On Petition eor Rehearing
Before Warner, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Lusk, Brand, Latourette and Perry, Justices. *366BOSSMAN, J.The defendant-respondent, Arnold L. Conty, has filed a paper in this canse which we will treat as a petition for a rehearing. In it Mr. Conty expresses a belief that onr decision failed to give heed to the contentions which he contributed when he submitted his brief. The latter, scarcely seven pages long, was pro-pared by Mr. Couty, who is not a member of the bar.
We bestowed upon this appeal painstaking care before we reached our conclusion. When we stated in our decision the issues submitted by the appeal, we had in mind Mr. Couty’s contentions, as well as those which came from the other parties. Before reaching our decision, we examined not only all of the contentions advanced by the parties, but carried our analysis beyond the scope of their briefs and citations. We inferred that this ease might be a harbinger of others arising out of the recurring developments in the employer-employee relationship.
Mr. Couty believes that we overlooked the constitutional provisions upon which he depended. In his brief he said: “One issue before the court is to determine whether or not the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must be in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.” Obviously, it must be.
Next, Mr. Couty’s brief declared: “A second issue before the court is the power of the courts of Oregon arising under Art. 6, of the Constitution.” At that point Mr. Couty quoted Article VI, which says, in part: “This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof * * # shall be the supreme law of the land.” No one connected with this case has challenged the validity of the *367Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (TaftHartley). We gave that act full effect as “the supreme law of the land. ” We do not understand that Mr. Couty claims that we misinterpreted the act.
Mr. Couty next declares: “A third issue before the court is odd, indeed. An attempt to delegate the jurisdiction of justiciable cause, in this case over the employee’s wages, to the collective bargaining agreement has been successful as evidenced by court decisions cited by counsel for the appellants. Such court decisions are in error.” Mr. Couty’s brief contains no citations whatever to any court decisions, textbook or to any statute. We believe that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 does not attempt to delegate to any union jurisdiction over any “justiciable cause.” The part of it which is germane to this case manifests no concern whatever over any “justiciable cause” but defines and places limitations upon the authority which may be exercised by a union. Its purpose is to facilitate orderly bargaining and to define the subjects which are liable to collective bargaining.
Finally, Mr. Couty cites the part of Article I, § 10, Constitution of the United States, which says: “No state shall * * *; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” He argues that the provisions just quoted enabled every employee of the Coos Bay Lumber Company to demand payment to him in “gold and silver” of the wage increase granted by the collective bargaining agreement.
The difficulty with the contention just mentioned is that the wage increase and the provision for a health and social welfare program were complementary to each other. The provision for a wage increase was the means whereby the grant of the other benefit was to be financed. No employee was at liberty to accept one *368of them and reject the other. The collective bargaining agreement provided:
“Upon execution of this agreement in his behalf by the Union and so far as is consistent with law each employee covered by this agreement authorizes and directs Employer to deduct from his earnings each month the sum of not more than 7%^ for each hour worked by him and pay said sum to such insurance carrier, * * *.”
Accordingly, if the agreement had not been “consistent with law”, the wage increase would have been payable to the employees, including Mr. Couty, and Article I, § 10, would have fixed the medium of payment. But, since the agreement was valid, all of the employees received the benefit of the health and welfare insurance program. The cost of that benefit was precisely the same as the wage increase, and, therefore, no debt to any employee, payable in gold and silver, resulted from the wage increase. No employee could reject the health and welfare insurance program and, since its cost completely absorbed the wage increase, the latter yielded nothing upon which Article I, § 10, could operate.
It was reasons of the above kind that brought us to our previous decision. We are satisfied that the latter is sound. We have given careful attention to the attack upon our decision, but abide by the latter.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.