I dissent. The majority’s holding that retirement contributions are subject to the limitation of section 1 of article XIII B of the California Constitution is based entirely on a literal reading of the language of section 5 of article XIII B (hereafter section 5) and the rule of statutory construction that a specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern over a more general provision relating to the same subject. That is, even though retirement contributions may be classified as an indebtedness under subdivision (a) of section 9 of article XIII B (hereafter section 9(a)), the majority conclude that section 5 must prevail because it refers specifically to contributions to retirement funds. In the view of the majority, the section 5 inclusion of retirement fund contributions is an exception to the general provision of section 9(a).
This holding is not only in violation of well-established rules of statutory construction, but is contrary to the intent of the voters in adopting article XIIIB of the state Constitution (hereafter article XIIIB). It is clear from the legislative history of that provision that the voters intended to exclude retirement contributions as an indebtedness under section 9(a). They were specifically told in the ballot pamphlet analysis by the Legislative Analyst that the government’s liability to make payments into a retirement fund was an “indebtedness” under article XIII B. This statement is a persuasive indication of the intent of the voters since, as the majority recognize, it must be assumed that they considered it in voting on the measure.
The majority reject the conclusion that logically follows from the Legislative Analyst’s statement. They cast doubt on its correctness because it is a “nonjudicial interpretation” of the language of article XIII B. But this may be said of any statement in the ballot pamphlet. In attempting to discern the intent of the voters, the legal persuasiveness of the analysis is not the standard; the purpose of consulting the ballot pamphlet is to determine what the voters intended, assuming, as we must, that they considered the statements made therein. The majority find the Legislative Analyst’s conclusion to be unpersuasive because “there is no indication” that he considered the language of section 5 in making his analysis. But there is no reason to suppose that he informed the voters that pension contributions are an indebtedness under article XIII B without considering the other provisions of the article, including section 5. The issue is not whether he was correct in his analysis of the measure in the hindsight of a court considering the issue more than a decade after it was adopted, but the understanding of the voters as to the meaning of these provisions.
Another reason given by the majority for rejecting the Legislative Analyst’s conclusion is that it contradicts section 5. But this is circular reasoning, for it assumes the answer to the question at issue. The problem posed by *586this case is whether pension contributions are excluded from the spending limitation as an indebtedness under section 9(a), or whether they are included in view of the language of section 5. To conclude, as do the majority, that contributions are not an indebtedness because such a determination would be contrary to the meaning of section 5, presupposes that section 5 prevails over section 9(a). That, of course, is the very issue under consideration.
In sum, there is no escaping the fact that the voters were expressly told by the Legislative Analyst that pension contributions were exempt from the spending limitation under article XIII B. The majority, instead of accepting the fact that this was the voters’ understanding and attempting to harmonize sections 5 and 9(a) in accordance with that understanding, hold that section 5 dominates, thereby disregarding the intent of the electorate.
The result reached by the majority is particularly inappropriate in the present case because sections 5 and 9(a) may be harmonized so as to give effect to both provisions. The majority disregard a rule of construction critical in the present context, i.e., that a court must attempt to reconcile provisions relating to the same subject matter to the extent possible, so as to avoid substantially nullifying the effect of any part of an enactment. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]; County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 58 [233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202]; People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560 [224 Cal.Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585].) The holding that section 5 is an exception to section 9(a) results in practically nullifying the effect of the latter provision. According to the majority’s own analysis, retirement contributions constitute “one of the largest categories of local governmental spending.” Such contributions are undoubtedly indebtedness of the city, a proposition the majority accept, at least for the sake of argument. To assume that the electorate chose in section 9(a) to except all indebtedness existing on January 1, 1979, from the spending limitation,1 but not to include within such indebtedness “one of the largest categories of governmental spending,” results in a significant abrogation of section 9(a).
This consequence is particularly unwarranted in the present case because sections 5 and 9(a) may be reconciled so as to give effect to both provisions. That is, section 5 may be construed as referring to pension funds established *587after January 1, 1979. Section 9(a), on the other hand, applies to funds established prior to that date to fulfill the city’s obligations to meet an “indebtedness.” This construction is consistent with both the language of section 5—it provides that a government entity “may establish” such funds as it “shall deem reasonable and proper,” implying establishment of funds at a future time—and the general rule that constitutional provisions are applied prospectively. (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371]; Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686 [91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17].)
The majority reject an alternate means offered by the Board of Supervisors for the City and County of San Francisco (board) to harmonize the two sections. The board asserts that if the government is required by contract to satisfy its obligation to pay pensions by making appropriations to a fund for that purpose, this constitutes a debt, not subject to the spending limitation under section 9(a). But if no such contractual requirement exists, and the government chooses as a matter of discretion to establish a pension fund as a means of accruing a reserve for the payment of pensions, then this is not an indebtedness, and the contributions to such a fund would be subject to the limitation.
The majority respond to this suggested means of harmonizing the two sections by asserting that section 5 creates an exception to section 9(a), and therefore there is no reason to attempt to harmonize the two sections. As discussed above, however, the view that section 5 is an exception to section 9(a) is untenable because it results in practically negating the effect of the latter provision.
The second answer to the board’s theory offered by the majority is that the city could evade section 5 by “satisfying its contractual obligations.” But this is exactly what section 9(a) requires, if such obligations are indebtedness incurred before January 1, 1979. Contrary to the majority, the board’s suggestion would not nullify the express declaration in section 5 that retirement contributions are subject to limitation, for contributions to a pension fund not required to be established by contract would be included in the limitation.
Finally, in my view Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318 [182 Cal.Rptr. 506, 644 P.2d 192] (Carman), supports the conclusion that retirement contributions are an indebtedness under section 9(a). Carman involved the construction of article XIIIA of the California Constitution (hereafter article XIII A). Subdivision (b) of section 1 of article XIIIA (hereafter subdivision *588(b)) exempts from the 1 percent limit on ad valorem taxes on real property imposed by section 1, subdivision (a) of the article “taxes to pay the interest and redemption charges on . . . any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to January 1, 1978 . . . .” The voters of the City of San Gabriel had, many years prior to 1978, approved a measure authorizing the city to levy a tax to fund the city’s employee retirement system. After article XIII A became effective, the city levied a special tax for that purpose. The plaintiff filed an action alleging that the tax was unconstitutional because it exceeded the 1 percent limit on ad valorem real property taxes.
We held that an employer’s duty to pay pensions promised and earned on terms substantially equivalent to those offered when the employee entered public service was a vested contractual right. Our opinion reasoned that the term “any indebtedness,” as used in subdivision (b), includes obligations arising out of a city’s pension plan, and the term “interest and redemption charges” refers to “the sums . . . necessary to avoid default on obligations to pay money, including those for pensions.” (Carman, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 328; accord, City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1137, 1145-1146 [202 Cal.Rptr. 313]; City of Watsonville v. Merrill (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 185, 193 [186 Cal.Rptr. 857].)
The language of subdivision (b) is similar to that of sections 9(a) and 8(g) of article XIII B. Unless there is some persuasive reason to interpret the provisions in the two articles differently, they should be construed as having the same meaning. Nevertheless the majority assert that the term “indebtedness” has a different meaning in the two provisions because article XIIIA does not have a provision similar to section 5, making contributions to retirement funds subject to the spending limitation.
But the majority fail to point to any substantive difference in a city’s obligations under article XIII A and article XIII B which would justify the conclusion that the duty to pay pensions or to fund a pension system for that purpose constitutes an “indebtedness” under one but not the other. Even if the meaning of the term “indebtedness” may vary, depending on the context in which it is used, the meaning attributed to it must relate to the nature of the obligation involved. Carman points out that the term “indebtedness” encompasses “ ‘obligations which are yet to become due as [well as] those which are already matured’ ” (31 Cal.3d at p. 327), and in support of its conclusion it relies on a case holding that the term “indebtedness” means “a complete and absolute liability to the extent that payment must ultimately be made . . . .” (County of Shasta v. County of Trinity (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 30, 38 [165 Cal.Rptr. 18].) There can be no question that the obligation to *589pay pensions comes within these definitions. It is, therefore, an indebtedness, and is exempt from the spending limitation.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeal noted, articles XIII A and XIII B “are complementary fiscal measures designed to limit the government’s ability to raise and spend tax revenues.” This view is subscribed to by this court. (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 59, fn. 1 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522].) Since, as we held in Carman, a government entity may impose a tax to fiind pension payments without regard to the tax limitation of article XIII A, it is anomalous to hold, as do the majority, that the voters intended to prohibit the use of the funds generated for this purpose without a compensating reduction in other government expenditures.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Under subdivision (g) of section 8 of article XIII B (hereafter section 8(g)), “debt service” is defined as “appropriations required to pay the cost of interest and redemption charges, including the funding of any reserve or sinking fund required in connection therewith, on indebtedness existing or legally authorized as of January 1, 1979.”