(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent. I believe the opinion in McConnell v. Commission of Finance1 correctly expressed the proper interpretation of Section 35-1-62, U.C.Á. 1953. Even conceding that Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc.,2 is the law in this jurisdiction, it is inconceivable that the provisions of Section 35-1-62 may be so construed as to permit a contingency fee of one-third of a compensation award to an attorney from the Insurance Fund. The result in the instant case particularly illustrates the absurdity of the situation; the Insurance Fund in order to be reimbursed must pay a greater sum for attorneys’ fees than it has already disbursed under the award.
The present construction of Section 35 — 1— 62 presents an anomalous situation and excludes from consideration the precept that all sections of an act should be construed together so as to harmonize apparently conflicting provisions. Under Section 35-1-87, U.C.A.1953, the Industrial Commission is empowered to regulate and fix the fees of attorneys. In construing this section, this court stated that in a compensation proceeding a different measure should be applied than in contingent fee cases in court or upon contracts based upon unliquidated claims.3 This court explained that if an injured employee be entitled to recover under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the amount is fixed and definite and not *337contingent; and therefore, fees for attorneys are not measured by the same standard as in legal proceeding before the courts.
I cannot uphold an interpretation which creates such a patent inconsistency, namely, in making an initial award, attorneys’ fees are set at a nominal standard by the Industrial Commission, but if reimbursement from a third party be in issue, an unlimited amount of the Insurance Fund may be consumed for an attorney’s fees.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of CALLISTER, C. J.. 13 Utah 2d 395, 396-397, 375 P.2d 394 (1962).
. 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 (1967).
. Ellis v. Industrial Comm., 91 Utah 432, 446-447, 64 P.2d 363 (1937).