concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s view that the violation by Floyd of § 12-47-128(l)(a), C.R.S., in giving beer to the minor driver, Herbert, constitutes negligence per se if Herbert’s drinking of the beer was a cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
By prohibiting the dispensation of alcoholic beverages to minors, the General Assembly has recognized that, lacking the experience and judgment of an adult, a minor may, as a result of consuming the beverage, cause injury to himself or others. It therefore’has imposed a duty, the breach of which is not only a crime, but also violates the duty of care the supplier owes to the minor himself or members of the public who may. suffer injury because of the minor’s consumption of the alcoholic beverage. It is therefore the consumption of the beverage by the minor and the resulting injury that makes the statutory breach of duty actionable in tort.
It is for this reason that I dissent to that portion of the majority’s holding that the violation by Skip’s of its statutory duty makes it liable if such breach “caused damage to Bartley’s legally protected interest.” Skip’s did not sell the beer Herbert, the minor whose driving injured the plaintiff.
If the minor of whom Skip’s had knowledge and to whom it sold the beer had, as a result of his consumption, caused the injury, Skip’s would have indeed been liable. However, the rule adopted today by the majority would make one who supplies beer to a minor liable for the actions of anyone to whom that minor might ultimately give or sell the beer, minor or adult.
To hold the supplier liable for the actions of the minor to whom it sold beer and of whom it had knowledge makes sense on the theory that it was charged with knowledge that such minor would consume the beer. But to hold it liable because a third person, unknown to the supplier, consumes it and as a result causes damage goes, in my view, far beyond the duty imposed by the statute. The majority’s rule would make Skip’s liable even if Floyd had given the beer to an adult to whom Skip’s might have directly sold the beer with impunity.
Therefore, although I agree with the majority’s reversal as to Floyd, I would affirm as to the dismissal of Skip’s.