Plaintiffs, Laura, Wanda, and Jeanette Smith, sought damages for the wrongful death of their family members, Sidney and Thomas Smith, who died as a result of electrocution after they pulled a portable grain auger into an overhead powerline maintained by defendant, Home Light & Power Co. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Home Light on their products liability claim. We affirm.
Plaintiffs brought claims against Home Light, the installer and designer of the overhead powerline, based on negligence, products liability, and carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity. They also asserted a products liability claim against the manufacturer of the grain auger.. Prior to trial, the court granted summary judgment to Home Light on the products liability and abnormally dangerous activity claims. At trial, the plaintiffs proceeded with a claim against Home Light based on negligence and a claim against the manufacturer based on products liability. Prior to closing arguments, plaintiffs settled their claim against the manufacturer, and the case was submitted to the jury only on plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Home Light. The jury returned a verdict absolving Home Light of negligence.
While conceding that summary judgment was appropriate on the abnormally dangerous activity claim, see Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107, 570 P.2d 239 (1977), plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the grant of summary judgment on the products liability claim was error.
Plaintiffs argue that electricity, as well as its transmission facilities, constitute “products” within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the distribution of electricity is a service, not a product. We agree that electricity itself is a product, but conclude that its distribution is a service.
In Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 87 Wis.2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979), the court held that electricity is a “product” within the meaning of § 402A. The court determined that electricity is “a form of energy that can be made or produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be used as an energy source for heat, power and light and is distributed in the stream of commerce. The distribution might well be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordinary user, is a consumable product.”
We adopt this approach both as to the characterization of electricity as a product and as to the characterization of the distribution system as a service. Wirth v. Mayrath Industries, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 789 (N.D.1979); Kemp v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 44 Wis.2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 *790Mich.App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975) are to the same effect.
The result reached by the application of these principles, however, depends upon the facts of each case. Plaintiffs’ products liability claim is premised on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) which states:
“One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.”
The sale of a product is fundamental to a strict liability claim. St. Luke’s Hospital v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975). Because the law does not require a manufacturer to be the insurer of its products, the scope of liability under § 402A is limited. Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo.1982).
Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the product, i.e., the electricity, was defective. Rather, they allege that Home Light had installed an unreasonably and dangerously defective electrical distribution system. Since the distribution system for electricity is a service, not a product, these allegations do not state a claim for relief under § 402A. The negligence issues have already been presented to the jury under proper instruction, and are not before us for review. Accordingly, summary judgment for the defendant on the products liability claim was proper.
The plaintiffs’ contention that the jury verdict was tainted by the injudicious conduct of the trial court is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
BERMAN, J., concurs. TURSI, J., dissents.