specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because it is clear in this case, as it has been in all the cases spawned by the new Phillips-Lukens rule, that the plea agreement’s lack of specificity relative to restitution has nothing to do with the vol-*172untariness of the plea. Thus, I agree that the defendant is not entitled to withdraw from his plea. However, I disagree with several other aspects of the majority opinion.
I have previously expressed the view that the Phillips-Lukens rule is both unnecessary and unwise. See State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 482, 747 P.2d 1176, 1181 (1987) (Moeller, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). At the time, I believed Phillips represented, at most, either a new interpretation of an existing state rule of criminal procedure or the promulgation of a new state rule of criminal procedure. Although some of the language in Phillips and Lukens hints that the new rule has a constitutional basis, the instant casq is the first time the court has undertaken to accord full-blown constitutional status to the new rule. This buttressing of the basis for the rule requires that I restate my objections, because I can find nothing in the due process clause to justify this new rule. No other state agrees with the majority that a Phillips rule is mandated by the due process clause of the federal constitution. Many have rejected such a suggestion, either expressly or by implication. See, e.g., Humber v. State, 481 So.2d 452, 454 (Ala.Crim.App.1985); State v. Kennedy, 327 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Minn.1982).
Moreover, federal courts clearly do not adhere to the proposition that a Phillips rule is mandated by the due process clause. This is no more evident than in the 1985 amendment to Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) ... When applicable, that the Court may also order him to make restitution to any victim of the offense.
The advisory comment to this amendment explicitly states that neither an exact amount nor an outer limit of restitution need be stated to the defendant:
Because [this legislation] contemplates that the amount of the restitution to be ordered will be ascertained later, in the sentencing process, this amendment to Rule 11(c)(1) merely requires that the defendant be told of the Court’s power to order restitution. The exact amount or upper limit cannot and need not be stated at the time of the plea.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) advisory committee’s note. This comment was cited with approval in United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 248-49 (4th Cir.1988) (failure to advise defendant at plea proceedings of possible restitution order deemed harmless in light of larger potential maximum fine); see also United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.1986) (omission of a restitution warning was a variance that did not affect substantial rights and must be disregarded as harmless error).
The majority supports its argument that Phillips is constitutionally required by stating: “Phillips defines a right under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Because a guilty plea waives constitutionally protected rights a defendant must thoroughly understand the rights that he is waiving.” I agree that a guilty plea waives constitutional rights and that a defendant must thoroughly understand the constitutional rights he is waiving. It does not follow that a defendant has a constitutional right to have the amount of restitution set forth in the plea agreement.
The majority cites McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) as support for its assertion that the Phillips rule has a constitutional basis. McCarthy sought to have his guilty plea set aside claiming the trial court did not comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. McCarthy is expressly limited to an interpretation of Rule 11. Although McCarthy does note that constitutional rights can only be validly waived if the waiver is voluntarily and knowingly made, the case involves no issue of restitution and provides no constitutional support for a Phillips rule.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Phillips did not create a *173new rule, but “merely applied a settled rule to different facts.” At 170, 765 P.2d at 994. This statement will come as a great surprise to the trial judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys of Arizona, who had routinely participated in plea agreements which almost invariably did not comply with Phillips. The statement of the court of appeals in this case is entirely accurate:
Suffice it to say that until Phillips, plea agreements seldom, if ever, stated the amount of restitution. Trial courts consistently accepted pleas without specific amounts of restitution and thereafter, at the time of sentencing, ordered the defendant' to pay a specific amount. In fact, the amount or range of restitution is often unknown until a pre-sentence investigation has been conducted, a procedure which does not occur until after a plea is entered.
Adams, 156 Ariz. at 91, 750 P.2d at 34 (Ct.App.1988).
No pve-Phillips case has yet arisen in which a trial judge, a prosecutor, a defense counsel, or a defendant objected to a plea proceeding on the basis that it did not comply with what is now known as the Phillips rule. This is eloquent testimony that Phillips represents a departure from established practice. This court itself, contrary to its present assertion, has earlier recognized that there was a “change in law wrought by Phillips.” State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. at 479, 747 P.2d at 1178 (1987). In my view, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Phillips-Lukens was a new rule. As a new rule, it was entirely appropriate for the court to limit its application to a prospective-only basis.
Thus, the majority and I arrive at the same conclusion: the defendant cannot withdraw from his plea agreement. For the reasons stated, however, I respectfully dissent from the reasoning by which the majority arrives at our common conclusion.
CAMERON, J., agrees with the special concurrence of MOELLER, J.