I dissent from the majority’s unwarranted interference with the Adult Authority’s term-fixing discretion.
The Legislature has conferred broad discretion on the Authority to fix terms of incarceration and parole on the merits of each case. (In re Grey (1974) 11 Cal.3d 554, 556 [114 Cal.Rptr. 104, 522 P.2d 664].) “The members of the Adult Authority presumably are selected for their, experience and expertise in the field of prisoner rehabilitation; the Authority’s discretionary determinations are not to be lightly overridden.” (Id.)
When the Authority had indisputable jurisdiction over petitioner for the rest of his life, it tentatively determined he should serve an additional three years and nine months in prison and on parole prior to discharge. The majority does not contend this determination constituted an abuse of discretion; in light of petitioner’s dismal record, such a contention would be frivolous. Nevertheless, overriding the Authority’s determination that this repeated felon and parole violator was not ready for release, the majority treats the Authority’s action as retroactively discharging petitioner.
Because of petitioner’s incorrigible conduct, the facts of this case are complex. But briefly: On 8 October 1970, the Adult Authority fixed petitioner’s two life-maximum terms. Petitioner’s “C” term (robbery) was fixed at 10 years, to run concurrently with his “A” and “B” terms, resulting in retroactive discharge of the “C” term on 8 January 1969. Petitioner’s “D” term (escape) was fixed at five and one-half years, to run consecutively to his “A,” “B” and “C” terms. As the majority concedes, “The Authority intended by this order to cause the ‘D’ term to commence retroactively as of January 8, 1969, the date of the discharge from the ‘C’ term.” (Ante, p. 807.)
The majority concludes the Adult Authority misconceived the legal effect of the “D” term. According to the majority, the “D” term was consecutive to the “A” and “B” terms, but not to the “C.” Under this theory, petitioner began serving an indeterminate sentence on the “D” term in either 1961 or 1963, rather than 1969. Accordingly, fixing the “D” term at five and one-half years in 1970 granted petitioner a retroactive discharge of that term.
However, the Authority clearly did not intend to retroactively discharge the “D” term. It intended to fix a term that would expire in the *814future, five and one-half years after the “C” term expired in 1969. Although the Authority technically may have been unable to treat the “D” term as consecutive to the “C” term, it certainly had the power to establish a tentative discharge date for the “D” term by using as a reference point the discharge date fixed for the “C” term.
I would deny the writ.