed the operation without negligence, but Mrs. Shorter had bled to death anyway, the doctor could not be held liable in this case.
However, the additional risk of bleeding to death created by the doctor's negligence is not a risk that should be allocated to the Shorters. If the Shorters are held to have assumed the risk of death from refusing blood, even when the blood was required because the doctor was negligent, that is in effect holding that the Shorters assumed the risk of the doctor's negligence. To expressly assume the risk of another's conduct, one must have knowledge of the risk, appreciate and understand its nature, and voluntarily choose to incur it. W. Keeton, Torts § 68, at 486-87 (5th ed. 1984); Martin v. Kidwiler, supra at 49. Express assumption of a risk requires assent to both the specific type and the magnitude of the risk. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 281, at 674 (1971). Additionally, a person does not have the duty to foresee negligence when he voluntarily exposes himself to a known risk;. See Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976).
Traditional tort analysis forecloses the result reached by the majority because the evidence in this case is insufficient to support a finding of assumption of risk by the Shorters. Dr. Drury's negligence greatly increased Mrs. Shorter's chances of bleeding to death; thus, the "magnitude" of the risk was increased. The record clearly reflects the fact that the Shorters believed the procedure was routine. The dangers of performing the D and C were never fully explained to the Shorters; they were not informed that three methods of accomplishing the procedure were available, nor were they told that the method Dr. Drury planned to use was the method most likely to result in uterine perforation and *662excessive bleeding. The Shorters were merely informed of a generalized risk of bleeding inherent in the procedure. Awareness of a generalized risk is not sufficient to prove an express assumption of risk; there must be proof that a person knew and appreciated the specific hazard that caused the injury. See Runnings v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); Martin v. Kidwiler, supra; Klein v. R.D. Werner Co., 98 Wn.2d 316, 654 P.2d 94 (1982).
The majority concedes the Shorters did not expressly assume the risk of the doctor's negligence. Having decided that, it logically follows that the Shorters did not expressly assume the risk of bleeding to death as a result of refusing blood, where the need for such blood resulted from the doctor's negligence rather than from the risks inherent in the procedure itself.
Accordingly, we come full circle: the Shorters did not assume the risk of negligence; they similarly did not assume the risk that a refusal of blood, which was necessitated by that negligence, would cause death. Only through the most strained analysis can the majority find that the Shorters assumed any risk here, beyond those risks inherent in a nonnegligently performed procedure.
Thus, the jury could not have found that the Shorters assumed the risk of death under the facts here. I would hold it was error to submit the assumption of risk question to the jury. Accordingly, I would strike the finding that the Shorters assumed the risk of 75 percent of their injury and reinstate the full $412,000 verdict to Mr. Shorter. See Klein v. R.D. Werner Co., supra at 320.
Utter, Brachtenbach, and Dore, JJ., concur with Pearson, J.