specially concurring:
I specially concur. My concern reflects my deep conviction that fundamental to our state constitution is the doctrine of the separation of powers, a corollary of which, in my opinion, is the operation of checks and balances. Since the court today leaves open the question of the Governor’s check by the right to budget approval, I add my vote to the announced opinion of the court.
ADDENDUM
The petition for rehearing by the attorney general presents new and expanded arguments which he admitted were not advanced in his original brief. Thus we issue this addendum to discuss them.
It is noted that in 1970 the people passed a constitutional amendment {Colo. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 22) which specified that the executive directors of principal departments would be exempt from civil service. In 1971, pursuant to that amendment, the legislature further amended the Administrative Organization Act of 1968 and provided that “The chief engineer shall be employed by the executive director of the state department of highways pursuant to the constitution and laws of the state.” Colo. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 29, 120-2-4 at 107. It further provided that the executive director of the state department of highways was to be appointed by the Governor and to serve at his pleasure. Id., 3-28-26 at 105. That same legislation reenacted the type 2 transfer of the chief engineer to the department of highways.
The type 2 transfer provides:
“When any department, institution, or other, agency, or part thereof, is transferred by a type 2 or type 3 transfer to a principal department under the provisions of this article, its prescribed powers, duties, and functions, including rule-making, regulation, licensing, promulgation of rules, rates, regulations, and standards, and the rendering of findings, orders, and adjudications are transferred to the head of the principal department into which the department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, has been transferred.” Section 24-1-105(4), C.R.S. 1973.
The attorney general argues that the chief engineer cannot be subject to the directives of the commission because the chief engineer is appointed by the director and contends the director now has all the powers of the chief engineer.
The attorney general contends that under this statute the powers, duties, and functions of the chief engineer were transferred to the princi*75pal head of the department, that is, the executive director of the department of highways.
The attorney general recognizes that this legislative action and the interpretation he urges would create a patent conflict with those powers clearly vested in the highway commission to direct the chief engineer. The attorney general would resolve this conflict by the application of section 24-1-104, C.R.S. 1973, which provides:
“. . . Where a conflict arises as to the administration of the policies of the executive branch of the state government, such conflict shall be resolved by the governor, and the decision of the governor shall be final.” However, the ostensible conflict between the respective powers vested in the highway commission and the executive director of the department of highways is one of law, not of policy. Thus the resolution of this conflict is for the judiciary, by application of recognized principles of statutory construction.
Our primary objective in interpreting these seemingly conflicting statutes is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Frohlick Crane Service, Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 510 P.2d 891 (1973); Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223, 493 P.2d 651 (1972). In our search for legislative intent, the statutes must be read and considered as a whole, and the meaning of any one section must be gathered from a consideration of the entire legislative scheme. In Re Interrogatories by the Governor, 163 Colo. 113, 429 P.2d 304 (1967); Wheeler v. Rudolph, 162 Colo. 410, 426 P.2d 762 (1967).
We are not here confronted with just a 26-mile segment of a previously designated connecting link in the interstate highway system. What we decide affects the entire legislative plan for a complete highway system. Running through Title 43, C.R.S. 1973, is a common thread — a coordinated series of five articles which will insure for the people of this state an entire network of state, federal and county highways so linked as to provide efficient connections to every section of the state. To accomplish this was created and continued in existence a policy-making commission composed of representatives from eight districts into which the state was divided. In addition there is an at-large member. They serve staggered terms so as to insure that this body politic will have continuity. This is reasonable because of continuity and experience from the initial plans to completion of a highway.
An analysis of other statutes, particularly sections 43-1-104, 43-1-105, and 43-1-106, C.R.S. 1973, indicates that the legislature ■ intended that the chief engineer be responsible to the commission in well-defined areas, because they set for that position highly professional engineering qualifications while providing for no expertise in engineering as a prerequisite to appointment as the director.
We hold that the commission continues to be empowered to direct the chief engineer in the areas which will enable it to “exercise its prescribed statutory powers, duties and functions . . . independently of the *76head of the principal department [in this case, the executive director of the department of highways].” Section 24-1-105(1), C.R.S. 197.3.
MR. JUSTICE LEE withdraws his participation in the original opinion, and he and MR. JUSTICE HODGES do not participate in consideration of the petition for rehearing nor in this addendum.