(dissenting):
Given a common sense application, the plain language of the agreement would require affirmance. The provision that the agreement “ * * * is conditional upon Buyer’s purchase, upon terms satisfactory to Buyer, of adjacent property * * * ” (emphasis added) is clear and meaningful. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “purchase” as “the acquiring of title to or property in anything for a price * * * a buying for money or its equivalent * * * something obtained for a price in money or its equivalent.” (Emphasis added) The following cases hold that the word “purchase” means “acquisition.” Marsh v. Lott, 8 Cal.App. 384, 97 P. 163 (1908); Anderson v. Badger, 84 Cal.App.2d 736, 191 P.2d 768 (1948); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949); Bowles v. Nelson-Ricks Creamery Co., 66 F.Supp. 885 (Idaho 1946); City of Enterprise v. Smith, 62 Kan. 815, 62 P. 324 (1900); Cobb v. Webb, 26 Tex.Civ.App. 467, 64 S.W. 792 (1901).
The Buyer’s prerogative under the escape clause of the agreement was reserved for precisely such eventuality as the Teach controversy. This protection should not be smothered by a strained construction reading in ambiguities, nor should it be destroyed by judicial addendum to the agreement.
*232The judgment should be affirmed as the summary judgment should have been when the first appeal was before us. I believe the former decision was palpably erroneous and the doctrine of the law of the case should not apply. Sibley v. Jeffreys, 81 Ariz. 272, 305 P.2d 427 (1956).