concurring in part and dissenting in part: I express my concurrence in the court’s reversal of this case for the reasons. *919stated in the opinion, but I must respectfully dissent from what is held in paragraph 4 (2) of the syllabus and the corresponding portion of the opinion.
It is not a burdensome or technical requirement to hold that an employer describe the handicap of an employee with such specificity so as to relate his physical or mental impairment to the diseases or conditions prescribed in K. S. A. 44-566. The employer is possessed with knowledge of all medical evidence of a handicapped employee’s prior impairment, and his notice should affirmatively disclose the impairment is one of the sixteen described in the statute. The description of the handicap should name or list the impairment, such as “arthritis,” “cardiac disease,” and “physical deformity.” The latter term is clearly ambiguous and it is hoped the Legislature will define the coverage intended. Under the director’s Rule No. 51-1-19 (e), the burden of proving the employee was handicapped as listed with the director and that it is a handicap enumerated in the statute, is on the employer.
In the instant case, I have no trouble with the listing of claimant’s handicap with respect to his low back. As the court indicates, arthritis is one of the enumerated diseases or conditions of prior impairment. But the description of the impairment to the claimant’s left knee should have been described as “physical deformity of the left knee resulting from osteochondritis.” Clearly, a description of a prior impairment such as “back injury” or “knee injury” should not entitle an employer to the benefits of the Second Injury Fund, or permit the introduction of expert testimony to show the claimed injury is one of those listed in the statute.
Fontron, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.