concurring:
I concur separately, as it is necessary to respond to the concurrence of Justice Springer.
Justice Springer states: “I am unwilling to sign the majority opinion because I believe that formal criminal prosecution of prepubescent children who engaged in childish sexual experimentation approaches the ridiculous.” I quote this sentence because of its many implications with which I cannot agree and to which I must respond.
First, I do not agree that this court is in a position to dismiss the conduct as merely “childish sexual experimentation.” This *240court heard none of the testimony. The district court, as the trier of fact, is the tribunal which has, or can have, a clear picture of what occurred. To suggest that the district court lacks the ability to discriminate between children who are expressing their natural curiosity in a harmless way, and children who are engaging in behavior that would be criminal if they were adults, is an insult. I have no dispute with the statement quoted from California Juvenile Court Practice: Delinquent Minors to the effect that sexual discovery and experimentation is part of the normal process of growing up and that courts should use discretion in invoking juvenile court jurisdiction. However, that discretion is lodged in the juvenile court, which hears the testimony, and not in this court which sees only a cold record.
Second, I do not agree that a six-, seven- or eight-year-old is capable of consenting to sexual acts with an eleven- or twelve-year-old. There is a major difference in power between the two. The testimony was that Scott started sexual activity when the girl was six years old and continued for two years. The disparity in the level of maturity, and especially sexual maturity, between those ages is very great. Moreover, our legislature has determined that even a fifteen-year-old is incapable of consenting to sexual activities with someone three years older for the purpose of our criminal statutes. NRS 200.364. It defies logic to suggest that a six-year-old’s sexual activities with an eleven-or-twelve-year-old are consensual.
Third, the record provides no basis whatsoever for characterizing the sexual activity found here as “harmless.” Even though he never heard the witnesses, Justice Springer does not believe that the sexual activity found by the trial judge actually occurred. One of Justice Springer’s reasons for contesting the conclusions of the trial judge, is that there was evidence that the little girl had engaged in other simulated sexual activity with her sister and brother. The testimony was that this activity took place after Scott started molesting the little girl. Even though the district attorney’s office used its discretion in only charging on Scott’s activity after December 1990, there was evidence of earlier molestation. Instead of serving as evidence of Scott’s innocence, the little girl’s later simulation of sexual activity more likely indicates that she had already been indoctrinated, presumably by Scott, in sexual activity. Justice Springer has chosen to describe only the evidence which supports his position.
The fact that the little girl later engaged in simulated sexual activity with other smaller children belies Justice Springer’s characterization of the activity as “harmless children’s sexual play.” The repetition of this inappropriate sexual behavior by this *241victim upon others is precisely what our juvenile justice system aims to curtail.
Justice Springer also regards it as telling that no one else witnessed the acts to which the little girl testified. It should be apparent that forbidden sexual acts are seldom performed in public. It has long been established that one person’s testimony found credible by the trier of fact can support a judgment. See Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 107, 867 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1994). Justice Springer has no basis for disputing the finding of the trier of fact.
There are other statements in Justice Springer’s concurrence with which I disagree. It should be apparent that juvenile court is not criminal court. Neither the purposes nor the potential consequences are the same. It is not difficult to understand the difference between a non-probational felony with a life prison sentence and an adjudication of delinquency with three years of probation during which the perpetrator is to participate in family therapy and a counseling group. Juvenile court is supposed to teach juveniles the difference between appropriate and inappropriate behavior with the hope of preventing their getting into the adult criminal system. This purpose cannot be accomplished if all sexual activity between children is dismissed as mere games or a waste of time.
I submit that this type of proceeding is a waste of time only if the perpetrator did not get the help that is needed to teach him the difference between appropriate and inappropriate sexual conduct.